1. Constructing roof so as to project snow and ice into highway.] Declaration
that defendant's building abutting a highway was so constructed that the
snow and ice may accumulate upon the roof and thence fall into the street,
and that it did so fall and injure the plaintiff, held, defective in not
charging defendant with negligence. Garland v. Towne (N. H.), 164.
2. Explosion of steam-boiler — liability of owner.] The owner of a steam-
boiler, which he has in use on his own property, is not responsible, in the
absence of negligence, for the damages done by its bursting. Marshall ▾
Wellwood (N. J.), 394.
3 Brickburning — prescription.] Plaintiff's lands surrounding his premises
were planted with ornamental shade and fruit trees and shrubbery. On
adjoining land the defendant owned and operated a brick-kiln, wherein he
manufactured brick by the use of anthracite coal, thereby producing a
noxious vapor, which the wind carried upon plaintiff's lands, and which
injured and destroyed his trees and shrubbery. Defendant's premises had
been in use as a brick yard, though not uninterruptedly, since before the
plaintiff purchased his lands, and for more than twenty-five years. Held,
(1) that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the defend-
ant from using such coal as would produce the noxious vapor; (2) that
plaintiff was entitled to damages; (3) that plaintiff's right was not affected
by the fact of the prior occupation by defendant, and (4) that defendant had
not acquired a prescriptive right, as the kiln had not been used uninter-
ruptedly for twenty years. Campbell v. Seaman (N. Y.), 567, and note, 580.
4 Abatement of.] When a nuisance consists in the use to which a building is
put, and not in its location, the abatement must consist only in putting a
stop to such use. Brightman v. Inhabitants of Bristol (Me.), 711.
5. Destruction of buildings by mob — evidence—damages.] In an action against
a town, under a statute, to recover damages for the destruction of a build-
ing by a mob, held, (1) that evidence that the business carried on in the
building was, from its noisome smells, a public nuisance, was inadmis-
sible (the business not being of itself unlawful) to justify the destruction
or as tending to show contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff';
(2) that the actual value of the property at the time it was destroyed was
the basis of the measure of damage. Ib
1. Remedy of, for unlawful removal.] A city officer cannot maintain a bill in
equity to enjoin the corporate authorities from unlawfully removing him
or appointing a successor, as he has a complete remedy at law. Delahanty
v. Warner (Ill.), 237.
2. Officer de facto — who is — acts of.] Service of a legal notice was made by
a person whose term of office as a constable had expired, but who was
generally supposed to be a constable, and at the time was notoriously
acting as such. Held, that he was an officer de facto, and that the valid-
ity of the service could not be collaterally called in question. Petersilea
v. Stone (Mass.), 335.
Bond of ―liability of sureties.] See SURETY, 266.
De facto - when one exercising judicial functions is not.] See CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 50.
Liability for acts of] See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 468.
Of municipal corporations, indemnity to.] See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 404.
Municipal - extra compensation of] See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 670.
Trespass by, in execution of process—when party not liable for.] 806 TRES
PASS, 519.
See COUNTY TREASURER, 638.
Action for injury to.] See Husband and WIFE, 353.
PARENT AND CHILD.
See INFANT; NEGLIGENCE, 510.
PAROL EVIDENCE.
See EVIDENCE.
1. Exemption--partners as such cannot claim.] Where an execution for a
partnership debt is levied on partnership property, either party may sever
his share and claim an exemption therein; but the partnership as such,
or the parties jointly, can claim no exemption. Russell v. Lennon (Wis.),
-] The members of an insolvent firm are not entitled to the statutory
exemptions out of the partnership property after it has been seized in
execution by partnership creditors, notwithstanding all the members join
in demanding the exemptions. Gaylord v. Imhoff (Ohio), 762.
3. Capital stock — loss -- contribution.] Articles of copartnership between A,
B, C, and D, for the transaction of a commission business, provided that
A and B should contribute the whole capital in unequal proportions;
that A should contribute "such time as he may be able to give;" that B, C,
and D, should each contribute all their time to the business; that each part-
ner should receive one-fourth of the net profits; and that A and B should
receive interest on the capital contributed by them. The partnership was
afterward dissolved by mutual consent, the business of the firm closed by
B, and it resulted in a loss. Held, on a bill in equity by B against the
other partners, that the capital constituted a debt of the partnership to
which all the partners were bound to contribute equally, and that, one of
them being insolvent, the loss was to be borne equally by the other three.
Whitcomb v. Converse (Mass.), 311.
4. Effect of payment by one partner after dissolution, on statute of limitation.]
Payment of interest on a note drawn by a firm, by one of the members,
VOL. XX.- 103
after the dissolution of the firm, but within six years after the maturity
of such note, will renew it, as against the statute of limitations; nor
will the fact that one of the firm is a married woman alter the effect of
such renewal. Merritt v. Day (N. J.), 362.
