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has since produced not union, but submission. It is not in nature that the Spanish king should foster kindly sentiments for him who has decked himself in the spoil of his house.... The proud, the brave, and the loyal Castilian groans under the yoke which galls him, but which he cannot break, and sickens at the recollection of his ancient glory. His deep resentments are known, and it is to prevent their effects that he has been compelled to make the cession of those provinces.... France will then hold at her discretion the Spanish treasures, and the rich provinces of the New World. At the first symtom of hostile sentiment, she arrests the means of aggression. Thus the dependance of Spain is rendered absolute, aud her chains are riveted forever. Does Spain behold this state of things with calm indifference? No; she feels all the pangs of wounded pride, driven to the necessity of perpetuating its own humiliation.

A few words after what has already been said will suffice to shew the importance of those provinces to France. This results from the influence on her rival, on Spain, and on the United States; by means of the position, the resources and the means of aggression which those provinces afford. Enough has been said of the position. The resources are great and encreasing. Not only cotton and indigo will be furnished for her manufactures, but supplies and subsistence for her colonies and her troops. These resources too will be at the very point most important both for defence and aggression.... The same force will be ready to operate either against England, Spain, or America. Thus that force will be tripled in its moral effect, and influence alike the conduct of all against whom it may be directed. To what has been said on the facility with which we may be assailed, I might add much, but it is unnecessary. It behoves us, however, to consider well the spirit of the French government, which in all its changes, has never lost sight of this object. The French minister Mons. De la Luzerne, when Congress were deliberating on the ultimata for peace, obtained a resolution that our ministers should, as to our western boundary, treat under the dictation of France. Our ministers disdained the condition, and refused to obey. Their manly conduct obtained for you the countries whose fate is now suspended on your deliberations. Never, no never, has France lost sight of Louisiana. Never for a moment has she been blind to its importance.... Those who, driven from her bosom into exile, wandered about among us, have gathered and communicated the fullest infor

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mation. While they enjoyed your hospitality, they probed your weakness, and meditated the means of controlling your conduct. Whatever may be the fair appearances, rely on it that every Frenchman bears with him every where a French heart, and so he ought. I honor him for it. O! that Americans had always an American heart!

It remains to notice the advantage of this country to the United States, as it may relate to our power, our peace, our commerce, and above all, to our freedom. As to our power

something has already been said on the peaceful influence which results from the dependance of colonies belonging to the great nations of Europe....add to this, that the product of those colonies must pass by our doors and be exposed to our cruisers. A further advantage is to be found in the ready means of invasion (in concert with the troops of others) if driven to the necessity of war. The possession of power will give us not only security, but peace. Peace indeed can never be safe but by the aid of power. Our disposition is pacific. It is our interest to be at peace, and the form of our government, while it secures to us the enjoyment of as much liberty as is possible, renders it particularly imprudent to risque in war, any change of the constitution. Grant us these provinces, and we can dictate the conditions of our commerce with the islands. Possessed of them, it will be doubly lucrative, and without them, wholly uncertain. There is another stream of profitable trade which will then flow in our channels. The risque and difficulty which Spain experiences in bringing home her treasures when she is at war, will naturally suggest the advantage of remitting them through this country. The produce of the Mexican mines may then be shipped directly to Asia. It will be paid for to Spain by bills on the commercial nations, and thus furnish to her the easy means of obtaining the supplies she may stand in need of. The bullion will be so much the more valuable, as the danger and expence of transportation are diminished. This, therefore, would have a beneficial result upon the whole commercial world. It would more especially emancipate Spain from her present thraldom. It would give a happy change to all her interior administration, and increase both her absolute and relative force. Let me say here, that it is our interest to preserve the authority of Spain over her American territory. We have enough of our own. We can have no wish to extend our dominion. We want men, not land. We are therefore the natural, and the safe guardians of Spain.

On us she may rely with perfect

confidence. We can derive from that commerce, which it is her interest to permit, all the advantage we ought to ask. But great as are the benefits which will result from the possession of the Floridas and New Orleans, great as is their tendency to advance our power, secure cur peace, and extend our commerce, there is a consideration, in comparison with which, commerce, peace, and power, are of but slight avail. These provinces will fortify the defences of our freedom. My honorable colleague has stated to you his apprehensions of standing armies. And yet, sir, if we be not possessed of this ter ritory, standing armies become necessary. Without an imposing military force, the inhabitants of the western country will be in such immediate danger, that they must league with a neighbor who will have every thing to offer, and from whom they will have every thing to fear. This will lead to the worst of all wars, to civil war. And when that shall happen, liberty will soon be lost. The army which has defeated one half the nation, will easily lend itself to enslave the other. Such is the history, and such will ever be the fate of man, In this view then, above all others, is that possession most precious. When it is in our hands, we need no standing army. We can turn our whole attention to naval defence, which gives complete security both at home and abroad, When we have twenty ships of the line at sea, and there is no good reason why we should not have them, we shall be respected by all Europe. The sense of security resulting from such force, must give a new spring to industry and encrease the stock of national wealth. The expence, compared with the benefit, is moderate, nay, trifling. And let me here say one word as to national expence. Sir, whatever sums are necessary to secure the national independence, must be paid. They will not amount to one half of what it must cost us to be subdued. we will not pay to be defended, we must pay for being conquered. There is no medium, and but the single alternative. In the proper expenditure for defence, therefore, is true economy, and every pitiful saving, inconsistent with that object, is the worst, the most profligate profusion.

