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CHAPTER II.

1803-1804.

Livingston's Reception in France-His Qualifications as a Minister-Communicates the Refusal of France to sell her new American Possessions-His Assurances to France in Respect to her colonizing them-These Assurances wholly at Variance with the Presi dent's Views-His Later Dispatches-Receives the President's Letter and Formal Instructions-The Discrepancy in the latter explained-The Federalists unconsciously playing into the President's Hands-Effect of their War Proposition in the Session of 1802-3 on Bonaparte-Why he preferred a Sacrifice of Louisiana to War with the United States-Why Monroe was sent to act with Livingston-President to Monroe and to M. Dupont-Livingston's Dispatches-England and France preparing for a Renewal of War The Crisis Anticipated by Jefferson reached-Talleyrand Proposes to Sell Louisiana-Marbois intrusted with the Negotiations by Bonaparte-His Official Offer to sell Louisiana-Answer of the American Minister-Treaty of Sale to the United States effected-Conditions of the Treaty and Conventions-Great Britain favors the Arrangement Her Motives-The American Minister's Dispatches Home-The Secretary of State's Reply-Errors in the Minister's Dispatch corrected-Jefferson's ModestyHis Exclusive Origination of the Policy which led to the Acquisition never publicly avowed-Extent and Value of the Acquisition-Illustrative Statistical ComparisonsOther National Advantages secured besides Territory and Wealth-The Victories of the Gallic Cæsar and of the Republican President compared-Consequences of President's Delicacy towards Livingston-President's Signals to England-His Letters to Sir John Sinclair and the Earl of Buchan-Republican Murmurs in 1803 at the President's Refusal to remove Federalists-His Unalterable Determination expressed to Nicholson-Result of the Spring Elections in 1803-Jefferson to Breckenridge on Further Territorial Acquisitions-The Effect of the Recent one on the Preservation of UnionRefuses to communicate his Birth-day to be made an Anniversary-Letter to Nicholas -Regards a Constitutional Amendment necessary to carry out the Stipulations of the Recent Treaty-Congress convened-Prominent Members-The President's Message -Treaty ratified by the Senate-Resolution in the House to carry it into EffectR. Griswold's Resolution calling for Papers-Determined Opposition to Treaty by Federalists-Grounds of the Opposition-G. Griswold's Speech-Republicans take Ground that no Constitutional Amendments are Necessary-Speeches of J. Randolph, Nicholson, Rodney, etc.-Federalists admit Constitutionality of Purchase, but contend the Territories must be governed as Colonies-Motives and Effects of their Propositions-The Final Vote-Question reopened in the Senate on another Bill-Speeches of White, Pinckney, J. Q. Adams, Dayton, and Tracy-The Republican SpeakersEffect of the Federal Opposition- Political Comparisons-Ames and Morris on the State of Affairs-Hamilton Silent-Bankrupt Law Repealed-Barbary Affairs-Death of Samuel Adams and Pendleton-Impeachment of Judge Pickering-Articles of Impeachment ordered against Judge Chase-Adjournment.

CHANCELLOR LIVINGSTON, on reaching the Court of France, had found himself coolly received. Jacobinism had gone out of fashion there. But he soon showed that his republicanism was

unaggressive and unmeddling. His personal tastes and habits were as far removed as possible from the Jacobin standards. He had as few of the arts or airs of the demagogue or sans-culotte as the other great leaders of American Republicanism.' Few of Bonaparte's courtiers, aspiring to the dignity of ancien régime, approached the long-occupied social plane of the stately American Patroon; and most of them were upstarts compared with him in personal and family pretensions. His wealth was reputed ducal. His hereditary possessions were greater than half a dozen French marquisates in the days of the Bourbons. He had sat in Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary Congresses. He had been one of the committee appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence; and though not in Congress to sign the instrument, the name of a near kinsman was on this more than Battle Abbey roll. He had conducted with distinguished capacity the foreign bureau of his country. A full score of his family of the existing generation, and more than twice that number of his kinsmen, had borne high civic and military commissions. His own whole life had been spent in the highest ranks of office.

