THEAT

HE ruling passion of Great Britain has ever been the acquisition of territory, by no means limited to the eastern continent and the isles of the sea. She persisted in her warfare with the Government of France until the year 1763, when she acquired from that Government all of her American possessions, and by treaty claimed the exclusive control until the close of the Revolutionary War in 1783, at which time, by the treaty commonly known as the Jay treaty, she ceded them to the Government of the United States of America. After holding undisputed sway for twenty years, appreciating the vast income derived from our fisheries and grants and licenses to those engaged in the fur-trade, she with great reluctance and with a poor grace re-ceded to our Government all her acquisitions from France. In making this cession by the treaty of 1783 of all the capacious harbors, noble rivers and the Northwest Territory, it was the opinion among many of our eminent statesmen that she ever cherished the desire and determination of regaining them. This opinion was based not only on the well-known desire for acquisition, but from her persistent efforts before and at the time of the treaty to limit our territory as far as practicable, and to the full extent of her power. Satisfied from her experience in the War of the Revolution that they could not be regained by force of arms, the energies of her statesmen were wasted in their efforts to have this vast territory organized into independent states, and to recognize the various Indian nations as independent nations. Could Great Britain have accomplished this purpose through the numerous and powerful tribes of Indians that roamed over these vast tracts of territory which have since become populous States, a large portion of whom were then in sympathy with and allies of the English during the Revolutionary War, she could then by treaty and purchase

have acquired that which she could not hold by force and arms. She could then have colonized and occupied nearly the whole line of territory on the lakes, and the territory west of Lake Erie would have been an insuperable obstacle to the growth of the Northwest, and would have to-day been subject to the British Government instead of a free and independent government.

This design on the part of Great Britain is further apparent from the fact that although this territory had been, by the treaty of 1783, ceded to our Government, the stipulations of the treaty were not carried out; and for years she retained possession of American ports captured during the Revolutionary War, and was constantly by bribes and presents instigating the savage tribes to make impracticable the settlement of the pioneers in the Northwest Territory. Notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty of 1783, the British Government, in violation thereof, still retained possession of the territory north of the Ohio, and at the decisive victory of General Wayne after the treaty, the Canadian volunteers and militia constituted a considerable part of the Indian armies. The decisive battle was fought under the walls of a British fort, standing on territory previously ceded to the United States Government.

These violations of a sacred treaty and encroachments upon our territory on the frontier were still more exasperating upon the high seas. Napoleon was at this time in the very zenith of his power; and Great Britain, instead of overthrowing and crushing at once the French Republic, began to tremble for her own safety. The deadly strife that followed exhausted her resources and crippled her strength. She had for years been mistress of the seas, and to supply her navy with seamen, resorted to impressment of not only her own subjects but on American ships of American sailors. She arrested our merchant vessels on the

high seas under the pretense of seeking deserters, and without hesitation with groundless charges forced our sailors into the British navy and pressed them into the service of a hated nation. Over six thousand were known to have been thus impressed into the enemy's navy, though the real number was far in excess of that number. This disregard of treaty obligations and these insults to our Government were not confined to the high seas, but our American merchantmen were boarded on our own coasts and captured. American seamen were pressed into their service in the very harbor of New York. These aggressions on land and violations of laws of nations and treaty stipulations continued, and becoming intensely aggravating, led on the part of our Government to an open declaration of war. The New England States, with fresh recollection of the carnage, bloodshed and strife of the Revolutionary War, with their sympathies for a monarchical form of government, were averse to the declaration of war; and we were not only compelled to encounter the armies and navy of the most powerful nation on land and sea,but to meet with wisdom and great firmness the opposition of a powerful party composed of our own citizens. Having just recovered from the consequences of the long and exhaustive Revolutionary struggle, and feeling the invigorating influence of prosperity, the nation instinctively shrank from a war that would necessarily paralyze her commerce and the rising hopes of a young nation. The Government determined to exhaust all the efforts of diplomacy before resorting to arms, but England's encroachments were so barefaced and outrageous that Thomas Jefferson concluded that patience and forbearance ceased to be virtues, and in communicating his impressions derived from intercourse with the English authorities, writes to our Government from England: "In spite of treaties England is our enemy. Her hatred is deep-rooted and cordial, and nothing with her is wanted but power, to wipe us and the land we live in out of existence."

