ception, whenever the occasion has arisen,-and there have been many, has asserted its sovereignty in jealous and absolute terms; and we find no instance where the assertion has been denied or disputed by the Federal Government. There is a remarkable case at the present day in the conduct of the State of Kentucky, in declaring its neutrality whilst the Government was at war.

By virtue of this sovereignty, the States, when so disposed, call a Convention, which has the power to pass an ordinance, or to repeal a former one passed by a predecessor. The repealing ordinance of the State of Georgia runs thus: "An ordinance to dissolve the Union between the State of Georgia, and other States united with her, under the compact of Government, entitled the Constitution of the United States."

"We, the people of the State of Georgia, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinances adopted by the people of the State of Georgia, in Convention, in 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States was assented to, ratified, and adopted, and also all acts, and parts of acts, of the general assembly, ratifying and adopting amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, rescinded, and abrogated.

"And we do further declare, and ordain, that the Union now subsisting between the State of Georgia, and other States, under the name of the United States, is hereby dissolved, and that the

State of Georgia is in full possession, and exercise, of all those rights of sovereignty, which belong, and appertain, to a free and independent State."

Here we have the passing of the law, and its repeal, both with the same solemnity, and by the same body. The power is inherent in every legislature to repeal a former act, and in every Convention to repeal a former ordinance. Parliament cannot pass an act which a future parliament may not repeal. A Convention is the direct organ of the sovereignty of the people, the instrument through which it manifests its absolute power. Called for the purpose of organic change, its functions are not limited, like those of a legislature, within the terms of a Constitution; on the contrary, its powers have no limit. It is there to make or unmake Constitutions. It is a clear act of sovereignty to summon a Convention, altogether beyond the scope of a province. The right of each State to do so has been constantly exercised, and never disputed, and no Convention can be called which has not within itself the inherent power to repeal an ordinance passed by a previous Convention of that State.

As each of the original States acceded to the Constitution by an act of Convention, and as this forms the only bond of union, it follows that each of those States, as a sovereign community, has, according to the constitutional principles of America, the inherent right to repeal that act, and sever the bond, or, in other words, to secede from

the Union. An effort is made to meet this, by confusing the joint action of the States in general Convention, with the separate act of each State which alone formed the Union. It is said, that as the States acted conjointly, no one of them can withdraw without the assent of the rest. It is true that twelve of the thirteen States acted conjointly-in framing the instrument; whereupon their joint action ceased, the instrument itself having no particle of force. Subsequently each State separately passed an ordinance which accepted that instrument, and attached such State to the Union. Hence the repeal of that ordinance is not the repeal of any conjoint action whatever, but of the single, separate act of that State. No assent of others was sought or given in the passing of that ordinance, and no assent of others is required to enable a succeeding Convention to repeal it.

Nor is this the only source from which the right of secession is derived. It arises under the clause of the Constitution, which reserves to each State every right not expressly conferred. This at once raises the question what are those rights, and what the powers reserved to a State; and to learn this, it is imperative to refer to the special Constitution of that State. Of these there are now thirty-four, differing in some of their provisions, but kindred in spirit. Few of them have ever passed a quarter of a century without alteration; they have invariably been altered for the worse,

by removing them further from the Federal standard. In the Constitution of Maine it is

66

stated: "All power is inherent in the people; all ΑΠ governments are founded in their authority and instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an inalienable right to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it." That of Tennessee affirms that, "Government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind." That of Oregon, one of the most recent, declares that, "All power is inherent in the people; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper." That of Mississippi asserts that the people "have at all times an inalienable, and indefeasible right to alter, or abolish, their form of government, in such manner as they may think expedient." These sentiments, slightly varied in expression, are common to the whole of the State Constitutions, and are disputed by none.

There is another great constitutional authority, the fountain head of American politics-the Declaration of Independence of which the first clause bears directly on this question: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that amongst these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to

R

secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter, or abolish it.”

These are the constitutional principles for the guidance of every citizen. When the people of Georgia, left in doubt by the silence of the Federal compact on the subject of secession, refer to these to enlighten them, to what conclusion must they come-what hesitation can they feel? They are told that the "pursuit of happiness" is "an inalienable right of man;" they feel that the government over them has become "destructive of this end;" they read that thereupon "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it." It will, indeed, be said that the people referred to, are the whole people of the whole country, but this is not the fact; the Constitutions quoted from, speak each of them for no other than the people of its own State. That, indeed, may promote the happiness of Georgia, which produces woe in California, at a distance of three thousand five hundred miles. By what arithmetic can the balance of happiness be adjusted between them? Further, the Declaration of Independence did not speak for all the people under the rule it denounced, but for a small portion of them only; nor did it speak for the people of the United States as a single people, but as separate colonies now claiming to be independent, the respective, original States. Clearly, then, this lan