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a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme li gislature, judiciary and executive.' In opposition to this, it was moved, that in order to carry into execution the design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation, a more effective government, consisting of a legislature, judiciary and executive, ought to be established,'-excluding the words 'national and supreme.' But it was resolved that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislature, judiciary and executive. The collision between these resolutions, and, consequently, the debate was produced by the words, national and supreme. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North-Carolina and South-Carolina for this resolution ; Connecticut against it, and New-York divided, so that a Convention of only eight States decided by a majority of six, that the States should be annihilated. It was late in the session before twelve States assembled; but whether an accession of votes, or the repentance usually attached to precipitancy produced the ultimate discomfiture to establish a supreme national government, can only be conjectured by computing the consequences likely to result from an excessive zeal for this consolidating policy, and from a refrigeration inculcated by an accession of votes or a firm opposition.” p. 20.
“At the threshold of the business we clearly discern, that the Convention was apprised of the meaning of words. One resolution asserts, that a government merely federal would not answer, and, that a supreme national government ought to be established. The rival resolution rejects the words national and supreme,' as incompatible with a Federal Union. One avails itself of the intimation from Congress in favour of a national government, and rejects the intimations of the same Congress in favour of a federal government. The other prefers the latter intimations, because they were legitimated by the States, and rejects the former because it was rejected by the States. These adverse opinions were evidently dictated, one by the political opinion already invented, of a consolidated nation; the other, by the actual existence of United States. The contrast between the two preliminary resolutions, in a very important view, depends on a single word. One proposed 'a supreme legislative, judiciary and executive;' the other, 'a legislative, executive and judiciary,' excluding the word ' supreme.' This word was adopted as suitable for the proposed national government, and rejected as inconsistent with the federal form of government, to which the States had confined their deputies. The adoption and rejection conspire to furuish us with a definition of this formidable word, both by the national and federal parties in the Convention. The sense in which both of these parties understood it, caused its exclusion from the Constitution, as inapplicable to a federal government. The advocates for a national government proposed to invest that form of government with a supreme power “to construe the articles of Union. The advocates for a federal government originally proposed to withhold supremacy from the legislative, judiciary and executive, and though they at first failed, finally succeeded. As applied by the successful federal party to the Supreme Court, it evidently refers to inferior Federal Courts. "Instead
of a judiciary invested with a supreme power to construe the articles of the Union,' and to negative State laws, a limited judiciary is found in the Constitution. To reject a supreme legislative and executive, and yet to retain a supreme judiciary, was never suggested by either the national or federal party in the Convention. As the project for a national form of government, bestowed the supremacy of construing the articles of Union, and negativing State laws, upon all its departments by plain words; and the project in favour of a federal form entirely rejected this supremacy, it is doing the utmost violence to probability to imagine, that the Constitution, by inference, without plain words, and without its having been proposed in the Convention, should have both deprived the federal legislature and executive of a power to settle the construction of our federal articles, and to negative State laws, and also have bestowed this enormous power exclusively on the Federal Court.” p. 21.
Our author next proceeds to select other extracts from the Journal of the Convention, proving "that the words national and supreme, constituted the great subject of debate."
“ The battle between a national and federal form of government began now to wax warm. June 6th, Mr. Pinckney gave notice that to-morrow he should move for a reconsideration of that clause in the Constitution, adopted by the committee, which vests a negative in the national legislature on the laws of the several States.'
“ June 8th. Mr. Pinckney, seconded by Mr. Madison, moved to strike out the following words in the sixth resolution, 'negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of the Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union,' and to insert the following words, namely, 'to negative all laws which to them shall appear improper.' This motion was rejected, only three States voting in the affirmative. It comprised the precise negative over State laws, now claimed by the Supreme Court. This trivial advantage seems to have been the first gained by the party adverse to a national government, but they speedily lost it.
“On the 18th June, it was moved by Mr. Dickinson, and resolved, that the articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the government of the United States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation and the prosperity of the Union.' This was the first resolution in favour of a federal, in opposition to a national government, but it was speedily revoked.” p. 26.
On the same day, Mr. Hamilton read bis plan of government, which was more completely a national government than any which had been proposed. Amongst its provisions, the executive was to have an unqualified negative on all the laws of Congress. All laws of the States, contrary to the Constitution and laws of Congress, were to be utterly void. The governor of each State to be appointed by the General Government, and
to have a negative upon all laws of the State of which he is governor
“On the 19th June, the day after Mr. Hamilton's plan was promulgated, Mr. Dickinson's resolution for a federal form of government, was taken up and rejected. For it, four States ; against it, six ; one State divided. Even yet only eleven States had appeared, and of these, five refused their concurrence to a national government, which now began to totter. June 23d. The deputies of New Hampshire first appeared, and New-York never afterwards seems to have given a vote in the Convention.
“ June 25th. It was proposed to erase the word national, and substitute the word United States, in the fourth resolution, which passed. July 23d. The proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national government, except what respects the supreme executive, were referred to a cominittee, and the next day the propositions of Mr. Pinckney were referred to the same committee." p. 29.
" August 18. It was proposed to empower the Legislature of the United States (the word national is now dropt) 'to grant letters of incorporation, in cases where the public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent; to establish an university ; to encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries ; to establish seminaries for the promotion of literature, and the arts and sciences; to establish institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce and manufactures ;' which, with other propositions, were referred to the committee of July 23d, who had already submitted the draft of the Constitution." p. 29.