Assuming the role of dictator, by her orders she not only violated all our rights as a nation while submitting a treaty that was for protection, but plundered our vessels, impressed our seamen and threatened the towns along our coasts with conflagration.

A powerful party within our own borders.

that was opposed to the War of 1812 comprised many of the leading statesmen of this country, and it should not appear to us strange when we consider the patriotism that characterized many in the party. Many of the noblest men had offered their lives and fortunes to the cause of liberty in the Revolutionary struggle, and yet regarded the British Government as the best in the world. They made their sacrifices and evinced their patriotism not so much against the form of government, but to be free from its oppressive acts. They admired the British constitution, and took up arms not so much to destroy as to enjoy the rights it guaranteed its subjects.

A great majority of the patriots and statesmen believed that sufficient provocation had been given to justify us in a resort to arms. The impressment of 6,000 or 7,000 seamen, most of them American citizens, the destruction of nearly a thousand merchantmen, and the insults heaped upon our flag, were wrongs which could not be justified.

In anticipation of the War of 1812, General Hull, the Governor of Michigan Territory, had been ordered to occupy the Territory with an army of two thousand men, for the purpose of defending the northwest frontier from the Indians, and in case of war with Great Britain to obtain command of Lake Erie. He would thus be able to co-operate with General Dearborn, who had served in the Revolution and had been appointed commander-in-chief of the northern forces, and had repaired to Plattsburg; while General Van Rensselaer of the New York militia, and General Smith, were stationed on the Niagara frontier.

The design of this work will not admit of following further and in detail the campaign of Generals Dearborn, Van Rensselaer and Smith, having in view the invasion and conquest of Canada, but will be devoted in future to the campaign in the Northwest Territory under the command of General Hull, who had been an officer of merit under General Washington in the Revolutionary War, and whose appointment at that time was considered a very judicious one.

In compliance with the call of the President, authorized by Congress, to the several States in anticipation of a war with Great Britain, Governor Meigs, of Ohio, issued his proclamation and drafted twelve hundred men from Ohio, which with three hundred volunteers under

Colonel Miller, three companies of artillery and a part of the First regiment of infantry, assembled at Dayton, Ohio. The command thereof was by Governor Meigs assigned to General Hull, with instructions from the War Department to march to Detroit with all possible speed. The three regiments, under the command of Colonels Cass, McArthur and Findlay, left Dayton June 1st with over two thousand rank and file for Detroit. While en route for Detroit General Hull at Findlay received information from the Secretary of War that war would probably soon be declared, dated June 8th, 1812; but the declaration of war dated the same day was not received by General Hull until July 2d, at Frenchtown, on the River Raisin, where he rested with his army over one day. On the 1st of July, at Miami, on the Maumee river, General Hull employed a schooner, the Cuyahoga, of which one Chapin was captain, to carry his baggage, hospital stores, intrenching tools and about thirty officers and privates, with muster rolls, which had just been completed, and with instructions from Secretary of War. The General declared that as he had not then received a declaration of war, the two Governments were yet at peace. But official notice of the declaration of war had been received by the British commander at Malden six days before the declaration was received by General Hull, giving the British officers a great advantage in preparations. When the vessel with army supplies attempted to pass the British fort at Malden it was seized and captured with all on board. This advantage gained over him had a depressing effect on General Hull.

On the 4th of July, General Hull, with his army, reached Huron River, about two miles east of the present site of Gibraltar, and constructed a bridge. Here he was met by troops from Detroit to aid in preparing the road. On the 5th the army crossed the Ecorse and Rouge rivers and reached the same evening Springwells, having traveled over 200 miles through an almost unbroken wilderness and forests, building bridges as they came to streams and rivers, wading through the memorable black swamp, enduring great hardships. On the morning of the 6th of July General Hull ordered General Cass to Malden with a flag of truce to demand the baggage and prisoners captured on the schooner Cuyahoga. On his arrival at Malden he was

blindfolded, his demands refused, and he was escorted back to Detroit.

General Hull, having reached Detroit with his capable and patriotic officers and army of 2,000 men, could have easily captured Malden, and was urged to the necessity of doing something to carry out the objects of the campaign. On the 12th of July he yielded to the pressure and marched with his army to Sandwich. Here he paused and was vacillating; to the great disgust of his officers, he halted four days; issued a proclamation to the Canadians, and sent out detachments penetrating into the country. After this delay, General Hull sent Colonels Lewis Cass and Miller with a detachment of 280 men, toward Malden. These officers pushed on to the River Canard, within four miles of the British fort at Malden, drove in the pickets, took possession of and held the bridge, and immediately dispatched a messenger to General Hull announcing their success. For some unaccountable reason General Hull, instead of being gratified at their success, seemed irritated, condemned the attack, and directed the immediate return of the detachment to Detroit. The brave officers persisted in their request to attack the enemy to no purpose.

