The appetite, satiated with luxuries cheaply acquired; requires new stimulants-even criticism palls-and private slander must be mingled with it to give the necessary relish. Happily, these evils will, at last, work out their own remedy. Scorn, of all human emotions, leaves the frailest monuments behind it. That light which now seems to play around the weapons of periodical criticism, is only like the electrical flame which, to the amazement of the superstitious, wreathes the sword of the Italian soldier on the approach of a storm, vapourish and fleeting. Those mighty poets of our time-who are now overcoming the derision of the critics -will be immortal witnesses of their shame. These will lift their heads, “like mountains when the mists are rolled away," imperishable memorials of the true genius of our time, to the most distant ages. ORIGINAL. ART. I. (Continued from No. 1.) Memoirs of my own times. By General JAMES WILKINSON. In three volumes, 8vo. Philadelphia, 1816. Third and last persecution: The grievances, which form the subject of this article, may be brought under two general heads;-those inflicted by Gen. Armstrong, and those suffered under the ministry of Mr. Munroe. When specified, they stand as follows-that he (Gen. W.) had been seduced from his command in the south; that he had been put on the execution of a plan of campaign impracticable in itself, or rendered so, by a deficiency of means; that, during the campaign, his authority had been often and seriously invaded, and his conduct and opinions grossly misrepresented by the Secretary of War; that promises made to him in relation to the protection of his rear, had been violated; that but for orders given him by the Secretary, he would have attacked and taken Kingston and the British fleet; that after having done more than was imposed upon him either by law or by usage, and in the midst of great plans and eminent usefulness, in forming and fitting the army for future and momentous enterprises, he had found himself divested of command, put under arrest and even removed from the theatre of war; that, though ready and solicitous for an immediate trial, means had been taken to defer the investigation; that when at last he was brought before a competent tribunal, similar means were employed to screen the pimps and parasites who had informed against him; that though repeatedly called for by name, and required by the court to attend, pretences of other service were raised to prevent their compliance, and consequently to cover their delinquency; and lastly, that after having been tried for neglect of duty-for ungentlemanly and unofficerlike conduct, and even for the vile and vulgar crime of drunkenness,-though honourably acquitted of these and all other charges, he had in his old age been inhumanly discarded from military service, to make room for men, destitute alike of private morality and public qualifications. This is certainly a strong case, and if sustained by sufficient proof-whatever may have been the General's demerits on other occasions-will entitle him, on this, to an ample share of public sympathy. Without however taking any thing for granted, pro or contra (as is our duty) let us examine his complaints separately and carefully. And 1st. That he had been seduced from his command in the south. The declaration of war, by the United States, against Great Britain, in 1812, found General Wilkinson on the theatre of the great exploits, commemorated under our last head; and whoever has a just sense and correct recollection of these, will not think it extraordinary, that they should have excited against him much open and some private eninity. But, without going into details on this point, it may be sufficient to remark, that the whole delegation from Orleans and other members of Congress from the Southern and Western states, had, without any very laborious process, arrived at the identical conclusion, with which we closed the preceding section; and not believing our hero worthy of either public trust, or private confidence, had requested his removal from a command so important to the nation as that of New Orleans.a On the abstract question, of complying with this request, or of rejecting it, there was no hesitation on the part of the President; but the difficulty lay in making such new disposition of Mr. Wilkinson, as should equally avoid offending him and the public; and it was not until after the subject had been carefully weighed, in the nice and tremulous scales of Mr. Madison's understanding, that an order was given, for divesting the General of his southern command. This task necessarily devolved on the Secretary, and we shall now see how he executed it. On the 10th of March, 1813, he wrote to Mr. Wilkinson, directing him "to repair, with "the least possible delay, to the Head-Quarters of Major General "Dearborn, then at Sacket's Harbour." This was obviously a mere act of authority-a peremptory mandate, leaving nothing to choice or discretion, and so worded, as to prevent even the possi a Then composed of Mess. Brown, Fromentin and Robinson. bility of mistake. But it was followed, (as the General tells us,) two days afterwards, by another-containing the seductive passages, to which, poor man! he became the victim. And what are these?" I transmitted to you," says the Secretary, "by the "last mail, an order to come to the north and take part in the "more active and interesting scenes of the war. Why remain in "a land of cypress, when patriotism and ambition equally invite "to one, where grows the laurel? The men of the north and east "want you; those of the south and west are less sensible of your "merits: I speak with a frankness due to you and to myself, and "again advise,-come to the north, and come quickly. If our "cards be well played, we may renew the scene of Saratoga.' Now, as in the order of the 10th, we found only the verba magistri -the simple expression of the presidential will, so in this, we but discover the courtesy of the minister, humanely endeavouring to break the fall of an old soldier and acquaintance. It is in vain that we look for any thing bearing the most remote resemblance to seduction. Seduction! to what?-to more active and interesting service!―to a career of patriotism and ambition!—to a renewal of the glorious scenes of Saratoga! And are these the temptations of which the General complains?