ern borders of the United States, where no other object could possibly be in view, than to take possession of and subdue a portion of the territory, by military force. For no inva. sion of the United States was then threatened by the Canadian provinces; and a proclamation was issued by one of the American generals on that border, evidently intended to induce the people of Canada to submit to, and become connected with, the American federal government.

That more adequate and efficient measures for the defence of the country were not provided, before war was declared, is proof that no invasion was then expected or feared. Great Britain had made no preparation for such an enterprise, nor threatened it; but, on the other hand, seemed desirous of maintaining amicable relations with the United States; though unwilling to yield to the demands repeatedly made, for a relinquishment of the doctrine of blockade, of impressment of seamen who were natural subjects of England, or of interdicting to neutrals the trade with her enemy in war, not permitted in a time of peace. On these points, the British government was tenacious and determined; and was ready to encounter the hostile movements of the United States, in addition to the attacks of European powers, rather than agree to the demands made of them; leading, as they believed, to their own subjugation and ruin.

The neglect of previous and seasonable preparation for war, was the occasion of extravagant expenditures afterwards to place the nation in a sufficiently formidable attitude, either for defence, if invaded, or for an attack on the British provinces, as was early projected. Men and provisions were wanted for the extreme western military post at Detroit, in the vicinity of Upper Canada; there not being an adequate force even for defence, much less for invading that territory, which was ordered. The regular army filled up but slowly, compared to the instant exigency and call; but few volunteer companies were raised; and though the militia were detached in several of the States, there was a reluctance generally in calling them into the field, until invasion should take place, or immediately threaten.

A disposition, on the part of the British government to remain in friendship with the United States, was manifested about the time the American Congress declared war

* A law was passed in June, twelve days after the declaration of war, authorizing the issue of treasury notes, to the amount of five millions of dollars; and at the following session of Congress, it was found necessary to issue ten millions more.

against that nation, by repealing the orders in council, so injurious to neutral commerce, and the revocation of which had been often demanded by the federal executive. On satisfactory evidence, that the French edicts of a similar character were actually revoked, the British administration caused its orders to be withdrawn, June 22d; and the intelligence of this repeal reached Washington the last of July. An armistice was also proposed by the British, but it was not accepted. For although it is very probable war would not have been declared by Congress, had the British Orders in Council been withdrawn, and the fact known in the United States before a formal declaration was made; these orders were not the only or chief reason given for resorting to that alternative. The principal cause of the war was stated to be the impressment of seamen, by the British commanders, from the vessels of the United States; and as there was no engagement made by the British ministry on the subject, the armistice was not accepted, nor did the American government cease hostilities which had already. commenced; and it was again explicitly announced, that until an adjustment was made on the subject of impressments, essentially agreeable to the views of the federal administration, the war would be prosecuted.

A very interesting question arose at this period, involving a great Constitutional principle, as to the extent of the power of the federal executive over the militia; whether they were under his uncontrolled and merely discretionary direction; or whether the authority of the general government to employ and command them was limited, and only to be exercised in certain specified exigences. The language of the Constitution, on this subject, is as follows: "Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." And when the President directed the general officers of the United States army, to call on the governors of the respective States for the militia, to be put under the command of those officers, in any case they might require, some of the governors declined so to call them forth and place them under command of an officer of the regular army; but, at the same time declaring, that when there should be an actual invasion, or immediate danger of invasion, the militia would be ordered out to repel it, and to defend the coast invaded; and be placed under the command of an officer in the service of the general government.

The principal reasons given for declining to call out the

militia and place them under the command of officers of the regular national army, were, that it was inconsistent with the rights of the militia, as citizens, to dispose of them in this manner, and was converting them into a body of standing troops against their will; and that the Constitution evidently required their being called into public military service by authority of the federal government to repel invasion, unexpectedly arising, and no regular troops prepared for the defence of the country: the power over the militia, the citizen soldiers of a State, being vested entirely in the governor thereof; except in the emergencies particularly stated in the Constitution. The argument of the federal administration, on the other hand, for claiming authority to call out the militia, as was done, at an early period, was, at least, plausible; and some believed, sufficiently valid, to justify the call, and to charge the governors of the States who refused to order out the militia, with a gross and dangerous neglect of public duty.

It was observed, that, as war had been declared, the whole country was exposed to attacks from Great Britain; and that, both for defensive and offensive measures, the whole force of the United States should be subject to the control and direction of the federal executive, in such time and manner as he might judge necessary or proper.

This is a most important subject; and, as in 1812, there is still a difference of opinion, respecting the authority of the federal government over the militia. The doctrine asserted at that period, by the friends of the administration, goes to destroy all State authority over the militia in time of war; and to justify the employment of them by the general government, in the same manner with regular troops; and thus power would be allowed an ambitious President to destroy the liberties of the people. And the extreme of the opposite construction, which would leave it to the governor of each State when, and where, to order out the militia, might often produce disastrous results.

