...truth, which I can not discuss with detail until my sixth lecture. Let me now say only this, that truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed,...name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there...

...to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience'. Hence his famous definition: 'the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, subsequently glossed, notoriously, as the 'cash-value' of experience.20 This shift from...

...relative, he thought that the most fruitful way to regard it was in terms of usefulness in a broad sense: The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief - in this world, just as certain foods are not only agreeable to our taste, but good for...

...beliefs in stock.6 En tal sentido, lo verdadero viene a ser en última instancia lo útil y provechoso: The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. Surely you must admit this, that if there...

...greatest number of people. William James has defended the first type of consequentialism (1919: 76): The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons'. An example of the second type is Jeremy...

...thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."5 Elsewhere he said, "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."6 His point in analogizing truth to tightness...

...Pragmatism ([ed. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis] [Cambridge, Mass., 1975], p. 42): "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed,...category distinct from good, and coordinate with it." at least two species — appropriate scientific symbols that are sentences, and appropriate artistic...

...really makes a difference in the character of invention. According to the pragmatic tradition, "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good" (James 76), so any truth becomes manifest in good acts. Therefore a pragmatic theory of invention is...

...Shestov. James considers utility as an essential value of selfhood. For example in Pragmatism he writes, "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons" (p. 42). Taking utility as a positive affirmation...

...importance of recalling that truth is an evaluative notion. Truth, he writes, 'is one species of good: The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief ' (1907 [1975: 42]). The difficulties in assessing his position arise because beliefs can...