From the statements of the British afterwards, it appeared that the approach of this detachment filled the British garrison with alarm; their shipping was brought up to the wharves and the loading of baggage and stores commenced preparatory to flight. Two sides of the fort were dilapidated, while 700 men, of whom only 100 were regulars, constituted the entire garrison. From the panic which the approach of Colonels Cass and Miller created, there is no doubt that the appearance of General Hull's army of 2,000 men before the place would have been followed by an immediate surrender. The American officers and army felt certain of success and were impatient to be led to the attack; but General Hull thought it unsafe to advance without heavy artillery, and desired to know the effect of his proclamation. Two thousand men quietly waited for this miserable garrison of 700 men, 600 of whom were Canadian militia, restrained by the vacillating course of the commanding officer. The American army was kept in this position three weeks. When at length two twenty-pounders and three howitzers were mounted and with the ammunition placed on floating batterier,

ready to move on Malden, the order to march was countermanded, and the army instead of advancing against the enemy, recrossed the river to Detroit, over which it had passed a few weeks before to the conquest of Canada. During his delay of weeks the gathering of the Indian clans and re-enforcements pouring into the British garrison at Malden seemed to alarm General Hull. The surrender at this time, on the 17th of July, of our post at Mackinac was announced by the officers and troops paroled, and increased his fears, for it threatened the opposing forces of the Indians, Canadians and British in all the Northwest. The fort at Mackinac was the grand depot of the fur companies, and had shielded General Hull from all attacks from that quarter.

Three days previous to the retreat of General Hull from Canada, Colonel Proctor, of the British army, had arrived at Malden with reenforcements, and threw a detachment across the river to Brownstown to intercept any provisions and army supplies that might be advancing from Ohio to the American army. Colonel Brush, who was on the way from Obio with the mail, flour, cattle and supplies for the fort at Detroit, was advised of the movements of Colonel Proctor and was ordered to halt at the River Raisin. To open the communication and aid Colonel Brush, Major Van Horne was dispatched with 200 volunteers and militia; but the detachment was led into an ambush at Brownstown and utterly defeated, but about one-half returning to the army. Both General Hull and Major Van Horne were censured the general for not sending a stronger force, remaining quietly in Canada and crossing his forces leisurely to Detroit; the latter for not heeding the information received that the enemy were in advance, and allowing his small force to rush into an ambuscade. General Hull's position was now embarrassing. Reenforcements were hastening to the support of Malden, his communications on Lake Erie were cut off by the British vessels, while the defeat of Van Horne indicated that his communications by land were also cut off. The general knew the land communications must be opened at all hazards, and dispatched Colonel Miller, with 400 men, on the route which Van Horne had taken, to clear the road to the River Raisin. Colonel Miller left Detroit August 8, 1812, and the next day in the afternoon, as he was

approaching Brownstown, came upon the enemy, covered with a breastwork of logs and branches of trees, protected on the one side by the Detroit river and on the other by swamps and thickets. The British were commanded by Muir and the Indians by Tecumseh. Captain Snelling, leading the advance guard, approached to within half musket shot, when he discovered the enemy. A fierce and deadly fire was opened on him, which he sustained with great courage until Colonel Miller, converting his march into order of battle, advanced to his support. Seeing how destructive the fire of the enemy was, while the bullets of his own men buried themselves for the most part in the logs of the breastwork, also perceiving some symptoms of wavering, Miller determined to carry the works by the bayonet. The order to charge was received with loud cheers, and the next moment one detachment poured fiercely over the breast works, routing the British and Canadians, and pressed swiftly on their retreating footsteps. Tecumseh, however, maintained his post, and Van Horne, who commanded the right flank of the American lines, supposing from his stubborn resistance that it would require more force than he possessed to dislodge him, sent to Colonel Miller for re-enforcements. The latter immediately ordered a halt, and with reluctance turned from the fugitives, now almost within his grasp, and bastened to the relief of his subordinate. On arriving at the breastworks he found the Indians in full flight. He started again in pursuit, but arrived in view of the enemy only to see it on the water floating away beyond his grasp. He had, however, established the communication between Detroit and the River Raisin, and dispatched Colonel Snelling to Detroit with an account of the victory and a request for boats to remove the wounded, bring provisions for the living and re-enforcements to supply the places of the dead and disabled. General Hull promptly sent Colonel McArthur with 100 men and the boats, but with provisions sufficient only for a single meal. Colonel Miller was then some twenty miles from supplies, but not deeming it prudent with his slender force and scanty provisions to proceed, remained on the battle field and sent another messenger, declaring communication opened, and assuring him a few more men and provisions would keep it so, expecting, as soon as

