describe hiftories of difeafes very accurately, on whose cure they can say but very little.

The firft ideas which generally fuggeft themselves, for the cure of Parliamentary diforders, are, to shorten the duration of Parliaments; and to disqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a feat in the House of Commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in those remedies, I am fure in the present state of things it is impoffible to apply them. A restoration of the right of free election is a preliminary indifpenfable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the conftitution, is a matter of deep and difficult research.

If I wrote merely to please the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troublesome to me as to another, to extol these remedies, fo famous in fpeculation, but to which their greatest admirers have never attempted seriously to refort in practice. I confefs then, that I have no fort of reliance upon either a Triennial Parliament, or a Place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps it might rather ferve to counteract, than to promote the ends that are propofed by it. To fay nothing of the horrible diforders among the people attending frequent elections, I should be fearful of committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the country into a conteft with the Treafury. It is easy to fee which of the contending parties would be ruined first. Whoever has taken a careful view of public proceedings, fo as to endeavour to ground his fpeculations on his experience, muft have obferved how prodigiously greater

greater the power of Miniftry is in the first and last feffion of a Parliament, than it is in theintermediate period, when Members fit a little firm on their feats. The perfons of the greatest Parliamentary experience, with whom I have converfed, did constantly, in canvaffing the fate of questions, allow fomething to the Court-fide, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. The evil complained of, if it exifts in the prefent ftate of things, would hardly be removed by a triennial Parliament: for, unless the influence of Government in elections can be entirely taken away, the more frequently they return, the more they will harrafs private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the fettled fyftematic intereft of Government, and to the refources of a boundlefs Civil Lift. Certainly fomething may be done, and ought to be done, towards leffening that influence in elections; and this will be neceffary upon a plan either of longer or fhorter duration of Parliament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, as not to render fuch contentions, too frequently repeated, utterly ruinous, firft to independence of fortune, and then to independence of fpirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excufed in another obfervation. With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this fubject with any man much converfant with public bufinefs, who confidered fhort Parliaments as a real improvement of the conftitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular

caufe,

i

cause, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of fuch perfons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with the means of better information. The authority of fuch perfons will always have some weight. It may ftand upon a par with the speculations of those who are lefs practifed in business; and who, with perhaps purer intentions, have not so effectual means of judging. It is, befides, an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine, that every Statesman is of courfe corrupt; and that his opinion, upon every conftitutional point, is folely formed upon fome finifter intereft.

The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The fame principle guides in both; I mean, the opinion which is entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public diftempers. Without being as unreafonably doubtful as many are unwifely confident, I will only fay, that this alo is a matter very well worthy of serious and mature reflexion. It is not eafy to foresee, what the effect would be, of difconnecting with Parliament, the greatest part of those who hold civil employments, and of fuch mighty and important bodies as the military and naval establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a corrupt interest in the forms of the conftitution, than that they should have none at all. This is a queftion altogether different from the difqualification of a particular defcription of Revenue Officers from feats in Parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower forts H

of

of them from votes in elections. In the former cafe, only the few are affected; in the latter, only the inconfiderable. But a great official, a great profeffional, a great military and naval intereft, all neceffarily comprehending many people of the first weight, ability, wealth, and spirit, has been gradually formed in the kingdom. These new interefts must be let into a fhare of reprefentation, elfe poffibly they may be inclined to deftroy thofe inftitutions of which they are not permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with; nor is it every well-meaning man, that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other ferious confiderations occur, I do not open them here, because they are not directly to my purpofe; propofing only to give the reader fome tafte of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the conftitution; juft to hint the uncertainty, to fay no worse, of being able to prevent the Court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its power, of applying that influence to parliament; and perhaps, if the public method were precluded, of doing it in some worse and more dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be studied. The science of evafion, already tolerably understood, would then be brought to the greatest perfection. It is no inconfiderable part of wisdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; left, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, inftead of cutting off the fubfifting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment

and

and fecurity of the old. It were better, un-
doubtedly, that no influence at all could affect
the mind of a Member of Parliament. But of
all modes of influence, in my opinion, a place
under the Government is the leaft difgraceful to.
the man who holds it, and by far the most safe
to the country. I would not shut out that fort
of influence which is open and vifible, which is
connected with the dignity and the service of the
State, when it is not in my power to prevent
the influence of contracts, of fubfcriptions, of
direct bribery, and thofe innumerable methods
of clandeftine corruption, which are abundantly
in the hands of the Court, and which will be
applied as long as these means of corruption, and
the difpofition to be corrupted, have existence
amongst us. Our conftitution ftands on a nice
equipoife, with steep precipices and deep waters
upon all fides of it. In removing it from a dan-
gerous leaning towards one fide, there may
a rifque of overfetting it on the other. Every
project of a material change in a Government fo
complicated as ours, combined at the fame time
with external circumftances ftill more compli-
cated, is a matter full of difficulties; in which
a confiderate man will not be too ready to de-
cide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or
an honeft man too ready to promife. They do
not respect the publick nor themselves, who en-
for more,
gage
than they are fure that they ought
to attempt, or that they are able to perform.
These are my sentiments, weak perhaps, but
honeft and unbiaffed; and submitted entirely to

H 2

be

the

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