issued March, 1823, and returned staid, by plaintiff's order, and was regularly issued to each succeeding term, and returned in the same manner, until March, 1825, when it was returned levied upon various chattels, and on a writ of vendi̟ ex. to June, 1825, one hundred and forty-nine dollars sixty-two cents, was returned made. A new writ of fi. fa. was issued to November, 1825, March and July, 1826, returned nothing found; and upon a writ issued November, 1826, a levy was made upon lands, out of which, the money in the sheriff's hands was made.

David Halloway, at March term, 1824, recovered two thousand one hundred and forty-eight dollars ninety cents, debt and costs, against the same debtor. A fi. fa. issued November, 1824, was levied upon real estate, which was valued, and the writ returned not sold for want of bidders. A vendi issued to May term, 1825, was returned with the same endorsement. At the same term, the valuations were set aside, and a new valuation was ordered, which was bad, upon a vendi, issued to October term, 1825, and a return endorsed of one thousand six hundred and seventy-nine dollars twenty cents, made by a sale of the property, which sale was confirmed by the Court. New writs of fi. fa. were issued to May and September terms, 1826, and returned nothing found. A writ, dated October, 1826, was levied on the property, which was sold for the money in the sheriff's hands to be distributed.

At November, 1824, James Mendenhall recovered a judgment against Yount, for two hundred and twenty-four dollars fifty cents, debt and costs. In June, 1825, fi. fa. issued, returned to November term, levied on a lot of land, and sold for twenty-three dollars, and nothing found to levy further. Similar and successive writs were issued to all the terms, in 1826, and returned in the same manner. A fi. fa. issued October, 1826, was levied upon the same land with the other writs enumerated, and a part of the money was claimed to satisfy this judgment also.

October term, 1826, Dodd and Parkinson recovered a judgment against the same debtor, for one hundred and thirty-eight dollars twelve cents, debt and costs. A writ of fi. fa. was issued to the first term in 1826, and returned nothing found. Another writ of fi. fa. was issued in October, 1826, which was levied on the same property, and claimed also, to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale.

At February term, 1826, the executors of Waymire obtained their judgment for one hundred and fifty-five dollars thirty-two cents. Execution issued to May and September terms of the same year, and returned nothing found. An. other fi. fa. issued in October, and was levied as the others, and the proceeds claimed as in the other cases. All these latter writs were dated on the same day, October 26, 1826, but that in favor of Halloway, was first put into the hands of the sheriff.

Stoddart, for Waymire, Staley and Mendenhall. Holt, for Halloway.
By the COURT.

This case is decided, we conceive, by the judgments of this Court, in the cases of (M'Cormick v. Alexander, and Patterson v. the Sheriff of Pickaway.) Waymire's judgment is the only one, of all who contend for this money, that

was levied on the property in question, within the year. By the 17th section of the act of 1824, a preference is secured to it, because none of the other judgments were levied on this property, within one year from the time they were rendered. In Patton's case, it is settled, that a levy upon other property, does not take the case out of the provisions of the 17th section, and we are satisfied it is rightly settled. In the same case, it is settled, that the 4th section of the act, only applies to cases, where the liens of the contending parties are equal, and does not touch a case, where upon other principles, one party has a prefer. able lien. Waymire must, therefore, be first satisfied.

No one of the other judgment creditors having levied execution upon the property in dispute, within twelve months from the rendering of their judgments, their liens are equal; and Halloway having put his execution first into the sheriff's hands, has thereby obtained a preference next to Waymire, under the provisions of the 4th section. Between the others, an equal distribution must be made.

RICHMOND v. PATTERSON, ET AL.

A declaration upon a note need not set forth a liability, promise, &c.

Double replications to a plea is no ground of error after verdict, finding both true.

Copies of records from another state, though sworn to, are not admissible as evidence, unless it be shown that the original records are kept under authority of law.

This cause came before the court upon a writ of error, and was adjourned here for decision from Jackson county.

In the original suit, J. and A. Patterson declared upon a note in writing, in these words "that the defendant on the 30th day of August, 1818, by his note in writing, of that date, duly executed, promised in ninety days after date to pay to the plaintiffs fifty three dollars, without defalcation," as by said note to the Court shown appears.

