treme mortification and chagrin, and indicates a mind precisely in that state to seize on every thing that could palliate the disgrace or sooth the wounds of feeling-in short, when all the ingenuity of pretext, and every possible extenuation will be resorted to, in order to diminish individual and national disgrace. We all perceive from captain Whinyates' letter that he seems to consider himself called upon to make such an official statement, as will most effectually screen himself and solace the wounded pride of his nation. Captain Jones had no conceivable motive to disguise the truth, while captain Whinyates had powerful ones to tempt him to deviate into misstate

ments.

"It is stated," says the writer of the Synopsis, "that captain Whinyates, her commander, was not apprised of the war, even when he met the Wasp."

This fact, I believe, now comes abroad for the first time. Most certainly the officers of the Frolick did not marshal this among their excuses; on the contrary, one of the officers of that ship, in a conversation with an officer of the Wasp, after the capture of the former, casually mentioned where they were when they first heard of the war. In addition to this, some of the Frolick's officers also mentioned, that they had obtained from a neutral vessel, some American newspapers, which spoke of the capture of the Guerriere; which, however, they paid little attention to, as they had not the remotest idea that any one of our frigates could take the Guerriere. But this point is placed beyond all doubt. "At thirty-two minutes past 11, A. M." says captain Jones's letter, "we engaged the sloop of war, having first received her fire." Captain Whinyates says: "About ten o'clock, both vessels being within hail, we hauled to the wind and the battle began." If he did not know of the war, he here most unaccountably omits stating the very circumstance, of all others, that would have gone furthest in extenuating his defeat; and that he did not state it, is a better proof against it than the mere assertion of an anonymous writer in its favour. But, in fact, it is not asserted--the writer

was too cautious for that:-he knew that it could be disproved, and that the detection of one falsehood must inevitably weaken the authority of every other part of his statement. He, therefore, merely intimates it, well knowing that those for whom alone his statement is intended, would give it all the weight of an unqualified assertion, while at the same time he would have a snug excuse in case the insinuation should be proved unfounded.

"Then us to men," continues the British officer on the American station, "she (the Frolick) was miserably defective." Her station had been Jamaica." "With a crew partly consisting of invalids from the naval hospital." "With a crew at least twenty-five short of her complement (one hundred and twentyone) and part of them just recovering from that dreadful West India malady, the yellow fever." "With a crew, feeble as it was, of little more than half the number opposed to them."

These are very remarkable assertions, and it is still more remarkable that we should never have heard of them before.

It is remarkable that captain Whinyates knew nothing of the melancholy state of his crew. It is remarkable that none of his officers ever mentioned it after the capture-and it is absolutely astonishing that this material fact should never have come to light until three years after the action! It is a fact, sir, that nothing of this kind was ever hinted by either of them in any of their conversations with the Americans, nor was this circumstance ever before presented to the public in any one of the numerous apologies for this signal defeat. I have no means of ascertaining the number of the Frolick's crew, but a circumstance which took place at the time, leads me to suppose that it had been augmented from the convoy on the Wasp heaving in sight. One of the ships of the convoy was observed to keep to windward during the action. She afterwards came down in company with the Poictiers, and put into Bermuda for want of hands. The inference is irresistible, that her crew had been borrowed by the Frolick, who, unfortunately, could not afterwards return them.

"The Wasp," says the British naval officer, "the Americans will not now deny, had for a crew one hundred and sixtyfive of the best men captain Jones could procure, and had only left the Delaware about a fortnight previous to the action. She was, therefore, fully prepared to meet an enemy's vessel every way her equal."