supplies came and he was relieved of the sick and wounded, to march to Brush at the Raisin. The next evening the messenger returned, bringing instead of the provisions a peremptory order to return to Detroit with his forces.

On the evening of the 14th General Hull sent Colonels McArthur and Cass, with a detachment of 400 men, to obtain by a back, circuitous and unknown route through the woods, that which Colonel Miller had secured and then been compelled to relinquish.

On the evening of the 15th General Hull sent a courier to the detachment under Cass and McArthur, ordering them before reaching the Raisin to return, as the fort had been summoned to surrender. The detachment marched until two o'clock that night on their return, and early the next morning arrived at the edge of the woods in the vicinity of Detroit, where they drew up in order of battle.

In the meantime General Brock, commander of the British forces, approached Detroit on the opposite side of the River Detroit, and commenced erecting batteries to protect his army and cover it in crossing the river. General Hull's officers proposed and urged him to permit them to cross and spike the guns and disable the enemy, but every project suggested was rejected, and the 24-pounders and howitzers were dumb on their carriages in front of these hostile preparations.

On the morning of the 15th of August, 1812, a messenger arrived from General Brock demanding an immediate surrender of the town and fort. General Hull replied, refusing in a very spirited manner. General Brock immediately opened his fire from a newly erected battery, and after knocking down chimneys and disabling a few soldiers, ceased firing about ten o'clock in the evening. The next morning General Brock, under the protection of his battery, commenced crossing the river and without loss succeeded. The opposing forces were nearly equal, but the position of the Americans gave them greatly the advantage. The American fort was of great strength, surrounded by a deep, wide ditch, and strongly palisaded, with an exterior battery of two 24pounders. At this time Colonel Anderson, stationed at corner of Jefferson avenue and Wayne street with two 24-pounders, with his fuse ready, was confident he could with one charge have blown General Brock's close

column to pieces, but instead received an order from General Hull not to fire. The ditch was occupied by 400 men, while 400 more lay behind a picket fence which flanked the approach to it. Three hundred more held the town. Against this formidable army General Brock boldly advanced, riding in front of his column, apparently doomed to swift destruction, with his troops advancing, while with impatience every eye of our forces was sternly bent, and every heart beating intensely to hear the command to fire. In this moment of thrilling excitement a white flag was hoisted above the fort, and an order came for all the troops to withdraw from the outer posts and stack their arms. Such a cry of indignation arose as probably never before assailed the ears of a commander.

This shameful deed was done on the 16th of August, 1812, and by the articles of capitulation included Colonels McArthur and Cass, with their detachments that had been sent to the River Raisin, together with the detachment under Colonel Brush at the River Raisin that was entrusted with the supplies. Colonels McArthur and Cass, having heard the cannonading twenty-four hours before, were returning, and at the moment the white flag was raised were with their forces within one and a half miles from the fort, advancing so as to take the enemy in the rear. Thus ended a defense which was thought by the most intelligent officers would have resulted in the entire destruction of the British army.

The terms of capitulation surrendered 2,000 men, 40 barrels of powder, 400 rounds of 24pound shot, 100,000 ball cartridges, 24,000 stand of arms, 35 iron and 8 brass cannon and a large supply of provisions; and for weeks thereafter small boats were engaged in transporting the military stores to Malden.

General Hull was tried by court-martial, of which Martin Van Buren was judge advocate. Acquitted of treason, he was found guilty of cowardice, and was sentenced to be shot, but was pardoned by the President. His life was saved, but he was ever after a blighted and ruined man. It is sad to think he went down to the grave in sorrow and disgrace - that one who had marched beside General Washington in the perilous advance on Trenton, stood firmly amidst the hottest fire at Princeton, gallantly led his men to the charge at Bemis