miraculous operation, to overrule the courfe of

nature.

But we must purpofely fhut our eyes, if we confider this matter merely as a contest between the House of Commons and the Electors. The true contest is between the Electors of the kingdom and the Crown; the Crown acting by an inftrumental House of Commons. It is precifely the fame, whether the Minifters of the Crown' can disqualify by a dependent Houfe of Commons, or by a dependent court of Star Chamber, or by a dependent court of King's Bench. If once Members of Parliament can be practically convinced, that they do not depend on the affection or opinion of the people for their political being, they will give themselves over, without even an appearance of referve, to the influence of the Court.

Indeed, a Parliament unconnected with the people, is effential to a Ministry unconnected with the people; and therefore those who faw through what mighty difficulties the interior Ministry waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this business, will conceive of what prodigious importance, the new corps of King's men held this principle of occafional and perfonal incapacitation, to the whole body of their defign.

When the Houfe of Commons was thus made to confider itself as the master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to fecure that House against all poffible future deviation towards popularity; an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure of the Court.

To complete the scheme of bringing our Court to a resemblance to the neighbouring Monarchies, it was neceffary, in effect, to destroy thofe appropriations of revenue, which feem to limit the property, as the other laws had done the powers, of the Crown. An opportunity for this purpofe was taken, upon an application to Parliament for payment of the debts of the Civil Lift; which in 1769 had amounted to 513,000l. Such application had been made upon former occafions; but to do it in the former manner would by no means anfwer the prefent purpose.

Whenever the Crown had come to the Commons to defire a fupply for the discharging of debts due on the Civil Lift; it was always afked and granted with one of the three following qualifications; fometimes with all of them. Either it was ftated, that the revenue had been diverted from its purposes by Parliament: or that those duties had fallen fhort of the fum for which they were given by Parliament, and that the intention, of the Legiflature had not been fulfilled or that the money required to discharge the Civil Lift debt, was to be raised chargeable on the Civil Lift duties. In the reign of Queen Anne, the Crown was found in debt. The leffening and granting away fome part of her revenue by Parliament was alledged as the cause of that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground, fuch it certainly was, for difcharging it. It does not appear that the duties which were then applied to the ordinary Government produced clear above 580,000l. a year; becaufe, when they were afterwards granted to

George

George the Firft, 120,000 /. was added, to complete the whole to 700,000 7. a year. Indeed it was then afferted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the net produce did not amount to above 550,000l. The Queen's extraordinary charges were befides very confiderable; equal, at least, to any we have known in our time. The application to Parliament was not for an abfolute grant of money; but to empower the Queen to raise it by borrowing upon the Civil Lift funds.

The Civil Lift debt was twice paid in the reign of George the Firft. The money was. granted upon the fame plan which had been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The Civil Lift revenues were then mortgaged for the fum to be raised, and ftood charged with the ransom of their own deliverance.

pur

George the Second received an addition to his Civil Lift. Duties were granted for the pofe of raifing 800,000l. a year. It was not until he had reigned nineteen years, and after the last rebellion, that he called upon Parliament for a discharge of the Civil Lift debt. The extraordinary charges brought on by the rebellion, account fully for the neceffities of the Crown. However, the extraordinary charges of Government were not thought a ground fit to be relied

on.

A deficiency of the Civil Lift duties for several years before, was ftated as the principal, if not the iole, ground on which an application to Parliament could be justified. About this time the produce

G4

produce of thefe duties had fallen pretty low, and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced 800,000l. a year clear to the Treasury.

That Prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new demands were made; but with fo much good order were his revenues and expences regulated, that, although many parts of the establishment of the Court were upon a larger and more liberal fcale than they have been fince, there was a confiderable fum in hand, on his decease, amounting to about 170,000l. applicable to the fervice of the Civil Lift of his prefent Majefty. So that, if this Reign commenced with a greater charge than ufual, there was enough, and more than enough, abundantly to supply all the extraordinary expence. That the Civil Lift hould have been exceeded in the two former reigns, efpecially in the reign of George the First, was not at all furprizing. His revenue was but 700,000l. annually; if it ever produced so much clear. The prodigicus and dangerous difaffection to the very being of the establishment, and the caufe of a Pretender then powerfully abetted from abroad, produced many demands of an extraordinary nature both abroad and at home. Much management and great expences were neceffary. But the throne of no Prince has stood upon more unshaken foundations than that of his present Majesty.

To have exceeded the fum given for the Civil Lift, and to have incurred a debt without fpecial authority of Parliament, was, prima facie, a cri

minal

4

1

minal act as fuch, Minifters ought naturally rather to have withdrawn it from the inspection, than to have expofed it to the fcrutiny, of Parliament. Certainly they ought, of themselves, officiously to have come armed with every fort of argument, which, by explaining, could excufe, a matter in itself of prefumptive guilt. But the terrors of the Houfe of Commons are no longer for Minifters.

On the other hand, the peculiar character of the House of Commons, as trustee of the public purse, would have led them to call with a punctilious folicitude for every public account, and to have examined into them with the most rigorous accuracy.

The capital ufe of an account is, that the reality of the charge, the reafon of incurring it, and the justice and neceffity of discharging it, should all appear antecedent to the payment. No man ever pays first, and calls for his account afterwards; because he would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and indeed only effectual, means of compelling a full and fair one. But, in national business, there is an additional reafon for a previous production of every account. It is a check, perhaps the only one, upon a corrupt and prodigal ufe of public money. An account after payment is to no rational purpose an account. However, the House of Commons thought all these to be antiquated principles; they were of opinion, that the moft Parliamentary way of proceeding was, to pay first what the Court thought proper to demand, and to take its chance

for