thority of the senses where it is impossible that they can be deceived. The positions and revolutions of the planets, although they are not evident to the senses of a person who is unacquainted with the general laws of nature; yet, when these laws are even but superficially known, instead of contradicting, they are perfectly agreeable to the common sense of mankind. However, a man of ordinary understanding will freely confess that he is ignorant of the laws by which the heavenly bodies are governed; and that he has, therefore, properly speaking, no settled opinion or belief about the matter. But, if any person pretend to demonstrate that neither sun, moon, or stars exist; that they are nothing but impressions or ideas; or that, if they exist at all, it is not in the heavens, but in his own mind that he must look for their existence, common sense would instantly revolt at such unintelligible jargon.

WERE I a man of an inflammatory temper, I would be tempted to say, that our authors next remark is something worse than ignorance of Dr REIDS meaning in the following passages. "It is genius," says Dr REID," and not the want of it, which adul

terates philosophy." Hear S. C.'s remark on this observation, which, even in the detached and unconnected manner in which he has quoted it, is extremely obvious and just.

Now, if the Doctor means only by this expression, that a genius for poetry, when employed about philosophy, adulterates it, then it is certainly an indisputable truth, but so self evident, that it does not appear worthy of the learned authors observation. But if he means, as the title and general tenor of his work imply, that a genius for reasoning, or the genius proper for philosophy, that the talent which alone qualifies a man for the understanding and improvement of philosophy, is the talent which occasions the adulteration of it, and without which there would be error or false theory; then, supposing the supposition to be true, which seems to involve in it a contradiction, might we not with just as much reason find fault with our legs as with genius; because, though we should not be able to walk without them, we should not then be liable to stumble ?”

HERE S. C. seems to have industriously avoided the real meaning of the Doctors observation, which must be apparent to the

most superficial reader, especially if he give himself the trouble of perusing the ten lines immediately following. But, even taking it as it stands in S. C.'s letter, it plainly implies, that a lively impetuous imagination is a temper extremely ill adapted for exploring truths, or for investigating the principles, operations, and affections of the human mind." It is genius," says the learned Doctor," and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy, and fills it with error and false theory. A creative imagination disdains the mean offices of digging for a foun-dation, of removing rubbish, and carrying materials; leaving these servile employments to mere drudges in science, it plans a design and raises a fabric. Invention supplies materials where they are wanting, and fancy adds a colouring and every befitting ornament. The work pleases the eye, and wants nothing but solidity and a good foundation," &c. Read these few lines Mr S. C. and seriously consider whether you have done justice to Dr REIDS performance. Philosophy requires her votaries to be men of a slow train of perceptions. They must be able, as it were, to correct the impetuosity of their ideas, and patiently to revolve, examine, and

arrange them. How ill qualified for this employment is a man of genius, or a man of a lively and impetuous imagination? His train of ideas is rapid as lightning. He cannot submit to any thing that requires deep thinking, or strict examination; his ideas succeed each other with such velocity, that they leave him no time to ruminate.

I COME now to the third remark of our author. Speaking of Bishop BERKLEYS Principles of Human Knowledge, Dr REID says, "The opinion of the ablest judges seems to be, that BERKLEYS principles neither have been, nor can be confuted; and that he hath proved what no man in his senses can believe.” Very good. If Bishop BERKLEY, by rejecting the evidence of the senses, has proved that nothing exists in nature except spirits and ideas, is not Dr REID sufficiently warranted to make this observation? And will

any man in his senses ever attempt to shew, that Bishop BERKLEYS principles are ill founded in any other way than by referring to that very evidence which he rejects as false? That Bishop BERKLEYS principles cannot be confuted but by the evidence of sensation, or consciousness, or common sense,

is all that Dr REID intends by the above ob servation.

BUT our author goes on, and draws the following conclusion. "It follows," says he, "from this position, either that the ablest judges of this point are mistaken about it, which is impossible to be true, because they would not be the ablest," &c. This conclusion is either too deep or too shallow for my comprehension. For, according to my way of thinking, it is very possible that the ablest judges of any point or subject under heaven may be mistaken about it. Neither will it surprise any man acquainted with human nature that this should frequently be the case, But let us view the other alternative in this conclusion" or that, as no man in his senses can believe arguments which cannot be confuted; therefore no man in his senses can trust his reason, or assent to demonstration." Dr REID does not use the word demonstration; though, arguments which cannot be confuted, which is the Doctors real expression, seems much the same with demonstration. But, when the Doctor says, arguments which cannot be confuted, he plainly