nefs. Our office correfpondence has loft all pretence to authenticity; British policy is brought into derifion in those nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilft they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmness, and candour, which fhone in all our negotiations. I reprefent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been univerfally received.

Šuch has been the afpect of our foreign politicks, under the influence of a double Cabinet. With fuch an arrangement at Court, it is impoffible it fhould have been otherwife. Nor is it poffible that this fcheme fhould have a better effect upon the government of our dependencies, the first, the deareft, and most delicate objects, of the interior policy of this empire. The Colonies know, that Adminiftration is feparated from the Court, divided within itself, and detested by the nation. The double Cabinet has, in both the parts of it, fhewn the most malignant difpofitions towards them, without being able to do them the smallest mischief.

They are convinced, by fufficient experience, that no plan, either of lenity or rigour, can be purfued with uniformity and perfeverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendship, nor apprehenfion from enmity. They look to themfelves, and their own arrangements. They grow every day into alienation from this country; and whilft they are becoming difconnected with our Government,

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we have not the confolation to find, that they are even friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal the futility, the weakness, the rafhnefs, the timidity, the perpetual contradiction, in the management of our affairs in that part of the world. A volume might be written on this melancholy subject; but it were better to leave it entirely to the reflexions of the reader himself than not to treat it in the extent it deferves.

In what manner our domeftic œconomy is affected by this fyftem, it is needlefs to explain. It is the perpetual fubject of their own complaints.

The Court Party refolve the whole into faction. Having faid fomething before upon this subject, I fhall only observe here, that when they give this account of the prevalence of faction, they prefent no very favourable aspect of the confidence of the people in their own Government. They may be affured, that however they amufe themfelves with a variety of projects for fubftituting something else in the place of that great and only foundation of Government, the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their condition worfe. When men imagine that their food is only a cover for poison, and when they neither love nor trust the hand that serves it, it is not the name of the roast beef of Old England, that will perfuade them to fit down to the table that is fpread for them. When the people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular

affemblies,

affemblies, are perverted from the ends of their institution, they find in those names of degenerated establishments only new motives to difcontent. Those bodies, which, when full of life and beauty, lay in their arms, and were their joy and comfort, when dead and putrid, become but the more loathfome from remembrance of former endearments. A fullen gloom, and furious diforder, prevail by fits; the nation lofes its relish for peace and profperity, as it did in that feason of fullness which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the First. A fpecies of men to whom a state of order would become a sentence of obfcurity, are nourished into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of intestine disturbances; and it is no wonder that, by a fort of finifter piety, they cherish, in their turn, the disorders which are the parents of all their confequence. Superficial observers confider fuch perfons as the cause of the public uneafiness, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the effect of it. Good men look upon this diftracted fcene with forrow and indignation. Their hands are tied behind them. They are defpoiled of all the power which might enable them to reconcile the ftrength of Government with the rights of the people. They ftand in a moft diftreffing alternative. But in the

election among evils they hope better things from temporary confufion, than from established fervitude. In the mean time, the voice of law is not to be heard. Fierce licentioufnefs begets violent reftraints. The military arm is the fole reliance;

reliance; and then, call your constitution what you please, it is the fword that governs. The civil power, like every other that calls in the aid of an ally ftronger than itself, perishes by the affiftance it receives. But the contrivers of this fcheme of Government will not truft folely to the military power; because they are cunning men. Their restless and crooked spirit drives them to rake in the dirt of every kind of expedient. Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour to raise divisions amongst them. One mob is hired to deftroy another; a procedure which at once encourages the boldness of the populace, and juftly increases their difcontent. Men become penfioners of state on account of their abilities in the array of riot, and the discipline of confufion. Government is put under the difgraceful neceffity of protecting from the severity of the laws that very licentiousness, which the laws had been before violated to reprefs. Every thing partakes of the original diforder. Anarchy predominates without freedom, and fervitude without fubmiffion or fubordination. These are the confequences inevitable to our public peace, from the scheme of rendering the executory Government at once odious and feeble; of freeing Administration from the conftitutional and falutary controul of Parliament, and inventing for it a new controul, unknown to the conftitution, an interior Cabinet; which brings the whole body of Government into confufion and contempt,

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THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.

After having stated, as shortly as I am able, the effects of this fyftem on our foreign affairs, on the policy of our Government with regard to our dependencies, and on the interior œconomy of the Commonwealth; there remains only, in this part of my defign, to fay fomething of the grand principle which first recommended this fyftem at Court. The pretence was, to prevent the King from being enflaved by a faction, and made a prifoner in his closet. This scheme might have been expected to answer at leaft its own end, and to indemnify the King, in his perfonal capacity, for all the confufion into which it has thrown his Government. But has it in reality answered this purpofe? I am fure, if it had, every affectionate fubject would have one motive for enduring with patience all the evils which attend it.

In order to come at the truth in this matter, it may not be amifs to confider it fomewhat in detail. I fpeak here of the King, and not of the Crown; the interefts of which we have already touched. Independent of that greatness which a King poffeffes merely by being a reprefentative of the national dignity, the things in which he may have an individual interest seem to be these wealth accumulated; wealth spent in magnificence, pleasure, or beneficence; perfonal refpect and attention; and above all, private ease and repofe of mind. These compose the inventory of profperous circumstances, whether they regard a Prince or a subject; their

enjoyments

i