The defendant pleaded non assumpsit and infancy. To the latter plea the plaintiff's replied, first, traversing the infancy. Secondly, that the articles for which the note was given, were necessaries suitable to the defendant's condition. Issues were joined, and on the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiffs on them all.

At the trial a bill of exceptions was taken by the defendant's counsel, to an opinion of the Court, rejecting a deposition offered by them. This was the deposition of the town clerk of New Milford, in the state of Connecticut, proving the correctness of a copy from the records of that town, showing the entry of the time of the defendant's birth.-The Court decided that it was inadmissible as evidence, without further proof, than it contained within itself, of the law of Connecticut with respect to keeping such records, as that of which this purported to be a copy.

The plaintiff in error assigned for error.

That the declaration did not aver that the note was given for any, or what consideration.

That there were double replications to a single plea.

That the deposition was erroneously rejected.

Brazee, for the plaintiff in error.

By the COURT.

In the case of Mors v. M'Cloud, it is distinctly stated that the mode of declaring pursued in this case, is in accordance with a long established practice, which the Court were not at liberty to disturb. We adhere to that opinion, so that the exception to the declaration cannot be sustained.

As to the double replications, a majority of the Court think it now too late to take an exception to them. Each contained a good answer to the defendant's plea, and both are found, by the jury, to be true. There must be some strong ground indeed, to induce us to reverse the plaintiff's judgment, because it appears that he has two valid answers to the defence set up, when either one would be sufficient for him.

Had the defendant wished to confine the plaintiff to one answer to his plea, he should have objected to the double replications before the trial, when the Court would have compelled the plaintiff to confine his proof to one, and order. ed the other to be struck from the record. By waiving this and going to trial, the fact has been found that both replications are true. Under these circum. stances, it is too late to disturb the verdict. It is to prevent confusion at the trial, that duplicity in pleading is prohibited. The exception must be taken in season to effect this object, or it is too late.

The deposition was properly rejected. Until proof was adduced that the record copied was kept under the authority of law, it was nothing. A sworn copy of a private paper is nothing without proof of the original being executed. So the copy, in this case, was inadmissible, until it was proven that the paper copied and alleged to be a record, was legally entitled to that character. In the absence of this proof, the deposition was rightly rejected. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas must be affirmed.

McCOY v. THE CORPORATION OF CHILLICOTHE.

A bill in chancery to obtain a perpetual injunction against collecting a tax assessed in the ordinary way, and unaccompanied by any circumstances of peculiar injury, cannot be sustained, even if the law authorizing the tax be unconstitutional.

This was a bill in chancery, to enjoin the collection of a tax, assessed by the corporation of the town of Chillicothe, upon the complainant's mercantile capital. The bill set forth, that the complainant was an importer into the town of Chillicothe, from Philadelphia, New-York and Baltimore, semi-annually, of merchandise to a large amount, a great proportion of which, had been imported from foreign countries. That the merchandise thus imported by him into the state of Ohio, was immediately exposed to sale, either by wholesale or retail, as best suited his convenience and customers: That he also purchased, in NewYork, Philadelphia and Baltimore, commodoties, the manufacture of those cities, and of the states of New-York, Pennsylvania and Maryland, or which had been previously imported into those states, from other states of the American union; That he was also a purchaser at Pittsburgh, in Pennsylvania, and at New Or

leans, in Louisiana, of like commodoties, all of which he imported into the state of Ohio for sale, which, with a very small portion of the products and manufac ture of the state of Ohio, constituted his stock of merchandise, upon which he transacted business as a merchant.