But Mr. Livingston wore his pretensions with affability and grace. Without coming under Sir Henry Wotton's punning definition of an ambassador-" an honest gentleman sent to lie abroad for his country"-he was a man of the world, possessed

1 Never was there a class of men who less put on the personal arts of demagogues than the Jeffersons, Samuel Adamses, Clintons, Livingstons, Dickinsons, McKeans, Macons, Pendletons, Madisons, Monroes, Masons, Nicholases, Randolphs, Breckenridges, Rodneys, etc., etc., before or after election! In this respect they (if we may credit English accounts) formed a most marked contrast with the manners of the English nobility of the same period, when they or their family cadets, or friends, were candidates for contested seats in the House of Commons. It is matter of record that the fortunes of even noble families were wrecked in these contests. One of Wilberforce's elections cost more than the annual expenses of one of our then American State Governments. Noblemen went about shaking hands and personally soliciting votes. Duchesses and Countesses did the same; and tradition says that the magnificent Duchess of Devonshire (the same, we believe, so nobly immortalized as "free Nature's uncorrupted child," in a lyric of Coleridge), on being offered a vote by a greasy clown-for Fox, if we remember aright -in exchange for a kiss, promptly sealed the contract and won the vote!

An American statesman of that day could address the people at the polls, explaining his views but he could not stoop to individual solicitation, and much less to some other English appliances. And his wife or his daughter would as soon have thought of emulating the exploit of Godiva (of Coventry) as of the Duchess Georgiana.

The American "Jacobins" of 1796, 1800, and thence along through the third Presidency, are not to be mistaken by young historical students for the pure French article! If democracy is Jacobinism per se, they were Jacobins. But in all the practical applications, and in the externals, they were about as near the French standard as were Aristides, Fabricius, and William Tell.

2 Dr. Dunglison, of Philadelphia, gave us a new turn to this witticism by Mr. Madison. The latter was on his back on a sofa, at Montpellier, complaining of considerable indisposition, but talking with great volubility to some guests. The Doctor suggested that he would not benefit himself by speaking so much in that position. "Oh, Doctor, I always talk easiest when I lie." was the reply.

social tact and business experience, was remarkably well informed, was broad and liberal in his views, and on all classes of subjects displayed uncommon abilities. When such a man sought to please, he could not fail. He was soon a favorite with the First Consul, and with the more liberal and intelligent of the statesmen who surrounded him.

Livingston's powers, we are inclined to think, were more remarkable for their range than for their intensity in any one department. He was scarcely an originator, though he caught a new idea promptly; and the history of his life-his munificent assistance of Fulton-his introduction of fine-wooled sheep into his country-and his patronage of all proposed undertakings of value, show how readily and liberally he entered upon new lines of thought and new practices. And having adopted an idea he pushed it with vigor and talent. Such a man was well adapted to be an ambassador of a republic, the path of which was plain and straight-forward—which had few diplomatic secrets and cared very little for those of other governments.

The French Government, however, studiously avoided giving our minister any information of its purchase of Louisiana or its non-purchase of Florida. The reason will presently appear in a dispatch of Livingston.

The latter, according to his instructions, attempted as a primary object to prevent the French continental acquisitions, and next, if they took place, to attempt to obtain that portion of them east of the Mississippi, and particularly West Florida, in order to secure the outlets to the Gulf of Mexico furnished by its rivers, especially the Mobile. In this Livingston met with no encouragement. On his hinting at a purchase, the minister told him "none but spendthrifts satisfied their debts by selling their lands." De Marbois (a steady friend of the United States) informed him that the French government considered the acquired possessions an excellent "outlet for their turbulent spirits." He soon learned that their colonization was a favorite scheme of the First Consul. Some passages in a dispatch of Livingston, of January 13th, 1802, deserve particular attention:

1

"By the secrecy and duplicity practised relative to this object, it is clear to me that they apprehend some opposition on the part of America to their plans. I have,

See Livingston's dispatches of December 10th and 12th, 1801.

