of bufinefs. This has never been his cuftom. It is enough for him that he furrounds them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excufe for doing all the work of this Faction, when they have no perfonal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an Administration, composed of infulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an Administration conftitutionally impotent, because supported by no party in the nation; he who contributes to deftroy the connexions of men and their truft in one another, or in any fort to throw the dependence of public counfels upon private will and favour, poffibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular perfon. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a Faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is fapping the foundation of its liberty, difturbing the fources of its domeftic tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the fyftem of Europe. It is this unnatural infufion of a system of Favouritifm into a Government which in a great part of its conftitution is popular, that has raised the prefent ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great fpirit of innovation, and a general diforder in all the functions of Government. I keep my eye folely on this fyftem; fyftem; if I fpeak of those measures which have arisen from it, it will be fo far only as they illuftrate the general scheme. This is the fountain of all thofe bitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst. The difcretionary power of the Crown in the formation of Miniftry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rife to a fyftem, which, without directly violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole conftitution. A plan of Favouritifm for our executory Government is effentially at variance with the plan of our Legiflature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed Government like ours, compofed of Monarchy, and of controuls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the Prince fhall not be able to violate the laws. This is ufeful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at firft view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenfive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the difcretionary powers which are neceffarily vested in the Monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, fhould all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a Court. This, I faid, is equal in importance to the fecuring a Government ac-· cording to law. The laws reach but a very little way. Conftitute Government how you pleafe, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercife of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of Minifters of State. Even all the ufe and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living, acting, effective conftitution. It is poffible, that through negligence, or ignorance, or defign artfully conducted, Minifters may fuffer one part of Government to languish, another to be perverted from its purposes, and every valuable intereft of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without poffibility of fixing any fingle act on which a criminal profecution can be justly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the State, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wife Government, ought to be among its very firft and deareft objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new fyftem tell us, that between them and their oppofers there is nothing but a ftruggle for power, and that therefore we are no-ways concerned in it; we muft tell those who have the impudence to infult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the most concerned, who and what fort of men they are, that hold the truft of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what must either render us totally defperate, or foothe us into the fecurity of ideots. We muft foften into into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, some good, fome evil. The elevation of the one, and the depreffion of the other, are the first objects of all true policy. But that form of Government, which, neither in its direct inftitutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most truft-worthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be difpofed of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but confequentially erroneous in every part of it. In arbitrary Governments, the conftitution of the Ministry follows the conftitution of the Legiflature. Both the Law and the Magiftrate are the creatures of Will. It must be fo. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable confideration of this matter, than that every fort of Government ought to have its Administration correfpondent to its Legislature. If it should be otherwife, things muft fall into an hideous diforder. The people of a free Commonwealth, who have taken fuch care that their laws fhould be the refult of general confent, cannot be fo fenfelefs as to fuffer their executory fyftem to be compofed of perfons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recom recommended to thofe powers, upon the use of which the very being of the State depends. The popular election of magiftrates, and popular difpofition of rewards and honours, is one of the first advantages, of a free State, Without it, or fomething equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good Government. The frame of our Commonwealth did not admit of fuch an actual election: but it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the conftitution is preserved) better for all the effects of it than by the method of fuffrage in any democratic State whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first duty of Parliament, to refuse to support Government, until power was in the hands of perfons who were acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the Court in which the nation had no confidence. Thus all the good effects of popular election were fuppofed to be fecured to us, without the mifchiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a diftinct canvafs for every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble and refined part of our conftitution. The people, by their reprefentatives and grandees, were intrufted with a deliberative power in making laws; the King with the controul of his negative. The King was intrufted with the deliberative choice and the election to office; the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refufal to fupport. Formerly this power of controul was what kept Minifters in awe |