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the opinion of grave men, well affected to the conftitution of their country, and of experience in what may beft promote or hurt it.

Indeed, in the fituation in which we ftand, with an immenfe revenue, an enormous debt, mighty establishments, Government itself a great banker and a great merchant, I fee no other way for the prefervation of a decent attention to public intereft in the Reprefentatives, but the interpofition of the body of the people itself, whenever it fhall appear, by fome flagrant and notorious act, by fome capital innovation, that these Reprefentatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This interpofition is a moft unpleasant remedy. But, if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on fome occafion to be used; to be used then only, when it is evident that nothing elfe can hold the conftitution to its true principles.

The distempers of Monarchy were the great fubjects of apprehenfion and redrefs, in the last century; in this, the diftempers of Parliament, It is not in Parliament alone that the remedy for Parliamentary diforders can be compleated; hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a confidence in Government is re-established, the people ought to be excited to a more strict and detailed attention to the conduct of their Reprefentatives. Standards, for judging more fyftematically upon their conduct, ought to be fettled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and correct lifts of the voters in all important questions ought to be procured.

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By fuch means fomething may be done. By fuch means it may appear who those are, that, by an indiscriminate fupport of all Administrations, have totally banished all integrity and confidence out of public proceedings; have confounded the beft men, with the worft; and weakened and diffolved, instead of strengthening and compacting, the general frame of Government. If any perfon is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country; even he is equally concerned to put an end to this course of indifcriminate fupport. It is this blind and undistinguishing support, that feeds the spring of those very diforders, by which he is frighted into the arms of the faction which contains in itself the fource of all diforders, by enfeebling all the vifible and regular authority of the State. The distemper is increased by his injudicious and prepofterous endeavours, or pretences, for the cure of it.

An exterior Administration, chofen for its impotency, or after it is chofen purposely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered fubfervient, will not be obeyed. The laws themfelves will not be refpected, when those who execute them are despised; and they will be defpifed, when their power is not immediate from the Crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never were Minifters better fupported in Parliament. Parliamentary fupport comes and goes with office, totally regardless of the man, or the merit. Is Government ftrengthened? It grows weaker and weaker. The popular torrent gains

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upon it every hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is not fupport that is wanting to Government, but reformation. When Miniftry refts upon public opinion, it is not indeed built upon a rock of adamant; it has, however, fome stability. But when it ftands upon private humour, its ftructure is of ftubble, and its foundation is on quickfand. I repeat it again-He that fupports every Administration, fubverts all Government. The reafon is this: The whole bufinefs in which a Court ufually takes an interest goes on at prefent equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wife or foolish, fcandalous or reputable; there is nothing therefore to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one confiftent fcheme of politicks. Nothing interpofes, to prevent the full operation of all the caprices and all the paffions of a Court upon the fervants of the publick. The fyftem of Administration is open to continual shocks and changes, upon the principles of the meanest cabal, and the most contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be folid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horrour from fuch a fervice. Men of rank and ability, with the fpirit which ought to animate fuch men in a free ftate, while they decline the jurifdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes, will, for both, chearfully put themfelves upon their country. They will truft an inquifitive and diftinguishing Parliament; becaufe it does enquire, and does diftinguish. If they act well, they know, that in fuch a Parliament, they will be fupported against any

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intrigue; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can protect them. This fituation, however aweful, is honourable. But in one hour, and in the felf-fame Affembly, without any affigned or affignable caufe, to be precipitated from the highest authority to the most marked neglect, poffibly into the greatest peril of life and reputation, is a fituation full of danger, and deftitute of honour. It will be fhunned equally by every man of prudence, and every man of fpirit.

Such are the confequences of the divifion of Court from the Administration; and of the divifion of public men among themselves. By the former of thefe, lawful Government is undone; by the latter, all oppofition to lawless power is rendered impotent. Government may in a great measure be restored, if any confiderable bodies of men have honesty and refolution enough never to accept Adminiftration, unless this garrison of King's men, which is ftationed, as in a citadel, to controul and enflave it, be entirely broken and disbanded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled with the ground. The difpofition of public men to keep this corps together, and to act under it, or to co-operate with it, is a touchstone by which every Administration ought in future to be tried. There has not been one which has not fufficiently experienced the utter incompatibility of that Faction with the public peace, and with all the ends of good Government: fince, if they oppofed it, they foon loft every power of ferving the Crown; if they submitted

to it, they loft all the esteem of their country. Until Ministers give to the publick a full proof of their entire alienation from that system, however plaufible their pretences, we may be fure they are more intent on the emoluments than the duties of office. If they refufe to give this proof, we know of what stuff they are made. In this particular, it ought to be the electors bufinefs to look to their Reprefentatives. The electors ought to esteem it no lefs culpable in their Member to give a fingle voté in Parliament to such an Adminiftration, than to take an office under it; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious infidelity and versatility of Members of Parliament, in their opinions of men and things, ought in a particular manner to be confidered by the electors in the enquiry which is recommended to them. This is one of the principal holdings of that deftructive fyftem, which has endeavoured to unhinge all the virtuous, honourable, and ufeful connexions in the kingdom.

This Cabal has, with great success, propagated a doctrine which ferves for a colour to those acts of treachery; and whilft it receives any degree of countenance, it will be utterly fenfeless to look for a vigorous oppofition to the Court Party. The doctrine is this: That all political connexions are in their nature factious, and as fuch ought to be diffipated and destroyed; and that the rule for forming Administrations is mere perfonal ability, rated by the judgment of this Cabal upon it, and taken by draughts from every division and denomination of public men. This

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