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judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law ?
The constitution declares " that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.”
If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve ?
“No person," says the constitution, “shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.”
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes directly for them a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act ?
From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words : “I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government ? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void ; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be discharged.
1 Cr. 180.
THE UNITED STATES v. FISHER AND OTHERS,
Assignees of Blight, a Bankrupt.
FEBRUARY TERM, 1805.
[2 Cranch’s Reports, 358 - 405.]
This case involved two questions, one of which was constitutional; we give only so much of the opinion of the court as relates to this.
The question was as to the constitutionality of a law which gave the United States a preference over the other creditors of a bankrupt. Upon this the chief justice said,
To the general observations made on this subject, it will only be observed, that, as the court can never be unmindful of the solemn duty imposed on the judicial department when a claim is supported by an act which conflicts with the constitution, so the court can never be unmindful of its duty to obey laws which are authorized by that instrument.
In the case at bar the preference claimed by the United States is not prohibited ; but it has been truly said, that, under a constitution conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised.
It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
In construing this clause it would be incorrect, and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power.
Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary, because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.
The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe.
This claim of priority on the part of the United States will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts, and will defeat the measures they have a right to adopt to secure themselves against delinquencies on the part of their own revenue officers.
But this is an objection to the constitution itself. The mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislative power of congress extends.
HEPBURN AND DUNDAS v. ELLZEY.
: FEBRUARY TERM, 1805.
[2 Cranch's Reports, 445 – 453.]
HEPBURN AND Dundas, who were citizens of the district of Columbia, sued Ellzey, who was a citizen of Virginia, in the United States' circuit court holden in the district of Virginia, and this question arose :
“Are citizens of the district of Columbia citizens of a state within the meaning of the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States ?”
The judges of the circuit court being opposed in opinion upon this question, it was brought before the supreme court; the opinion of which was given by the chief justice, as follows :
The question in this case is, whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the district of Columbia, can maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia.
This depends on the act of congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. That act gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in cases between a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another state. To support the jurisdiction in this case, therefore, it must appear that Columbia is a state.
On the part of the plaintiffs it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is therefore “a state,” according to the definitions of writers on general law.
This is true. But as the act of congress obviously uses the word “state” in reference to that term as used in the constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the constitution.