“ The propositions of August 18th, seem to have been the last considerable struggle for a national government, but the residue of the journal, is so concise and imperfect, that their rejection is only discoverable by a reference to the Constitution, in which not a single one of them is to be found. Their rejection was a necessary cousequence of substituting a federal for the national government, zealously contended for from the 29th of May to the 14th of September. It was obvious, that powers to establish corporations, prescribe the mode of education, patronize local improvements, and bestow rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce and manufactures, would certainly swallow up a federal and introduce a national gorernment. When, therefore, a federal system obtained the preference, it would have been inconsistent with the high degree of intelligence, possessed by the members of the Convention, to have permitted their determination to be defeated by these indirect attempts. This intelligence was assailed by the soothing and insidious restriction, that the power to incorporate, to grant exclusive privileges, and to exercise every species of patronage, were only to be exercised where the public good may require it. The same soothing, but insidious argument is now addressed to the intelligence of the public, to justify an exercise of the very powers which the intelligence of the Convention withheld from a federal government.”—p. 30.
“The Convention saw, that if Congress could exercise such powers for the public goud, it might upon the same ground usurp any powers whatever, and in rejecting the propositions decided between investing that body with a general or a limited federal authority. Hence the power to regulate Commerce, was not intended to revise the rejected proposition, to empower Congress to bestow rewards upon agriculture, commerce and manufactures. Hence the rejected proposition to empower Congress to direct the exercise of the judicial power,' at its discretion, (Jour. 300.) cannot enable it to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. And for the same reason, a power to make war cannot revive the rejected power to niake canals, or to perform any of the et ceteras, whatever they were, referred to by the Journals. If these sweeping and indefinite sovereign powers, or all powers thought by those who exercise them to be necessary for the public good, do yet pass to Congress under the Constitution, then the battle between the national and federal parties terminated, quite contrary to the usual course of things. The vanquished were victorious, and the victorious were vanquished ; and if they were now alive, one party would be as much surprised to discover that it had carried the consolidating propositions, which it had lost, as the other, that it had lost the Federal principles which it had carried.' The spectacle of the slain rising up, and the living falling down dead, could not have been expected by either.” p. 31.
It has escaped our author's notice that the dying struggle for a national government was not made on the 18th of August. It was on the 23d. On this day was renewed a proposition, which our author has ornitted to say was made and lost on the 18th of July, and which, from the first day of the Convention, the friends of a national government had most at heart. It was on the 23d of August moved and seconded, to agree to the following proposition, as “an additional power," to be vested in the legislature of the United States, “to negative all laws passed by the several States, interfering in the opinion of the legislature with the general interests and harmony of the Union; provided, that two-thirds of the members of each house assent to the same.” On its being moved to commit the proposition, it was negatived, six States to five. (Journal, 283). It was then withdrawn as a defeated measure.
We regret that our limits will not permit us to quote more largcly from the work before us, but we hope we have laid enough before our readers, to satisfy them, that proposals for a national government, with a negative over the State laws, and a control over the State judiciaries were actually made ; that they were not only made, but warmly espoused, and as VOL. VI.-NO. 12.
zealously opposed, and finally rejected. Those who are not satisfied with the extracts we have furnished, we must refer to the volume itself. They will find in it a body of valuable information, and considerable original thought. They, will perceive, that the hall of the Convention was the great battle ground on which was decided the contest, whether the government should be a national or a federal government; but it is impossible to rise from the company of our author without being struck, that the great struggle was to give to the General Government a supremacy over the State authorities, either by a negative in Congress, or in the United States judiciary, and, that the Constiution was at length presented to the States, us a scheme of government, in which there are provisions, which unqualifiedly shew, that the Federal and State authorities—legislative, executive and judicial, are all co-ordinate, neither dependant on the other. Neither is supreme over the other, but each is supreme in the clearly acknowledged sphere of its own powers. There are but two instances in which a control is given by a national over a State authority. The first is, where a State shall solicit the permission of Congress to lay imposts for executing its own inspection laws. In this case, the State agrees that in case such a permission should be used to the injury of Congress, such law shall be subject “ to the revision and control of Congress.” The second is, where Congress has the power by law to alter the regulations, whạch a State shall prescribe for holding elections for Federal Senators and Representatives. It being thought necessary to submit to a negative in these two cases, by a special provision, conclusively shews, that no general negative either of Congress or of its judiciary can be implied.
Having now, as we hope, satisfied our readers, that it was foreign to the intention of the Convention to give to the Supreme Court any power over the State courts, let us return to the arguments of the Court, and see how these pretensions to superiority are maintained. In this inquiry, we shall not stop to notice either in Martin v. Hunter, or Coben v. Virginia, those views which arise from a deep rooted-conviction in the mind of the Court, that the Constitution of the United States emanates from the people, and is not a compact between sovereign States. In South-Carolina the people are at this moment so enlightened on the subject of our political institutions, and understand so fully the nature of the compact, that it would be a waste of time to reply to observations, founded on premises affirmed to be false by our legislature, and, of course, generally repudiated by our citizens. Laying aside all such, the only ground on