Ib. December 31.

Ib. February 26, 1802.

VOL. III.-4

however, on all occasions declared that as long as France conforms to the existing treaty between us and Spain, the Government of the United States does not consider herself as having any interest in opposing the exchange. The evil our country has suffered by their rupture with France is not to be calculated. We have become an object of jealousy both to the Government and people.

"The reluctance we have shown to a renewal of the treaty of 1778, has created many suspicions. Among other absurd ones, they believe seriously that we have an eye to the conquest of their islands. The business of Louisiana also originated in that; and they say expressly that they could have no pretence, so far as related to the Floridas, to make this exchange, had the treaty been renewed, since by the sixth article they were expressly prohibited from touching the Floridas, I own I have always considered this article, and the guaranty of our independence, as more important to us than the guaranty of the islands was to France: and the sacrifices we have made of an immense claim to get rid of it, as a dead loss."

By comparing this with Jefferson's letter of April 18th, 1802, given in our preceding chapter, it will be seen how completely the President's views differed from Mr. Livingston's in regard to the consequences of a French colonization of Louisiana, and in regard to the proper policy to be adopted by the United States if it was attempted. And the further dispatches show that no change took place in the minister's views until he received the letter of the President. The policy which secured the purchase of Louisiana was purely original with the latter. Not a distant hint-not even an analogous idea was received from any other quarter.

The minister again wrote home, March 24th, that the colonization of New Orleans was " a darling object of the First Consul"-that he " saw in it a mean to gratify his friends and dispose of his armies"-that it was thought "that New Orleans must command the trade of our whole western country"—that the French had been persuaded "that the Indians were attached to France and hated the Americans"-that "the country was a paradise," etc. The minister then proposed that the United States establish a port at Natchez, or elsewhere, and give it such advantages" as would bring our vessels to it without touching at New Orleans."

He wrote, April 24th, that the French minister "would give no answer to any inquiries he made" on the subject of Louisiana; that the government was "at that moment fitting out an armament" to take possession, consisting of "between five and

1 Had there not been a foundation for this suspicion? Had not the French Minister in the United States penetrated the projects of the Miranda schemers?

seven thousand men, under the command of General Bernadotte," who would shortly sail for New Orleans, "unless the state of affairs in St. Domingo should change their destination." He declared his information certain, and again pressed his Government "immediately to take measures to enable the Natchez to rival New Orleans."

Some other letters passed which are not necessary to be mentioned. On the 30th of July, Livingston wrote the Secretary of State that he had received his dispatches of May 1st and 11th, the President's letter through Dupont de Nemours, of the preceding April 18th (1802), and that he was preparing a Memoir to the French Government.

The formal instructions of May 1st and 11th fell far short of the scope or decision of the President's private letter which he had sent to Dupont de Nemours open, expressly and avowedly to have its contents made known to the French Government. The former, however, directed the minister to urge upon France "an abandonment of her present purpose." Those of the 1st directed him to endeavor to ascertain at what price she would relinquish the Floridas-those of the 11th, to employ "every effort and address" to procure the cession of all territory east of the Mississippi, including New Orleans-and he was authorized, should it become absolutely necessary in order to secure this, to guarantee the French possessions west of the

river.

The discrepancy between the instructions and private letter admits of a ready explanation. The one exhibited the official attitude which it was considered prudent to take-the other gave warning of the inner and entire feelings and purposes, in a form which would have its full effect, but which could not be officially recognized and therefore construed into a menace, or made the subject of official discussion and disclosure. The inofficial letter, in effect, converted the propositions of the official ones into ultimata. If France would cede to the United States New Orleans, and all the territory east of the Mississippi, for an equivalent in money, then the "marrying" with England would not take place, and France could have the benefit of another American guaranty. But what was a guaranty worth which would fall with the first collision of the parties between whom the predicted "friction" would not be in the least reduced

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