of order, method, or certainty in the public receipts or disbursements. This mass of depressed paper, thrown out at first in loans to accommodate government, has done little else than embarrass and distress government. It can hardly be said to circulate, but it lies in the channel of circulation, and chokes it up by its bulk and its sluggishness. In a great portion of the country the dues are not paid, or are badly paid; and in an equal portion of the country the public creditors are not paid, or are paid badly.

It is quite clear, that by the statute all duties and taxes are required to be paid in the legal money of the United States, or in treasury-notes, agreeably to recent provisions. It is just as clear, that the law has been disregarded, and that the notes of banks of a hundred different descriptions, and almost as many different values, have been received, and still are received, where the statute requires legal money or treasury-notes to be paid.

In these circumstances, I cannot persuade myself that Congress will adjourn, without attempting something by way of remedy. In my opinion, no greater evil has threatened us. Nothing can more endanger, either the existence and preservation of the public revenue, or the security of private property, than the consequences which are to be apprehended from the present course of things, if they be not arrested by a timely and an effectual interference. Let gentlemen consider what will probably happen, if Congress should rise without the adoption of any measure on the subject.

Virginia, having passed a law for compelling the banks in that State to limit the circulation of their paper, and resume specie payments by the autumn, will, doubtless, repeal it. The States farther to the south will probably fall into a similar relaxation, for it is hardly to be expected that they will have firmness and perseverance enough to persist in their present most prudent and commendable course, without the countenance of the general government. If, in addition to these events, an abandonment of the wholesome system which has thus far prevailed in the Northern States, or any relaxation of that system, should take place, the government is in danger of falling into a condition, from which it will hardly be able to extricate itself for twenty years, if indeed it shall ever be able to extricate itself; and if

that state of things, instead of being changed by the government, shall not change the government.

It is our business to foresee this danger, and to avoid it. There are some political evils which are seen as soon as they are dangerous, and which alarm at once as well the people as the government. Wars and invasions, therefore, are not always the most certain destroyers of national prosperity. They come in no questionable shape. They announce their own approach, and the general security is preserved by the general alarm. Not so with the evils of a debased coin, a depreciated paper currency, or a depressed and falling public credit. Not so with the plausible and insidious mischiefs of a paper-money system. These insinuate themselves in the shape of facilities, accommodation, and relief. They hold out the most fallacious hope of an easy payment of debts, and a lighter burden of taxation. It is easy for a portion of the people to imagine that government may properly continue to receive depreciated paper, because they have received it, and because it is more convenient to obtain it than to obtain other paper or specie. But on these subjects it is that government ought to exercise its own peculiar wisdom and caution. It is supposed to possess, on subjects of this nature, somewhat more of foresight than has fallen to the lot of individuals. It is bound to foresee the evil before every man feels it, and to take all necessary measures to guard against it, although they may be measures attended with some difficulty and not without temporary inconvenience. In my humble judgment, the evil demands the immediate attention of Congress. It is not certain, and in my opinion not probable, that it will ever cure itself. It is more likely to grow by indulgence, while the remedy which must in the end be applied will become less efficacious by delay.

The only power which the general government possesses of restraining the issues of the State banks, is to refuse their notes in the receipts of the treasury. This power it can exercise now, or at least it can provide now for exercising in reasonable time, because the currency of some part of the country is yet sound, and the evil is not universal. If it should become universal, who that hesitates now will then propose any adequate means of relief? If a measure like the bill of yesterday, or the resolutions of to-day, can hardly pass here now,

what hope is there that any efficient measure will be adopted hereafter?

