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gibility to become a citizen and takes the loss of citizenship and puts it over under the expatriation provision.
The CHAIRMAN. That would apply, for instance, to the Bergdoll case ?
Mr. HAZARD. I think so, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And we have had a number of people during the last war that did not go out of the jurisdiction of the United States but were within the jurisdiction and avoided the draft. What disposition has been made of that up to now! Have they been naturalized or are they still being withheld?
Mr. HAZARD. You mean those who came within the terms of this law?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but who avoided the draft.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. And may I say that these provisions were very carefully considered by the representatives of the United States Army and the United States Navy, who aided the advisory committee in the consideration of these measures, and they thought it was very desirable that those provisions be retained in the statute.
Mr. REES. Section 307.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 307 is a restatement of the present basic requirements of character and residence that now appear in the law.
Mr. REES. Is that the same as present law? It just does not seem to read like it. I do not have the present law before me.
Mr. HAZARD. It is the same thing. There is no change in substance.
Subdivision (b) refers to absences from the United States, and so far as subdivision (b) is concerned, it is substantially the same as the present law.
The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean what, Mr. Hazard ?
Mr. HAZARD. It would mean that an alien may be absent from the United States during this period for which he must prove continuous residence, being the 5 years preceding naturalization-I mean 5 years preceding petitioning for naturalization in the usual case, and between the time he files his petition and the final hearing—he may be absent during that period for not more than a period greater than 6 months but less than a year, which would raise only a presumption of the break of residence.
The CHAIRMAN. But there are hundreds, maybe thousands, of cases that are living abroad. American citizens that are still holding down their American citizenship. Now, would you explain the distinction between those cases and these?
Mr. HAZARD. That would have some bearing on whether they retain citizenship, which is treated over in another chapter.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Yes. I beg pardon.
Mr. HAZARD. But in the absence of longer than 6 months but less than a year, it raises a presumption of a break in the continuity of residence, which may be overcome by satisfactory evidence to the court. An absence, however, for a continuous period of a year or more breaks the continuity of residence and necessitates the 5-year period being begun over again, with exceptions in three classes of cases, which are now the law and which have been carried into this law substantially
in the same language, and that is where the absence for a year or more is in the employ of the Government of the United States or in the furtherance of American trade or commerce, or engaged with an American institution of research, recognized as such by the Secretary of Labor.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the law now, is it not?
The CHAIRMAN. That is the law that this committee has amended heretofore, for an entirely different situation.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes.
Mr. Hazard. Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) is part of the same provision we just discussed.
Then subdivision (d) is a clarification of the law in a respect that has given us some difficulty heretofore in determining just what, if any, residence is required in certain classes of cases
The following shall be regarded as residence within the United States within the meaning of this chapter:
(1) Honorable service on vessels owned directly by the Government of the United States, whether or not rendered at any time prior to the applicant's lawful entry into the United States.
Now, those vessels are distinguished from merchant vessels, but these are Government vessels, like possibly the Coast Guard in time of peace or the revenue cutter service, and the provision that service on those vessels may be regarded as residence even though the alien had not been lawfully admitted to the United States under the immigration laws, was based on the theory that if the Government of the United States was willing to accept these aliens in its service, and they had rendered faithful service, then it ought not to raise an issue as to the fact that the entry into the United States originally was not a lawful one.
Mr. REES. That is not the present law?
Mr. Rees. How could that sort of thing come about? How could this Government take on a Frenchman or a German or an Italian or a Greek on a vessel owned by the United States, a Government ship?
Mr. HAZARD. In the first place, there is probably not very much likelihood of many cases of that kind arising.
Mr. REES. You must have had the question come up or you would not have put the thing in the bill.
Mr. HAZARD. There have been a few cases that have arisen from time to time, when men who have been in the service of the United States Government for many years, and rendered faithful service, discovered that they came into the United States without conforming to all of the requirements of the immigration laws.
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Congressman, I think a good many of these vessels at Asiatic stations take on Chinese, Filipinos, and so forth, as mess boys and employees of that character. They enlist them, and then later on the vessel may come to the United States. I think that is the way a great many of those cases arose, from those vessels in foreign service.
The CHAIRMAN. Atlantic Ocean steamship companies, under our present law, must have two-thirds of the crew American citizens.
Mr. REES. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. The others may be aliens, and there are certain men trained in a particular field on the ship, and for many years they have employed one-third of them aliens. These men have been on American ships and they are practically the ship itself. They do the hard work. They come in and go out, come in and go out, year in and year out. This would practically apply to persons of that character.
Mr. HAZARD. Mr. Chairman, may I explain that the following section relates to merchant vessels and requires legal entry into the United States of any aliens who want to claim residence by reason of service on board merchant vessels.
Mr. REES. I can see that, where somebody enters the country legally, I can see why there might be a reason for letting that person claim his time on an American ship, but to have the United States Government own ships and pick up a Greek or an Italian or a Frenchman, or whatever he may be—I do not know why in the first place they would put them on the ships and use them. I can see, however, that if they ever take them on, they probably would be responsible for helping them to become citizens. I cannot see why you would want to take them on in the first place.
Mr. HAZARD. Well, I do not know just what-
Mr. BUTLER. No; they could not be naturalized, because they would not be of the white or African race.
Mr. HAZARD. But conditions might arise where, in an emergency, a man might be needed to fill a ship's complement in some technical position, and we have had some cases where, with no intent to evade the immigration laws, a man may have come in under circumstances that were not lawful, and it is conceivable that a case of that kind might arise, although the probability would be small, I imagine.
Mr. Rees. That gives him legal entry, if he gets on to a Governmentowned ship?
Mr. HAZARD. And is accepted.