Bals of one partner to the firm is not an alienation.] See INSURANCE, 583
Unlawful commitment to work-house.] See CONSTITUTIONAL Law 681
1. When obligations extinguished by — subrogation.] S. advanced money to a
railway company to enable it to pay its past due coupons under an agree-
ment that he should hold the coupons thus paid as security. The prop-
erty of the railway was afterward sold under the mortgage given to
secure the bonds and coupons, and the proceeds being less than the in-
debtedness, S., as holder of such coupons, claimed a pro rata share with
the holders of other bonds and coupons. Held, that as the bondholders
were ignorant of the arrangement between S. and the company, the
coupons when paid became, as to them, extinguished, and that S. was not
entitled to share. Union Trust Co. v. Monticello, etc., R. R. Co. (N. Y.),
541.
& To the administrator of a living person.] A payment by a debtor to an
administrator duly appointed is valid, and a bar to an action to compel a
second payment, although the supposed intestate is alive at the time and
letters of administration are subsequently revoked for this reason
Roderigas v. East River Saving Institution (N. Y.), 555.
POLICE POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12.
PREFERENCE.
See BANKRUPTCY, 438.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 243; NUISANCE, 567.
Liability of agent to principal for damages caused by uncuthorized acts.] See
ACTION, 241.
PRIZE FIGHT.
See ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
PROBATE COURTS.
See COURTS, 555
PROMISE.
Bee CONTRACT, 847.
PROMISSORY NOTES.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
PUBLIC CHARITY.
See TRUST.
See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 631; MARRIAGE, 888.
. Constitutional law — making railroad companies liable for coroner's inquest.]
A statute made railroad companies liable "for all expenses of the coroner
and his inquest, and the burial of all persons who may die on the cars, or
who may be killed by collision or other accident occurring to such cars,
or otherwise." Held, unconstitutional so far as it attempts to make rail-
road companies liable in cases where they have violated no law or been
guilty of no negligence. Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. v. Lackey
(Ill.), 259.
2. Statute requiring to fence line.] A statute requiring a railroad company to
fence its lines is a police regulation, and obligatory upon all railroads
whether chartered before or after its passage. Wilder v. Maine Central
R. R. Co. (Me.), 698.
3. Negligent communication of fire.] A railroad company is bound to keep its
track and contiguous land clear of materials likely to be ignited from
sparks issuing from its locomotive properly constructed and driven. Sal
mon v. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. (N. J.), 357, and note, 362.
4. Contributory negligence.] A person owning land contiguous to a railroad is
not obliged to keep the leaves falling from his trees, from being carried
by the wind to such railroad; nor to keep his lands clear of leaves and
combustible matter; nor, on failure to perform such acts, does he become
contributory to the production of a fire originating in the carelessness, on
its own land, of the railroad company. Ib.
Damages for lands condemned for.] See DAMAGES, 220.
How affected by changes in general laws.] See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 592.
Injury to animal through failure to fence.] See NEGLIGENCE.
Injury to employee.] See MASTER AND SERVANT, 552.
Liability of assignee of, for injuries occasioned in operating.] See NEGLI
GENCE, 533.
Liability of, for negligence of servant in the affairs of the estate.] See NEGLI
GENCE, 533.
Of deed, when not notice.] See DEED, 737.
1. When may be had.] An action by the citizen of a State against a foreign
corporation cannot be removed into the United States Circuit Court un-
der the Revised Statutes after one trial has been had, although the
action is one where review will lie. Whittier v. Hartford Ins. Co. (N.
H.), 185.
2. Residence of parties.] A citizen of New Hampshire brought action against
a Vermont corporation, and afterward, in good faith, moved to and became
a citizen of Vermont. Afterward the defendant petitioned for a removal
of the cause to the United States Circuit Court. Held, that both parties
being citizens of the same State at the time of the petition, the removal
could not be had. Laird v. Conn. & Pass. Rivers R. R. (N. H.), 215.
Evidence of.] See EVIDENCE, 325.
1. Of standing timber· - license to enter and remove.]
veyed the timber standing and lying thereon, with license to the grantee
to enter and remove the same. Held, that the grantee might enter within
a reasonable time, but that if he did so afterward he was liable in trespass
quare clausum for the entry, but not for the value of the trees. Hoit v.
Stratton Mills (N. H.), 119.
2. Of exempt property — may be fraudulent as to creditors - homestead.] J. S.
owning premises which were exempt from execution as a homestead, con-
veyed them to plaintiff by a deed which was fraudulent and void as to
creditors; but J. S. continued to occupy them. The premises were after-
ward sold under an execution against J. S., and defendant derived
title through such sale. Held, (1) that the right to a homestead was not
assignable, and therefore, that whatever rights J. S. might have had, the
plaintiff could not avail himself of them; and (2) that the conveyance
might be fraudulent and void as to creditors although the property was
exempt from levy. Currier v. Sutherland (N. H.), 143, and note, 150.
8. Representations as to vegetable seeds — implied warranty.] A statement made
in good faith at the time of sale, by the vendor, that seed is of a certain
kind, such seed, with respect to kind, not being ascertainable by inspection,
will lay a ground from which a jury, or a court having power to pass upon
facts, may infer a warranty as to kind. Wolcott v. Mount (N. J.), 425, and
note, 430.
4. Measure of damages.] Where seed are warranted as to kind, and the vendor
knows the use to be made of the seed, he is answerable for the difference
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