Sanford v. Huxford. burden is on the defendant to defeat the agreement, which will be presumed good until facts are alleged against it to invalidate it. Paris v. Dexter, 15 Vt. 379; Wade v. Simeon, 2 C. B. 565; Gould v. Armstrong 2 Hall (S. C.), 267. And if the parties act in good faith, even where they know all the facts, and there is a promise without legal liability to base it on, the courts hesitate to disturb the agreements of parties on any assumption that an advantage which they have obtained, and conceive to be worth paying for, is not considered valuable. The decisions in this State have gone far to sustain such bargains. Weed v. Terry, 2 Doug. (Mich). 344; Van Dyke v. Davis, 2 Mich. 148; Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 id. 266; Hull v. Swarthout, 29 id. 249; Gates v. Shutts, 7 id. 127. In Van Dyke v. Davis, the party had no title whatever. In Moore v. Locomotive Works, the defendant had become liable for not delivering machinery, and it was regarded as an advantage gained to the plaintiff to get the property, instead of a lawsuit for damages, so as to uphold a waiver of delay. In Gates v. Shutts, the claim was supposed to be barred by the statute of limitations. The decisions generally hold that an agreement to settle an existing suit is sustainable without reference to the merits of the controversy, unless under very peculiar circumstances. It is so held on the ground that an alteration in the position of the parties may of itself be an advantage, and may, in the absence of fraud or other controlling reason, be a sufficient consideration. In Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S. 559, the court held that there could be no doubt whatever that the compromise of a suit was a sufficient consideration; but that the reason was not the saving of the costs, but the change of position, and that in all cases where parties had so changed their position the same rule would apply. There a person not liable for a rate had compromised it with the commissioners and agreed to pay the reduced sum, both knowing the facts but differing as to the law; and he was held liable. In Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co., 4 Metc. 270, it was held a settlement with an insurance company could not be disturbed by the subsequent discovery of facts which would have prevent ed it if known. In Wade v. Simeon, 2 C. B. 565, it was said that the fact that a plaintiff knew he had no cause of action would not necessa rily defeat a compromise unless he knew he could not under any circumstances have got a verdict. In Gould v. Armstrong, supra, the test was likewise stated to be whether there "could be " any recovery. In Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 113, the parties were not ignorant of the facts, but the law was doubted. So in Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Ald. 117, it was held a compromise would not fail unless it was clear there could be no possible liability. Sanford v. Huxford. The cases refer, among other things, to the contingencies of losing testimony as not to be disregarded. And in Cooper v. Parker, 15 C. B. 822, the doctrine is very broadly laid down. A defendant had pleaded infancy, which was not true in fact. The suit was compromised for a smaller sum, and that plea was by the same agreement withdrawn. The court held the plaintiff bound. PARKE, B., uses this language: "I cannot see why this is not a good plea. The value of the defendant's giving up the question in the action in the county court cannot be ascertained. In dealing with a plea of this sort, the court does not enter into a consideration of the value of the satisfaction if the plaintiff agrees to accept it. The advantage to the plaintiff of the defendant's giving up the plea of infancy in the county court, though an untrue one, might be great." MARTIN, B., very briefly concurs by saying still more broadly, that parties should be allowed to have their agreements carried out as they make them. The decision was unanimous. Cat It is also held that the presumption will always be raised that pleadings are not put in for sham purposes or in bad faith, and that they can. not be attacked except upon averments to the contrary. Bidwell v. ton, Hobart, 216; Smith v. Monteith, 13 M. & W. 427; Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall, 473. There is no reason for presuming unfairness when parties are merely relying on their legal rights, and no reason why they should be debarred from demanding compensation for giving them up. If there has been fraud or unfairness in bringing about a settlement, the want of any hon est cause of action or probable defense may be a fact to be considered among the rest. In the present case Crowell does not appear on the pleadings as the moving party, and there is nothing to indicate fraud. He gave up valu able privileges, and the creditors got valuable benefits thereby, on which they put their own estimate. The bargain cannot be presumed to have been fraudulent, and the consideration is valid, unless the whole trans action was unlawful. Upon the general question, see further, Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 653; Stoddard v. Mix, 14 Conn. 12; Farmers' Bank v. Blair, 44 Barb. 652; Atlee v. Backhouse, 3 M. & W. 633. So far as any question arises concerning fraud against Crowell's partners, we do not perceive how it can be presented on this record. If the defendants could set up any fraud against them to avoid the contract, upon which we need not pass here, such fraud is not to be presumed. And under the second count, which avers their consent, it must be likewise presumed to have been fairly obtained. Sanford v. Huxford. Neither do we think there is any ground for holding such an agreement to be in fraud of the bankrupt law. It has been held that secret agreements by favored creditors to withdraw opposition to the discharge of debtors, or to abstain from examining them, are void, because by their position in the case other creditors are at liberty to rely on their prosecuting all necessary inquiries and developing all important facts, which such agreements tend to smother. It is held such arrangements have a direct tendency to favor fraudulent dealings with assets, and to conceal the truth upon the merits. Hall v. Dyson, 10 L. & Eq. 424; Dexter v. Snow, 12 Cush. 594; Tuxbury v. Miller, 19 Johns. 