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Superstition imposes fresh restraints upon the sensual appetites, though it may often let loose the malignant passions; but atheism takes away many restraints from those appetites, without throwing upon those passions, under under many circumstances which may incite them in the minds of its votaries. Superstition is eager from a vicious excess of credulity; but atheism is often obstinate from an excess of incredulity, equally vicious. Superstition is sometimes docile from conscious weakness; but atheism is always haughty from real or supposed strength. Superstition errs, and perverts only in consequence of error; but atheism rejects, and for the most part disdains to examine after rejection. Superstition catches at appearances; but atheism starts back from realities. Superstition may, in some favorable moment, be awakened to the call of truth; but atheism is generally deaf to the voice of that "charmer, charm she never so wisely."-Dr. Parr.

462.

If all proceeds from God, so must the qualities of our minds as well as the forms of our bodies; and the gifts must be directed by His will, which shews itself in the variety of His works, as well in the moral as the natural world.

That will must also shew itself in the mode of giving, which in man is modified by a due proportion of free agency, to constitute and temper his responsibility, and the retributions which his use of it shall call for. This, I believe, is the limit of God's predestination, distinct as that must be from His prescience: leaving to Him the full exercise of His attributes, and to man the exercise destined for him of his free agency.-W. Danby.

463.

This is the security of us creatures who live

under an irresistible and uncontrollable power, that all the ways and proceedings of that power are in loving-kindness, righteousness, and judgment. -Dr. Whichcote.

464.

Reason cannot be perfectly satisfied with what it does not comprehend; but there are matters in which this want of satisfaction may be supplied by the feelings; so it is in religion, which addresses itself to both. If reason were perfectly satisfied, there would be no operation on the feelings, or, at least, not of that sort and degree that would not interfere with our free agency, or with that trial of our feelings, which depends upon our having the power over them that free agency supposes. Without that free agency, or, at least, a sufficient degree of it (for every thing in human nature is limited), there can be no responsibility.W. Danby.

465.

I think we cannot repeat that passage in Scripture, "Surely there is a God who governs the earth," without being sensible that the assurance is derived from a mixture of reason and feeling, which would not have been made to concur, if the action of each had not been necessary, as an aid to the other.-W. Danby.

466.

In matters of sentiment, the grounds of assent or rejection must, I should suppose, differ from those of mere matter of fact; and the manner and degree of assent obtained must probably depend a good deal upon the moral inclination of the person addressed. Now religion is chiefly a matter of sentiment: not merely the judgment, but all the passions are concerned, one way or another, in its reception or rejection.-W. Danby.

467.

Our wills are more to be blamed than our natures: perverse wills do more harm in the world than weak heads.-Dr. Whichcote.

468.

It grieves me more than I can say, to find so much intolerance; by which I mean over-estimating our points, of difference and under-estimating our points of agreement. I am by no means indifferent to truth and error, and hold my own opinions as decidedly as any man; which of course implies a conviction that the opposite opinions are erroneous. In many cases I think them not only erroneous but mischievous; still they exist in men, whom I know to be thoroughly in earnest, fearing God and loving Christ, and it seems to me to be a waste of time, which we can ill afford, and a sort of quarrel "by the way," which our christian vow of enmity against moral evil makes utterly unseasonable, when christians suspend their great business and loosen the bond of their union with each other by venting fruitless regrets and complaints against one another's errors, instead of labouring to lessen one another's sins. For coldness of spirit, and negligence of our duty, and growing worldiness, are things which we should thank our friends for warning us against; but when they quarrel with our opinions, which we conscientiously hold, it merely provokes us to justify ourselves, and to insist that we are right and they wrong.-Dr. Arnold.

469.

We may maintain the unity of verity in point of faith, and unity of charity in point of communion, notwithstanding all differences in point of apprehension.-Dr. Whichcote.

470.

The essential idea of opinion seems to be, that

it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion.-Lewis.

471.

It seems possible, and even not very difficult, for two truly candid and intelligent persons to understand each other upon any subject.-Hartley. 472.

Things may be viewed in such different lights, that it is possible we may be thought to contradict ourselves when we really do not.-W. Danby.

473.

True unanimity is that which proceeds from a free judgment arriving at the same conclusion after an investigation of the fact.-Bacon.

474.

Men's apprehensions are often nearer than their expressions; they may mean the same thing when they seem not to say the same thing.-Dr. Whichcote.

475.

I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only when we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, disputes, and positiveness in false and dubious propositions are evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms.-Dean Swift.

476.

Those who have no opinion of their own, are perhaps the most likely to adopt a wrong one, or at least it is an even chance whether they do or not; for being incapable of forming an opinion of their own, they are equally so of distinguishing between the good and bad which they meet with in others; and this incapacity leaves them no resource but in an obstinate adhesion to the opinion they may happen to have adopted.-W. Danby.

477.

There are many who take up their opinions without having been incited by any previous doubt to the examination of the subject on which they have formed them. They have no idea that conviction can be the result of such a process. These can hardly be ranked among the thinkers. But what is curious is, that those who so take up their opinions, are often the most obstinate in adhering to them, without very well knowing why. These then can hardly be ranked among the reasonable. Instead of

having "proved all things," they have not even proved what they have adopted. Neither the one nor the other of these rational beings seems to understand what doubt is: they jump at once from perfect ignorance to perfect certitude, or what they take for such. They can hardly say, "My heart became the convert of my head.". W. Danby.

478.

Principles taken upon trust have seldom an equal influence upon us with those which we take upon strict examination and mature deliberation. And men will be easily tempted to desert those for which they have no better anthority than the vote of a multitude.

K