Mr. REES. And is accepted on the ship, that gives him legal entry into the United States. And also, whatever time he puts in on the ship applies on his time to become a citizen.
Mr. HAZARD. That would be the result.
Mr. FLOURNOY. That does not seem, as I read it, to give him legal entry.
Mr. HAZARD. Technically, no. He has not complied with the immigration laws, but when it makes him eligible for naturalization, it, in effect, waives the requirements of the immigration law, so far as the nature of his entry is concerned.
Mr. REES. I should think so. Well, that is new law. Mr. HAZARD. That is subdivision (2), immediately following: Continuous service by a seaman on a vessel or vessels whose home port is in the United States and which is of American registry or American-owned, if rendered subsequent to the applicant's lawful entry into the United States for permanent residence and immediately preceding the date of naturalization.
Mr. REES. Why do you say "whose home port is in the United States"? Why do you not say “whose home or residence is in the United States"?
Mr. HAZARD. This is a ship, though. Mr. REES. The ship's home port? Mr. HAZARD. Yes. That is not very different from the present law, which is stated in rather puzzling terms, and this was an attempt to clarify the language, as well as to give service the standing of residence.
Mr. REES. In other words, a man who comes in here legally, and who is employed on a ship that flies the American flag, can use whatever time he is employed on the ship to apply to his citizenship?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; and before the law has not been clear as to that. It left those seamen up in the air, and in many cases it has been rather difficult for them to prove their cases.
Mr. Rees. If he is on an American ship and enters legally? Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Mr. REES. All right. Now No. 3. Mr. HAZARD. Section (3): Residence in the Panama Canal Zone, either while in the service of the armed forces of the United States, or while otherwise in the employ of the United States or of the Panama Railroad Co.: Provided, That the applicant shall have entered the United States lawfully for permanent residence prior to such residence in the Panama Canal Zone.
Mr. REES. Now, if he comes from France and enters legally, then goes down to Panama and gets a job, or goes down and works for the United States Government, or works for this railroad company, or serves in the armed forces of the United States—but now he is an alien, is he not?
Mr. HAZARD. But this merely gives him the opportunity of counting that time as residence in the United States; otherwise, many of these people who would be in the Panama Canal Zone serving the armed forces or working for the United States Government in territory over which we have sovereignty or the right of sovereignty, would not be able under present law to become naturalized, because the only cases in which residence in the Panama Canal Zone is regarded as residence for naturalization purposes are those of alien declarants who have served in the United States Army, Navy, or the Philippine Constabulary, who have been honorably discharged and have been accepted for either the military or the naval service of the United States on condition that they become citizens, a very narrow class of persons.
Mr. REES. This man does not have to declare his intention to become a citizen of the United States if he gets in the Army.
Mr. HAZARD. This is merely saying that persons in those various categories who are in the Panama Canal Zone are regarded as residing in the United States, if they conform to the other requirements. It is merely a definition of residence, saying that what is not now residence in the Panama Canal Zone, in a large variety of cases will be regarded as residence hereafter.
The CHAIRMAN. That does not waive his right to go through the natural process of naturalization?
Mr. HAZARD. Not at all.
The CHAIRMAN. He has got to take out his first papers and wait 5 years, and all that?
Mr. HAZARD. This merely says, just as it says in the preceding subdivision, that presence in a particular place, or residence in a particu
far place, will be regarded as residence for naturalization purposes, just as service on board an American merchant ship.
Mr. REES. How does the Frenchman get to the Canal Zone so he can live there?
The CHAIRMAN. He would have to first come into the country legally. Mr. REES. Where?
The CHAIRMAN. Into a regular port of entry, and if he resides in Iowa or New York or Pennsylvania and he is a man of some responsibility and some competency, he has got a job in the Panama Canal Zone, under present law if he goes down there he can work for our Government, the Government of the United States, for 20 years, and it does not stop counting his residence for citizenship if he is a desirable citizen. So therefore, the only question involved here, as I see it, as was well put by the witness, is that it is just a waiver of residence in the States. If he is working for the Government in the Panama Canal Zone, that equals residence in the State where he resides.
Mr. HAZARD. In this provision these persons are actually there and are residing there. The only thing we do is to say that if they are there and are residing there, under
these circumstances we will count that as residence for naturalization purposes.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not waive his quota, though? You do not waive the necessity for his lawful admission under the immigration law of 1924. You do not waive his first papers, his second papers. You simply provide a means that if he is actually employed by our Government in a place which is no man's land, practically, for the purposes of citizenship, that shall count for him?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Section 308, subdivision (a): As to each period and place of residence in the State in which the petitioner resides at the time of filing the petition, during the entire period of at least six months immediately preceding the date of filing the petition, there shall be included in the petition the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses, citizens of the United States, stating that each has personally known the petitioner to have been a resident at such place for such period, and that the petitioner is and during all such period has been a person of good moral character.
May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman, that in the provisions of section 307, the general requirements as to residence and character and attachment to the principles of the Constitution, I should have mentioned that there is a change in the requirements.
Mr. REES. Six months.
Mr. HAZARD. Six months in the State instead of six months in the county in which the petitioner resides. That is a change that I did not mention and it should have been mentioned. The reason for that is that the present requirement that the 6 months immediately preceding the date of filing of the petition for naturalization must be in the county in which he resides at the time of filing the petition would mean that up in your district, Congressman Dickstein, if a man resided in one part of metropolitan New York, in Manhattan, for instance, for 5 months and then moved over to Brooklyn, he would have to remain in Brooklyn for 6 months before he could declare his intention for naturalization.
The CHAIRMAN. And he would be in the same city, under the same domination and same jurisdiction.
Mr. HAZARD. This would relieve a great deal of hardship there.