The author is a first-rate philosopher of law and justice and his seemingly watertight arguments are always a worthwhile challenge. However, most chapters in this book originated from separately written papers. Although they have been amended before publication in this volume, the separation still shines through. There's not one big argument here which would span the entire book. Instead there are several smaller arguments on a number of weakly connected topics.

I liked part I of this book, which comprises the first six chapters. The author analyzes how legislative assemblies incorporate disagreement and diversity and why legislative acts can be authoritative even in the face of irresolvable dissension. These chapters form a relatively cohesive whole and the author performs a nice general analysis without presupposing familiarity with any particular national legislative institutions.

But I was not equally pleased with parts II and III. In these parts the author engages debate with other works in legal philosophy, especially those of Ronald Dworkin and to a lesser extent John Rawls. The level of rigor and detail is suited for academic papers, but not for a book which strives to reach a wider audience. Some of the chapters also assume more familiarity with the American and British legislative systems than readers from other parts of the world are likely to possess.

In conclusion I can recommend the first part of this book to general readers interested in philosophical questions about legislation. The rest of the book contains far more specialized material with limited relevance for the first part.