The conduct of the treasury department in receiving the notes of the banks, after they had suspended payment, might, or might not, have been excused by the necessity of the case. That is not now the subject of inquiry. I wish such inquiry had been instituted. It ought to have been. It is of dangerous consequence to permit plain omissions to execute the law to pass off, under any circumstances, without inquiry. It would probably be easier to prove that the treasury must have continued to receive such notes, or that all payments to government would have been suspended, than it would be to justify the previous negotiations of great loans at the banks, which was a voluntary transaction, induced by no particular necessity, and which is, nevertheless, beyond doubt, the principal cause of their present condition. But I have expressed my belief on more than one occasion, and I repeat the opinion, that it was the duty, and in the power, of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the return of peace, to return to the legal and proper mode of collecting the revenue. The paper of the banks rose on that occasion almost to an equality with specie; that was the favorable moment. The banks in which the public money was deposited ought to have been induced to lead the way, by the sale of their government stocks, and other measures calculated to bring about, moderately and gradually, but regularly and certainly, the restoration of the former and only safe state of things. It can hardly be doubted, that the influence of the treasury could have affected all this. If not, it could have withdrawn the deposits and countenance of government from institutions which, against all rule and all propriety, were holding great sums in government stocks, and making enormous profits from the circulation of their own dishonored paper. That which was most wanted was the designation of a time for the corresponding operation of banks in different places. This could have been made by the head of the treasury, better than by any body or every body else. But the occasion was suffered to pass by unimproved, and the credit of the banks soon fell again, when it was found they used none of the means which the opportunity afforded them for enabling them to fulfil their engagements.

As to any power of compulsion to be exercised over the State

banks, they are not subject to the direct control of the general government. It is for the State authorities which created them to decide whether they have acted according to their charters, and if not, what shall be the remedy for their irregularities. But from such of them as continued to receive deposits of public money, government had a right to expect that they would conduct their concerns according to the safe and well-known principles which should properly govern such institutions. It is bound also to collect its taxes of the people on a uniform system. These rights and these duties are too important to be surrendered to the accommodation of any particular interest or any temporary purpose.

The resolutions before the House take no notice of the State banks. They express neither praise nor censure of them. They neither commend them for their patriotism in the loans made to government, nor propose to tax them for their neglect or refusal to pay their debts. They assume no power of interfering with these institutions. They say not one word about compelling them to resume their payments; they leave that to the consideration of the banks themselves, or to those who have a right to call them to account for any misconduct in that respect. But the resolutions declare that taxes ought to be equal; that preferences ought not to be given; that the revenues of the country ought not to be diminished in amount, nor hazarded altogether, by the receipt of varying and uncertain paper; and that the present state of things, in which all these unconstitutional, illegal, and dangerous ingredients are mixed, ought not to exist.

It has been said, that these resolutions may be construed into a justification of the past conduct of the treasury department. Such an objection has been anticipated. It was made, in my opinion, with much more justice to the bill rejected yesterday, and a provision was therefore subsequently introduced into that bill to exclude such an inference. This is certainly not the time to express any justification or approbation of the conduct of that department on this subject, and I trust these resolutions do not imply it. Nor do the resolutions propose to express any censure. A sufficient reason for declining to do either is, that the facts are not sufficiently known. What loss has actually happened, what amount-it is said to be large-may be now in the treasury, in notes which will not pass, or under what

circumstances these were received, is not now sufficiently ascertained.

But before these resolutions are rejected, on the ground that they may shield the treasury department from responsibility, it ought to be clearly shown that they are capable of such a construction. The mere passing of any resolution cannot have that effect. A declaration of what ought to be done does not necessarily imply any sanction of what has been done. It may sometimes imply the contrary. These resolutions cannot be made to imply any more than this, that the financial affairs of the country are in such a condition that the revenue cannot be instantly collected in legal currency. This they do imply, and this I suppose almost all admit to be true. An instantaneous execution of the law, without warning or notice, could in my opinion produce nothing, in a portion of the country, but an entire suspension of payments.

But to whose fault it is owing that the affairs of the country are reduced to this condition, they do not declare. They do not prevent, or in any degree embarrass, future inquiry on that subject. They speak to the fact that the finances are deranged. They say, also, that reformation, though it must be gradual, ought to be immediately begun, and to be carried to perfection in the shortest time practicable. They cannot by any fair construction be made to express the approbation of Congress on the past conduct of any high officer of government; and if the time shall ever come when this House shall deem investigation necessary, it must be a case of very unpromising aspect, and of most fearful issue, which shall afford no other hope of escape than by setting up these resolutions by way of bar to an inquiry.

Nor is it any objection to this measure that inquiry has not first been had. Two duties may be supposed to have rested on the House: the one, to inquire into the origin of the evil, if it needed inquiry; and the other, to find and apply the remedy. Because one of these duties has not hitherto been discharged, is no reason why the other should be longer neglected. While we are deciding which to do first, the time of the session is going by us, and neither may be done. In the mean time, public mischiefs of unknown magnitude and incalculable duration threaten the country. I see no equivalent, no consolation, no mitigation, for these evils in the future responsibility of departments. Let