have not fo effectual means of judging. It is, befides, an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine, that every statefman is of course corrupt; and that his opinion, upon every constitutional point, is folely formed upon fome finifter intereft.

The next favourite remedy is a place-bill. The fame principle guides in both; I mean, the opinion which is entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of publick diftempers. Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are unwifely confident, I will only say, that this alfo is a matter very well worthy of ferious and mature reflexion. It is not easy to forefee, what the effect would be, of disconnecting with parliament, the greatest part of thofe who hold civil employments, and of such mighty and important bodies as the military and naval establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a corrupt intereft in the forms of the conftitution, than that they should have none at all. This is a queftion altogether different from the difqualification of a particular defcription of revenue officers from feats in parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower forts of them from votes in elections. In the former cafe, only the few are affected; in the latter, only the inconfiderable. But a great official, a great profeffional, a great military and naval intereft, all neceffarily comprehending many people of the first weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has VOL. II. Y been

been gradually formed in the kingdom. These new interefts must be let into a fhare of reprefentation, else poffibly they may be inclined to deftroy thofe inftitutions of which they are not permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with; nor is it every well-meaning man, that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other ferious confiderations occur. I do not open them here, because they are not directly to my purpofe; propofing only to give the reader fome tafte of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the conftitution; juft to hint the uncertainty, to fay no worse, of being able to prevent the court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its power, of applying that influence to parliament; and perhaps, if the publick method were precluded, of doing it in fome worfe and more dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be ftudied. The fcience of evafion, already tolerably understood, would then be brought to the greatest perfection. It is no inconfiderable part of wifdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; left, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, initead of cutting off the fubfifting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment and fecurity of the old. It were better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member of parliament. But of all modes of influence,

4

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influence, in my opinion, a place under the vernment is the leaft difgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the most safe to the country. I would not fhut out that fort of influence which is open and visible, which is connected with the dignity and the fervice of the state, when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of fubfcriptions, of direct bribery, and thofe innumerable methods of clandeftine corruption, which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as thefe means of corruption, and the difpofition to be corrupted, have existence amongst us. Our constitution stands on a nice equipoife, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all fides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one fide, there may be a risk of overfetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in a government fo complicated as ours, combined at the fame time with external circumstances still more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties; in which a confiderate man will not be too ready to decide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honeft man too ready to promife. They do not refpect the publick nor themfelves, who engage for moré, than they are fure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. These are my fentiments, weak perhaps, but honeft and unbiaffed; and fubmitted entirely to the opinion of grave Y 2

men,

men, well affected to the conftitution of their country, and of experience in what may best promote or hurt it.

Indeed, in the fituation in which we stand, with an immenfe revenue, an enormous debt, mighty establishments, government itself a great banker and a great merchant, I fee no other way for the prefervation of a decent attention to publick intereft in the reprefentatives, but the interpofition of the body of the people itself, whenever it shall appear, by fome flagrant and notorious act, by some capital innovation, that these representatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This interpofition is a moft unpleasant remedy. But, if it bể a legal remedy, it is intended on fome occafion to be used; to be used then only, when it is evident that nothing elfe can hold the conftitution to its true principles.

The diftempers of monarchy were the great fubjects of apprehenfion and redrefs, in the laft century; in this, the diftempers of parliament. It is not in parliament alone that the remedy for parliamentary diforders can be compleated; hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a confidence in government is re-eftablished, the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their representatives. Standards, for judging more fyftematically upon their con

duct,

duct, ought to be settled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and correct lifts of the voters in all important queftions ought to be procured.

By fuch means fomething may be done. By fuch means it may appear who those are, that, by an indiscriminate fupport of all administrations, have totally banished all integrity and confidence out of publick proceedings; have confounded the beft men with the worft; and weakened and diffolved, instead of ftrengthening and compacting, the general frame of government. If any perfon is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country; even he is equally concerned to put an end to this courfe of indifcriminate fupport. It is this blind and undiftinguishing fupport, that feeds the fpring of thofe very disorders, by which he is frighted into the arms of the faction which contains in itfelf the fource of all diforders, by enfeebling all the vifible and regular authority of the ftate. The diftemper is increafed by his injudicious and prepofterous endeavours, or pretences, for the cure of it.

An exterior adminiftration, chofen for its impotency, or after it is chofen purpofely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered fubfervient, will not be obeyed. The laws themselves will not be refpected, when those who execute them are despised; and they will be despised, when their power