to return to jail in case said petition is not granted." The defendant, after the passing of this resolution, gave the bond required by it, and, on the twenty-eighth of the same month, was discharged from imprisonment, and has ever since been at large, out of the custody of the sheriff. In February, 1816, the legislature, upon a due hearing, granted the prayer of the defendant, and passed the following resolution: "On the petition of Nathan Haile, of Foster, praying, for the reasons therein stated, that the benefit of an act, passed in June, 1756, for the relief of insolvent debtors, may be extended to him, voted, that the prayer of the said petition be, and the same is hereby, granted." By the granting of the prayer of the petition the condition of the second bond given to the sheriff was complied with, and the bond became extinguished.

The defendant afterwards proceeded to take the benefit of the insolvent act revived in his favor, according to the statute provisions, and received, in due form from the proper court, a judgment "that he should be, and thereby was, fully discharged of and from all debts, contracts, and demands, of every name, nature, and kind, outstanding against him, debts due to the state aforesaid, or to the United States, excepted, and from all imprisonment, arrest, and restraint of his person therefor." The insolvent act of 1756 is not considered in force as a general and permanent law, but the legislature of Rhode Island has been in the constant habit of entertaining petitions like the present, and has, by the general law of 1798, (now in force,) prescribed the mode by which such petitions are to be regulated, and in case of granting the prayer of the petition, the course is to pass an act or resolution, giving the benefit of the act of 1756 to the petitioner, and thus, in effect, reviving it for his particular benefit. So that the mode pursued to obtain the discharge of the defendant, as set out in the pleas, was according to the established course of proceeding in cases of insolvency, and in conformity to the laws of Rhode Island, by which the defendant was discharged from all his contracts, and from imprisonment.

The effect of this discharge upon the original judgment against Haile is not now drawn in question. The only inquiry is, whether he has violated the condition of his bonds of March, 1814, by going at large, under the authority and sanction of the resolutions of the legislature, as before stated. His bond required him to remain a true prisoner, until he should be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape during the time of restraint. The bond is not that he shall remain a true prisoner until the debt shall be paid. Nor is there anything upon the face of the bond, or if we look out of it to the known and established laws and usages in that state, calling for such a construction. A lawful discharge, in its general signification, will extend to, and be satisfied by, any discharge obtained under the legislative authority of the state. And it is not unreasonable to consider such prison bonds as given subject to the ordinary and well known practice in Rhode Island, for the legislature to entertain petitions in the manner pursued by the defendant to obtain the benefit of the insolvent act of 1756, in the manner in which these petitions are received and proceeded upon, as prescribed by the act of 1798. And, indeed, this cannot strictly be considered a private contract between the parties, but rather as a statute engagement, imposed by an act of the legislature, and as a part of the process under which the defendant was held as a prisoner. And with the full knowledge of this regulation and practice, it is hardly to be presumed, that such discharges were not understood to be lawful discharges. And the same remarks will apply to the term "escape" in the bond, which can mean no more than a departure from the limits without lawful authority. Suppose the legislature, after the execution of this bond, had enlarged the jail limits? It surely would not have been an escape for the defendant to have availed himself of the enlarged limits, and gone beyond his former bounds. And yet, if the limits prescribed at the time. the bond was executed are to govern the effect and operation of the bond, it would be an escape. Such bonds may well be

considered as an enlargement of the prison limits, and a mere modification of the imprisonment, according to the provisions of the laws of Rhode Island.

Can it be doubted but the legislatures of the states, so far as relates to their own process, have a right to abolish imprisonment for debt altogether, and that such law might extend to present as well as future imprisonment? We are not aware that such a power in the states has ever been questioned. And if such a general law would be valid under the constitution of the United States, where is the prohibition to be found, that denies to the state of Rhode Island the right of applying the same remedy to individual cases? This is a measure which must be regulated by the views of policy and expediency entertained by the state legislatures. Such laws act merely upon the remedy, and that in part only. They do not take away the entire remedy, but only so far as imprisonment forms a part of such remedy. The doctrine of this court in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield (4 Wheaton's Reports, 200) applies with full force to the present case. "Imprisonment of the debtor," say the court, "may be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be allowed as a means for inducing him to perform it. But a state may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold it altogether, and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair its obligation."

In whatever light, therefore, the question is viewed, no breach of the condition of the bond, according to its true sense and interpretation, has been committed. The liberation of the defendant from confinement, on his giving bond to the sheriff to return to jail in case his petition for a discharge should not be granted, was sanctioned by the due exercise of legislative power, and was analogous to extending to him more enlarged jail limits, and would not be considered an escape. And both this and the final discharge, so far, at all events, as it related to the imprisonment of the defendant, affected the remedy in part

only, and was in the due and ordinary exercise of the powers vested in the legislature of Rhode Island, and was a lawful discharge, and no escape, and, of course, no breach of the condition of the bond in question.

It must, accordingly, be certified to the circuit court, that the matters set forth in the defendant's amended pleas are sufficient to bar the plaintiff's action.

12 Wh 379.

SATTERLEE v. MATTHEWSON.

JANUARY TERM, 1829.

[2 Peters's Reports, 380-416.]

ONE Elisha Matthewson married the sister of one Elisha Satterlee, and with him, in 1784-5, took possession of some lands in Pennsylvania under a supposed title from the Susquehanna Company. They held the whole tract in common till 1790, when it was agreed that Matthewson should occupy all of the tract west of the Susquehanna river, holding Satterlee's portion thereof as his tenant; while Satterlee was to hold all of the tract east of the river, being Matthewson's tenant for his share of that portion. It was also agreed, that either might put an end to the tenancy at the close of any year, in which case each was to be put in possession of his share of the lands.

In 1805 Matthewson died, leaving his share of the lands to his widow during her life, and to their children afterward. Satterlee refused to give his sister possession of the part which he held of her property; but she in 1812 applied for and obtained a patent for the lands from Pennsylvania. As Satterlee, being tenant, could not, under the common law, dispute his landlord's title, he bought an old Pennsylvania claim to the lands on a patent issued in 1781, had it conveyed to his son, and, by taking advantage of a law then existing, in 1813, caused his son to eject him from the land under the old patent, without his sister being notified, and then received a lease from his son for life for the sum of one dollar; by this means throwing off his tenantship to his sister, Mrs. Matthewson.

She commenced a suit against him in the court of common pleas, and his son caused himself to be made co-defendant. On the trial the verdict and judgment were in her favor, on the ground that the purchase of, and lease by, the son, was all a