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Having now considered, in its various relations, the importance of these provinces, the way is open to estimate our chance of obtaining them by negociation. Let me ask on what ground you mean to treat? Do you expect to persuade? Do you hope to intimidate? If to persuade, what are your means of persuasion? Every gentleman admits the importance of this country. Think you the First Consul, whose capacious

mind embraces the globe, is alone ignorant of its value? Is he a child whom you may win by a rattle to comply with your wishes? Will you, like a nurse, sing to him a lullaby? If you have no hope from fondling attentions and soothing sounds, what have you to offer in exchange? Have you any thing to give which he will take? He wants power. You have no power. He wants dominion. You have no dominion. At least none that you can grant. He wants influence in Europe, And have you any influence in Europe? What, in the name of heaven, are the means by which you would render this negociation successful? Is it by some secret spell? Have you any magic power? Will you draw a circle and conjure up devils to assist you? Or do you rely on the charms of those beautiful girls with whom the gentleman near me says, the French grenadiers are to incorporate? If so, why don't you send an embassy of women? Gentlemen talk of the principles of our government, as if they could obtain for us the desired boon. But what will these principles avail? When you enquire as to the force of France, Austria, or Russia, do you ask whether they have a habeas corpus act, or a trial by jury? Do you estimate their power, discuss their interior police? No. The question is, how many battalions have they? What train of artillery can they bring into the field? How many ships can they send to sea? These are the important circumstances which command respect and facilitate negociation. Can you display these powerful motives? Alas! Alas! To all these questions you answer by one poor word....confidence....confidence....confidence....Yea, verily, we have confidence.... We have faith and hope, aye: and we have charity too.

Well....

Go to market with these christian virtues, and what will you get for them? Just nothing. Yet in the face of reason and experience, you have confidence; but in whom? Why, in our worthy President. But he cannot make the treaty alone. There must be two parties to a bargain. I ask if you have confidence also in the First Consul? But whither, in the name of heaven, does this confidence lead, and to what does it tend? The time is precious. We waste, and we have already wasted moments which will never return. You have already tried negociation. I say you have tried it, because I know you have a minister in France, and I am sure the first magistrate of our country cannot have been so negligent as not to pay attention to a subject which is confessedly of such magnitude. You have then negociated. And with what success? Why, instead of defeating the cession you have closed the

river. Instead of obtaining any advantage by a new treaty, you have lost the benefit of an old one. Such are the results

of your negociation in Europe. In this country you have negociated to get back the privilege you are robbed of: and what follows? A prohibition to touch their shores. Instead of restoring the rights of treaty, they cut you off from the rights of humanity. Such is your splendid success from negociation; and yet gentlemen tell us we must continue to nego ciate. The honorable member from Kentucky, says that great lengths are gone in enquiring into, and rectifying the irregular procedure.... He tells us a minister is just appointed, and it would therefore be inconsistent to fight just now: that more-. over it would degrade the President's authority, and defeat his measures. The gentleman from Georgia, says we have no right to go to war till there shall be a refusal on the part of Spain; and my honorable colleague assures us, that if our wrongs are redressed by negociation, we can have no complaint. As to the lengths which are gone, it is for those gentlemen to appreciate their value, who know what they are. I profess my ignorance, and judging by effects, must withhold my confidence. If we must wait for a pointed refusal before we do ourselves right, I venture to predict a delay fatal to the peace of this country. But, sir, what is it we are to ask, the refusal of which will justify war? Is it (as my honorable colleague supposes) a mere restitution of a privilege wrongfully taken away? Sir, I answer in the words of the resolutions moved by my friend. "It does not consist with the dignity of this country to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain." But the honorable member from Maryland has told us that we need not cross the Atlantic to seek for precedents, that we have enough on our own archives; and he has had the goodness to mention our humble petitions presented to the king of Great Britain in 1775. We sent, says he, petition after petition. I am sure that honorable member has no wish that a minister should be sent to bear our humble petitions to the footstool of the First Consul's throne. But, sir, whether we treat or pray, it will end as it did in 1775, by war, unless we are determined to give up that independence which we then fought to establish. Let us consider a moment the natural course of this negociation. It is the interest of France to foster in us a hope from treaty, until she has put herself in a condition to frustrate all other hope. There can be no question therefore that she has avoided, and will avoid a direct refusal. And as long as we are content to accept of smooth speeches,

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