of negro slaves in the British dominions in the condition of barbarism in which they were thirty years ago, and we find the purest of men and strictest of moralists falling short of the conclusion. In private life the magnitude of the good which results from maintaining the principle inviolate, far overbalances any specific evil which may possibly attend an adherence to it in a particular case. But in political affairs it may happen that the specific evil is the greater of the two, even in looking to the longest train of consequences that can be said to be within the horizon of human foresight. For to set a generation of savages free in a civilised community, would be merely to maintain one moral principle inviolate at the expense of divers other moral principles.

Upon the whole, therefore, I come to the conclusion that the cause of public morality will be best served by moralists permitting to statesmen, what statesmen must necessarily take

and exercise — a free judgment namely, though a most responsible one, in the weighing of specific against general evil, and in the perception of perfect or imperfect analogies between public and private transactions, in respect of the moral rules by which they are to be governed. The standard of morality to be held forth by moralists to statesmen is sufficiently elevated when it is raised to the level of practicable virtue: such standards to be influential must be above common opinion certainly, but not remotely above it; for if above it, yet near, they draw up common opinion; but if they be far off in their altitude they have no attractive influence.

By some readers it may perhaps be questioned whether, in a work the scheme of which admits no amplitude of discussion, I ought to have treated at all, since I must of necessity treat shortly, so high and grave a subject as that of political morality. I have done so, supported

by the assurance that there is amongst the writers and thinkers of this country such an effective oppugnancy to all false doctrine on moral themes, that even should I have fallen into error, the putting forth of such error will tend to bring truth into a more vital activity. Yet this assurance notwithstanding, I may almost say that I have written this chapter with a trembling hand.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON CONSISTENCY IN A STATESMAN.

THE credit which is commonly attached to consistency in a statesman, belongs to it, not so much for being a merit in itself (which it may or may not be) as for being a presumptive evidence of another merit- the merit of political probity. Considering the temptations under which politicians are placed, of changing their opinions, or rather their professions of opinion, from motives of self interest, the world will not give them credit for motives of honest conviction, unless when the change shall be to their manifest loss and disadvantage. And if the judgments of the world were to go otherwise, no

doubt these temptations would be yielded to much more frequently than they are.

There

fore when a statesman sees fit to change an opinion which he has publicly professed, whether the change be right or wrong, it is required for the general guarding and sustaining of political honesty, that he should suffer for it, either in political character, or (what would generally be the more eligible alternative for him in the long run) in immediate and apparent personal in

terests.

In this country and in these times, the questions of political consistency which arise are exceedingly complicated and perplexing, and the snares with which a statesman's integrity is beset are many in proportion, and very inveigling. For popular assent having become an essential condition of the practicability of measures, an assumption of that assent being attainable to any measure becomes part and lot of the opinion about it; in as much as the opinion, if