The bill further stated, that the mayor and commonalty of the town of Chillicothe, on the 21st of May, 1827, had passed an ordinance, declaring, amongst other things, that the capital stock of merchants, employed within the corpora tion, should be subject to taxation, for corporation purposes; and that by a subsequent ordinance, the tax of two mills on the dollar, of the capital stock of merchants, should be assessed and collected for the year 1827. The bill further stated, that the complainant's capital stock had been rated at twenty thousand dollars, and assessed accordingly, and that the corporation were about to collect the amount, by distress, through the instrumentality of its officer, who was also made defendant. This collection, it was alleged, was contrary to law, and against equity, and prayed an injunction to stop it. The injunction was allowed by an associate judge of the Court of Common Pleas, of Ross county. The corporation answered, setting out their authority under their charter, and the laws of the state, to assess the tax in question, which they alleged was legally assessed, and setting forth the ordinance assessing the same, and asserting the legal right to collect the amount assessed upon the defendant. The answer ad. mitted the general character of complainant's importations, except as to the amount of the products and manufactures of Ohio, admitted the intention to collect the tax, and denied the equity of the complainant's bill. The collector answered, by a reference to the answer of the corporation, and by admitting his intention, to collect the tax, until restrained by injunction.

Some testimony was taken, as to the character of the stock, showing the proportion of it that was of the produce and manufacture of Ohio. But as this fact has no connexion with the point decided, it is unnecessary to report it.

Upon a final hearing, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the bill, and the complainant appealed to the Supreme Court. The cause was adjourned here for decision from Ross county.

Grimke, for complainant, Leonard, contra.

By the COURT.

The facts, set out in the bill and answer, present the ordinary case of a proceeding to collect a tax, assessed for the single purpose of revenue. The collection is to be made in the common manner, by the sale of the persoual goods of the party. There is no allegation or pretence that, to make the collection by distress, would, in any extraordinary manner, prejudice the complainant. Neither is there any suggestion that the parties complained of are insufficient to respond in damages, for the injury they are about to commit, should it be unauthorized by law. No circumstances distinguish the case from one of a common trespass, except, that the act sought to be enjoined, is about to be committed under color of law. In a mere matter of simple trespass, a Court of Equity has not yet interfered by an injunction. This is agreed upon both sides, and we are too well satisfied with the doctrine, as it is now settled, to make a precedent for disturbing it.

The proposition that chancery may interfere by injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits, has no application, that we can perceive, to this case. If the tax was levied by distress, one action at law would settle the right and secure to the party his redress. If, notwithstanding, another tax were levied, it would be the subject of a single suit. The separate repetition of trespasses, laying a ground for separate suits, between the same parties, is not that description of multiplicity of suits which induces equity to interfere. Where many parties and different rights are involved in the same transaction, all of which cannot be legally adjusted without several suits, this state of things is sometimes held a sufficient ground for chancery to interfere. And we are by no means satisfied that what is said, by way of argument, in the opinion, in the case of Osborne v. Bank U. S., warrants the conclusion that equity should take cogni. zance and jurisdiction between two individuals, where one apprehended as series of trespasses would be committed upon him, for each one of which, if perpetrated, the law give him a full and adequate remedy.

The bill proceeds upon the hypothesis that the law authorizing the assess ment. of tax, in question, is unconstitutional, and therefore can confer no authority. But this does not make a case for chancery jurisdiction. What ever may be the principal question, in a cause, the attendant circumstances must be such as to give the court jurisdiction of the subject, or between the parties, before it can be considered or decided. If the ground assumed in the bill is correct, then the collection of the tax is a trespass, and, without the as. sistance of other facts than are here alleged, the remedy is at law, not in chan. cery. In the case of Osborne v. Bank U. S. the jurisdiction was sustained evidently upon the ground that the trespass apprehended, if permitted, would operate to the destruction of the Bank. The undistinguished object of the act to be enjoined, was to destroy the franchise. For this, the court were of opinion, compensation, in a verdict and judgment for damages, would not be a full and adequate remedy, and therefore the preventive remedy of injunction became necessary. This case does not resemble that in any of its features, but the single one that, in both cases, the collection of a tax was the subject in contro. versy. We think the jurisdiction cannot be sustained upon safe and proper principles. The bill is dismissed on that ground, the other branch of the case not having been considered.

BELL v. BATES.

In an action of assault and battery and false imprisonmout, if the damages assessed are under five dollars, the plaintiff can recover no costs.

This was an action of trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. On the trial the injury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed his dama. ges to one dollar seventeen and a half cents. The trial was had before the Supreme Court in Champaign county. The plaintiff moved for judgment for costs, and the motion was adjourned to be decided by the court in special ses