-Has it come to this, that the most laudable stimulants to military exertion are regarded as baits and bribes, which it would have been both virtue and wisdom to have resisted? After all-these wreaths of roses were, it seems, not sent alone; they covered an intimation of the true cause of his recall ;—a repetition of the order of the 10th, and an admonition, not merely to come, but (knowing Mr. Wilkinson's frailty) to come quickly.a 2d. That he had been put on the execution of a plan of campaign impracticable in itself, or rendered so by a deficiency of means. That there is a period, within which a General has a right to make objections to any plan of campaign he may be employed to execute, is not denied-nor will it be doubted, that there is also a period, within which this right ceases. Without waiting however to settle the exact boundaries between the two, we are willing to give to the former an extension that will leave nothing to cavil, and instead of confining it, as is usual, to any act of adoption on the part of the General, we admit, that from the beginning to the end-from the commencement to the failure of an expedition, a a It will be remembered, that Mr. Wilkinson was bearer of the official account of Burgoyne's capture, and performed this duty so deliberately, as to excite much censure. When therefore a proposition was made in Congress to reward the courier, Roger Sherman, a distinguished member of that body, seconded the motion, but proposed to amend it, by voting a whip and pair of General has a right (provided the facts warrant the assertion) to say to his government-" Your project is impracticable from its own nature, or it becomes so from want of means to accomplish it. I hasten to tell you this, and to claim your protection against the consequences of your own errors, or negligence, or both, which otherwise might be imputed to me." If we apply this rule, favourable as it is, to the present case, how stands the credit of the General's recent declaration that he had been put on the execution of an impracticable project with incompetent ' means?' Did he, from the commencement to the failure of the campaign, make a single objection to the plan, on the ground either of its own character, or that of the means given by the government to execute it? Far otherwise. On the 26th of August, 1813, we find him submitting this very plan of campaign to a council of war, over which he himself presided, and who, after full discussion, (as well separately as in comparison with other plans,) unanimously adopted it. "The fourth proposition" (that of passing by Kingston and marching directly on Montreal)" meets the "approbation of the council: the object appears feasible, and if "accomplished, the upper country falls of course," &c.a Writing to the war department, he says, "I am endeavouring to "lead Sir George to the west end of the lake, but whether I suc"ceed in this attempt or not, should our men and means answer "report, and heaven favour me, I will be in possession of Kingston, "or below, on the 26th proximo." On the 24th of August, he says, "all things are working well, and it would seem, that nothing "short of an act of God, or the betrayal of my plans, can prevent 66 our success." On the 27th of September, in reply to a letter from Gen. Brown, he remarks on the issue of the campaign— "I have no doubt of the result, but expect to pay a reasonable "price for every advantage gained." Again: writing, on the 28th October, to the war department, he says, "all our hopes "have been nearly blasted, but thanks to the same providence "which placed us in jeopardy, we are surmounting our difficul"ties, and, God willing, I shall pass Prescott on the night of the "1st or 2d proximo. Once passed Prescott, and our bayonets and "sabres shall remove all impediments." On the 8th of November, (twelve days after making this heroic engagement, and nine after actually passing Prescott, without loss or interruption,) it was again unanimously determined, in a council of war, "to press with "all possible rapidity the march on Montreal;" and in a letter of the 15th of November, he says, "It is a fact, for which I am "authorized to pledge myself, on the most confidential authority, a See document No. 1. Vol. III. The council consisted of Generals Wilkinson, Lewis, Brown and Swartwout, and Commodore Chauncey. b See document No. 24, Vol. III. of the memoirs. "that on the 4th of the present month, the British garrison of "Montreal consisted solely of four hundred marines and two hun"dred sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. What a glo"rious golden opportunity has been lost!" And lastly, in his letter to the Secretary, of the 17th of November, he adds " The game was in view, and (had Hampton performed the junction directed) "would have been ours in eight or ten days. But he chose to re"cede in order to co-operate, and my dawning hopes, and the hopes and honour of the army, were blasted." 66 Let us now see what were the means given to accomplish this plan, the object of which (had Hampton done his duty) was, as we have seen, so entirely within the General's grasp. In the exposition of his forces made to the council of war, held on the 26th of August, he says, "the whole present and effective force of the army of this district (No. 9) may be estimated at seven thousand "four hundred combatants, exclusive of the navy department; "but it is expected, that, by the recovery of the sick and the junc"tion of recruits, it will be augmented to nine thousand, exclu"sive of militia, (on which no solid reliance can be placed,) by the "20th of September." Nine thousand, then, was the maximum of his calculations, and a force competent, in his judgment, and in that of the council of war, to accomplish the service assigned to them. In the minutes of the second council, already mentioned, we find the General stating his effective force, on the 8th day of November, after all the casualties of his passage across lake Ontario and down the St. Lawrence, at 7000 men, and the division of Hampton at Chataugay at 4000: making on that day a total of 11,000 combatants, or 2000 more than the number deemed necessary for the object. But that this statement does not do justice to the case, will be seen from the more correct report of the Adjutant General of the army, dated twenty-two days after that of the General, and which makes his Light Artillery, Heavy Artillery, Infantry, and Riflemen, to consist of Now in this report were not included Two regiments of Dragoons, detached to Utica Making a total of 8143 400 102 500 4000 13,145 a Or, an excess beyond what had been requested, required, or expected, of 4145 men. a See page 83 of documents accompanying the President's message to Congress the 2d of February, 1814. Two brigades of militia-not included in this statement. |