311; Bell v. Leggett, 3 Seld. 176; Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R. 17. And on similar principles a secret promise to pay a creditor, who signs a com promise with others, and so induces them to regard him as acting without such an inducement, is held fraudulent. Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 49. But a debtor who devotes all his property to be used ratably for all his creditors does what the law highly favors and approves. This is the very aim and purpose of the bankrupt law, and the only end for which the petition in bankruptcy was filed. No act can be in fraud of a law which it is intended and calculated to carry out. Crowell merely bargained to submit to the purposes of this law, when he had before resisted the attempt to bring him within it. If it had been a bargain to conceal or withdraw his assets from distribution, or to procure a collusive discon. tinuance of the suit after other creditors had appeared, there might have been some reason for doubting its validity. But an agreement to submit to a bankruptcy decree, and to have the estate disposed of in due course of law, is entirely proper and valid. The judgment should be reversed, and the demurrer overruled, with costs, and the cause remanded to the court below, that the defendants may plead over. The other justices concurred. Equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of a personal tax, even if it be illegal; nor will it assume jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits when the parties have, severally, remedies at law. A statute provided for the assessment of a specified tax on liquor dealers, the money thereby raised to be devoted to the use of the towns, villages, and cities in which the business was carried on. Held, (1) not a "State tax," and therefore not within the constitutional provision directing the application of "specific State taxes;" (2) that the fact that the same tax was levied on all dealers without regard to the amount of business did not render it unjust or unequal; (3) that the parties taxed could not object because the municipality had no voice in the levy, nor because the sheriff and not the tax collector was made the collector, and (4) that the tax was not equivalent to a license so as to come within the constitutional prohibition of licensing the sale of liquors. BILL ILL in equity to restrain the collection of a tax assessed against the several complainants separately in respect to the business of liquor dealers. The opinion states the case. Romeyn & Weir and F. A. Baker, for complainants. George H. Prentis, C. A. Kent and Andrew J. Smith, Attorney-General, for defendant. COOLEY, J. The bill in this cause was filed to restrain the collection from the several complainants of a tax assessed against them separately, in respect to the business in which each is engaged. It is a personal tax purely. It was decided at an early day in this State, that equity had no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of a personal tax, even conceding it to be illegal; the ordinary legal remedies being ample for the party's protection. Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. The principle has ever since been regarded as not open to controversy in this State, and it was applied without its soundness being contested in Henry v. Gregory, 29 Mich. 68, decided last year. In other States it is supported by a strong preponderance of authority. Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass. 152; Durant v. Eaton, 98 id. 469; Loud v. Charlestown, 99 id. 208; Whiting v. Boston, 106 id. 89; Hunnewell v. Charlestown, 106 id. 350; Rockingham Savings Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 17; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn. 332; Ritter v. Patch, 12 Cal. 298; Berri v. Patch, Youngblood v. Sexton. 12 id. 299; Worth v. Fayetteville, Winst. Eq. (N. C.) 70; Van Cott v. Supervisors, 18 Wis. 247; Greene v. Mumford, 5 R. I. 472; Mc Coy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio, 370; Conley v. Chedic, 6 Nev. 322; Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo. 90; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 id. 443; Barrow v. Davis, 46 id. 394; McPike v. Pew, 48 id. 525; Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132: Intendant v. Pippin, 31 Ala. 542; Baltimore v. Baltimore Ohio R. R. Co., 21 Md. 50; Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 109; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 id. 547. The question then presents itself, how this bill came to be filed, and on what ground the Superior Court was asked to and did proceed to render a decision on the merits. The jurisdictional question has not been argued in this court, but we are not inclined to pass it over in silence, thereby giving countenance to the idea, that by the mere acquiescence of parties a jurisdiction may be made for a court of chancery, by means of which the extraordinary remedy by injunction can be made use of to restrain public officers in their action, where neither the legislation of the State nor the general principles which control the action of courts have ever given this remedy. The writ of injunction is peculiarly liable to abuse; and the practice of resorting to it in cases where it is not allowed by law, relying upon the opposite party to overlook or waive the illegality, is not one that can safely be encouraged or sanctioned. The jurisdiction of courts is never subject to be enlarged or diminished at the discretion of parties; and it would be peculiarly mischievous to permit jurisdiction to rest upon consent or waiver in cases where general public interests are to be affected by the litigation. The grounds suggested, but not argued, as giving equitable jurisdiction in the case, are, first, that thereby a multiplicity of suits may be avoided; second, that otherwise the proceedings may ripen into a cloud upon the title to complainants' land; and, third, that irreparable injury is threatened to complainants in their business. As the tax is only personal, and as yet affects no real estate, and may never do so, the second ground calls for no consideration. The force of the third must rest in the fact that enforcing the tax may in some cases compel the suspension of business, because it is more than the person taxed can afford to pay. But if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every controversy where money is demanded may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a money demand |