The opinion expressed by the men then in power in the federal government, was quite different from that which they had advocated a few years before, when they were in the minority. They had insisted on a rigid construction of the Constitution, and opposed all exercise of power in Congress and in the President, not plainly authorized by that instrument; and contended strenuously for the right of authority in the State governments to act in all cases, not expressly granted to the general government. And the former administration and its friends had been charged

with a design to exceed the powers given by the Constitution, in its strong measures; and as aiming unduly to restrict and lessen the authority of a State. By claiming a right to command and control the militia, without the approbation or consent of the State authority, as was done in 1812, the opposite doctrine was assumed to be correct; and the practical result would be a concentration of the whole power and force of all the States in the hands of the President and his agents, despite the dissent and remonstrance of the State authorities. The Constitution did not give an unqualified or unlimited authority over the militia to the federal government, but confined it to particular exigences; and unless such occasions presented, the federal executive possessed no just authority to command or employ them. If the President, and his subordinate officers, had a constitutional right to call out and employ the militia, as asserted, they might require their services, and keep them under control, when and as long as they might order, under the pretence, that an invasion might take place at some future day, even in six or twelve months; and that it was necessary to be seasonably prepared to act for the defence of the country. The doctrine was so evidently liable to abuses and an arbitrary exercise of power, as well as incompatible with the constitutional rights of the militia, that many political friends of the administration repudiated it by open and explicit declarations.

In several States, where the militia were not called into the field, when war was first declared, and their services. first required, the legislatures afterwards authorized the Governors to order them out, in the event of invasion, or of imminent danger thereof: and the militia were actually and readily employed, at subsequent periods of the war, when the territory of the United States was invaded, or the appearance of the enemy on the coasts, or near the borders, indicated an intended attack.*

When it was known, that the British orders in council, so justly complained of, and which furnished one of the

* On application of the people near the northeast bounds of Maine, then part of Massachusetts, the Governor ordered several companies of militia to march to that frontier for defence. They apprehended an attack from the British in New Brunswick; and satisfied the Governor they had sufficient reason to fear invasion at that time. He promptly ordered a military force for their protection, though he had declined to call out the militia of the State, when the war was first declared. He gave the federal executive notice of this measure, and declared his readiness to place the men under command of an officer of the United States for the purposes of defence.

principal reasons for the declaration of war against that nation, were withdrawn, and cessation of hostilities or an armistice proposed, the people of the United States became more dissatisfied, and generally expressed a strong desire for renewed negotiations and for peace. The views and sentiments of a great portion, if not of the majority of the citizens, were probably justly expressed in the resolutions, referring to the war and the causes or pretences for it, adopted by a very large meeting in the city of New York, on the 19th of August, 1812; and given in the note below.*

"Resolved, that the legitimate objects of government is the public good, to promote which its powers ought to be exercised: That a free people have a right to form an opinion of the conduct of those entrusted with authority, and to express that opinion: That our national government is an association of the States, for their joint and several advantage: That exercising the powers of that association, to the great and manifest injury of its members, is a breach of trust: That to adopt rules of proceeding, by which the people are deprived of the power of expressing their sentiments through their representatives, is a violation of the first principles of representative government: That the pros'perity of the State is principally derived from agriculture and commerce: That the interests of these two great sources of national wealth and power are inseparable; wherefore, the war, lately declared, being destructive to the one, cannot but impair the other: That war, one of the greatest calamities which afflict mankind, is, when waged without just cause, an insult to the divine Majesty: That, if undertaken, however just the cause, without probability of success, is an act of extreme imprudence: That where the injury which must result is great and manifest, while the object to be secured is of trivial comparative importance, the interest of a nation ought not to be hazarded; still less for the gratification of personal partialities or resentments: That the war, lately declared by a slender majority of Congress, is unwise: That the circumstances, under which it was declared, were unfavorable: That the consequences, to which it leads, are alarming: That it is unwise, because if unsuccessful, the objects for which it is waged, whatever they may be, will probably be abandoned: [They were abandoned or waived:] That the more important those objects are, the more unwise must be a war which rashly puts them to the hazard: That if it be intended to establish national rights, it ought to have been considered, that those rights, though violated, could not, while claimed, be considered as abandoned; whereas, if at the end of an unsuccessful war, the nation should relinquish them for the sake of peace, they will be annihilated; or, at least, will depend on the issue of another bloody contest: That it would have been difficult to select a moment more unfavorable for a measure so portentous; the United States unprepared, the treasury empty, articles of primary importance omitted to be procured in season, and not now to be purchased, much of the funds of our mercantile citizens in the hands of those now by Congress made our enemies, property to a large amount afloat on every sea, the revenue impaired by imprudent commercial restrictions, and now by the war destroyed; the nation against whom the war is declared, completely armed and possessed of ample means to protect herself and to annoy us, her fleet mistress of the ocean, and in a capacity to lay waste many of our maritime cities and towns: That a comparison of the condition, in which the two nations stood at the time of that declaration, and in which they now stand, is alone sufficient to show that in making it, our rulers were not possessed of, or did not exercise, a sound political discretion: That a defensive war is to be