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To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and to fecure to the Court the unlimited and uncontrouled ufe of its own vast influence, under the fole direction of its own private favour, has for fome years past been the great object of policy. If this were compaffed, the influence of the Crown muft of course produce all the effects which the most fanguine partizans of the Court could poffibly defire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower forts. A new project was therefore devised, by a certain fet of intriguing men, totally different from the fyftem of Adminiftration which had prevailed fince the acceffion of the Houfe of Brunswick. This project, I have heard, was first conceived by fome perfons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.

The earliest attempt in the execution of this defign was to fet up for Minifter, a perfon, in rank indeed refpectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vaft and sudden elevation, was little known or confidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit fubmiffion. But whether it was for want of firmness to bear up against the first oppofition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the most eligible; that idea was foon abandoned. The inftrumental part of the project was a little altered, 3

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to accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more furely to the one great end propofed.

The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a line which should separate the Court from the Miniftry. Hitherto thefe names had been looked upon as fynonymous; but for the future, Court and Administration were to be considered as things totally diftinct. By this operation, two fyftems of Administration were to be formed; one which should be in the real fecret and confidence; the other merely oftenfible, to perform the official and executory duties of Government. The latter were alone to be refponfible; whilft the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, A party under thefe leaders was to be formed in favour of the Court against the Ministry: this party was to have a large share in the emoJuments of Government, and to hold it totally feparate from, and independent of, oftenfible Adminiftration.

The third point, and that on which the fuccefs of the whole scheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquiefcence in this project. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and character, of the Minifters of the Crown'. By means of a difcipline, on which I fhall fay more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the moft oppofite interefts, and the most discordant politicks,

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politicks. All connexions and dependencies among fubjects were to be entirely diffolved. As hitherto business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no fort of confideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an infenfibility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty fentiments, which are the great fupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in Parliamentary decorum, than in a Turkish army. It was to be avowed as a conftitutional maxim, that the King might appoint one of his footraen, or one of your footmen, for Minifter; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the clofet and back-ftairs was substituted in the place of a national Adminiftration.

With fuch a degree of acquiefcence, any measure of any Court might well be deemed thoroughly fecure. The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristicks of arbitrary power, would be obtained. Every thing would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the perfonal favour and inclination of the C

Prince.

Prince. This favour would be the fole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held: fo that no perfon looking towards another, and all looking towards the Court, it was impoffible but that the motive which folely influenced every man's hopes must come in time to govern every man's conduct; till at last the servility became univerfal, in fpite of the dead letter of any laws or inftitutions whatsoever.

How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon fuch a project of Government, may at first view appear furprizing. But the fact is, that opportunities very inviting to fuch an attempt have offered; and the scheme itself was not deftitute of fome arguments not wholly unplaufible to recommend it.

Thefe opportunities and thefe arguments, the ufe that has been made of both, the plan for carrying this new scheme of government into execution, and the effects which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our ferious confideration.

His Majefty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predeceffors fince the Revolution. Fourth in descent, and third in fucceffion of his Royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, faw fomething to flatter their favourite prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The perfon and caufe of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title difowned throughout Europe, his party difbanded in England.

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His Majefty came indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, victorious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negociate, but to dictate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite fum, was ample, without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conqueft, by an augmentation of debt, by an increase of military and naval establishment, much strengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a ftrong diflike, fo from dread there feemed to be a general averfeness, from giving any thing like offence to a Monarch, against whofe refentment oppofition could not look for a refuge in any fort of reverfionary hope.

These fingular advantages infpired his Majesty only with a more ardent defire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a fituation so full of glory. But to others it fuggefted fentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now beheld an opportunity (by a certain fort of Statef men never long undiscovered or unemployed) of drawing to themselves, by the aggrandifement of a Court Faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honourable fervice; and which it was impoffible they could hold with the leaft fecurity, whilst the fyftem of Administration rested

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