This paragraph is written with a deal of petty art and disingenuousness. In saying that the Americans will not now deny the fact which he states, he insinuates, and doubtless his readers will believe, that the Americans had at first denied it, but that it had since been so undeniably established, that they had at last been forced to acknowledge the truth even against their will. The fact is, it never has nor ever will be acknowledged by the Americans, either that the crew of the Wasp consisted of one hundred and sixty-five men, or that they were all picked men, because neither of these assertions are true. The Poictiers, which captured the Wasp after the action with the Frolick, became entitled, by the usages of the British service, to head-money for each person on board the Wasp. In order to ascertain the precise number, captain Jones and one of his officers, were desired to give their depositions before the court of admiralty at Bermuda. They testified, on oath, that the whole number of persons on board the Wasp, previous to the action, was one hundred and thirty-seven, and for that number the captors were paid head-money. If the writer of the Synopsis doubts this, he may, if he pleases, consult the archives of the court. It is equally incorrect, that the crew of the Wasp were picked men. She was on her way from France, with despatches, when captain Jones first heard of the war; and no alteration afterwards took place in her crew, except what occurred in consequence of the discharge of a very few men, who claimed to be British subjects, and were fearful of being hanged if they were taken. That the Wasp, as the writer of the Synopsis affirms, "was fully prepared to meet a vessel every way her equal," is an honest truism, which I have not the hardihood to deny, because every vessel that

ever sailed the ocean, must, of necessity, be prepared to meet another which is only "every way her equal." Equality precludes any advantage, or to state the proposition of this logical writer more at large, equality precludes any superiority, and, therefore, every vessel is prepared to meet another vessel, which is only equal to herself; for, if she be equal to the enemy, the enemy cannot be her superior, and, therefore, I admit that the Wasp was, in reality, equal to any vessel not superior to herself. This is, in fact, the amount of the "British naval officer's" proposition, as expressed in the Synopsis; and, if he really meant any thing else, the poverty of his language or his ideas, it would seem, prevented him from expressing his meaning so as to be understood.

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Captain Whinyates," continues our author, "speaks decidedly of the unmanageable state of the Frolick in the action, owing to the loss of her main-yard, and of the power it gave the enemy to rake him repeatedly."

The same motives which induced captain Whinyates to state that the gale happened the evening before the action, which is not true, undoubtedly prompted him to exaggerate the injuries he received from it. During the whole action the Frolick was never once raked, nor was the Wasp in a situation to rake her. Captain Jones states, in his official letter, that the action commenced at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, both vessels right before the wind, and that they gradually lessened this distance, until he ran on board the Frolick. If this vessel had been in reality thus disabled by the gale two days before, was it probable that captain Whinyates would have decoyed this "suspicious sail" under his guns, thus making sure of a battle, under circumstances so every way disadvantageous to himself? I believe no one will suspect him of such temerity. The truth is, that the loss of the main-yard, the only loss sustained in the previous gale-(for every man on board the Wasp saw, at daylight, on the morning of the action, the main-topsail of the Frolick furled, and her fore topsail set) was of no consequence in the manner in which

captain Whinyates fought the action. He kept right before the wind, and every nautical man knows well, that in such a situation, it is not of the smallest consequence whether any after sail is set or not. Captain Whinyates kept right before the wind, because in so doing he experienced no disadvantage from the want of his main-yard; and captain Jones also kept before the wind, because it was in this way alone he could keep company with his adversary.

Very early in the action the Wasp was very much crippled in her spars and rigging, and hence arose the idea of the "superiority of his fire," which so tickled the hopes of captain Whinyates. He saw distinctly the effect of his fire, but he could not so distinctly ascertain that of the Wasp, which, being entirely directed to the hull of his ship, swept away his men; as distinctly appeared to the Americans, from the blood that poured through the scuppers, and the gradual slackening of the enemy's fire. It was not the superiority of the Frolick's fire that induced captain Jones to run her on board, but the apprehension that his masts would go over the side, by which means the enemy, having then all his spars standing, might be enabled to make his escape. If by superior fire, captain Whinyates means higher, I fully agree with him; for he seemed exclusively to direct his guns at the spars and rigging of the Wasp. In any other point of view, the result of the action is sufficiently convincing that the "superiority of his fire" was not very remarkable.

The writer next gives a statement of the relative size, armament, &c. of the two vessels, which is founded on no authority whatever, as is virtually contradicted by the silence of captain Whinyates on the subject. We find the commanding officers of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, the Java, and every other captured ship, stating, in the broadest, most prominent manner, the superiority of the ships to which they were compelled to surrender; but captain Whinyates, who made so much of his gale, and the loss of his main-yard, is entirely silent as to any disproportion of force. He says not a word of the