lymphatic temperament, or great deficiency of brain; by persons ignorant of human nature, this state is sometimes mistaken for patience; just as the extinction of thought and feeling in a nation, is mistaken by a despot for the repose of contentment.

An individual possessing an active temperament, and SelfEsteem, Combativeness and Destructiveness, larger than Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness, will be impatient of opposition and contradiction; one in whom Tune, Time, and Ideality are large, will be impatient of bad music; one in whom Benevolence, Conscientiousness, and Causality are large, will be impatient of hypocritical and selfish conduct. If the nervous and sanguine temperaments predominate, the organs are very active, and the individual will be impatient of all slow prosing movements, whether in speech or actions.

JOY and GRIEF. Mr. Hume enters into a very acute and refined analysis, to show that grief and joy are merely mixtures of hope and fear. After treating of several passions, he continues thus: "None of these passions seem to contain any thing curious or remarkable, except hope and fear, which, being derived from the probability of any good or evil, are mixed passions, that merit our attention."

"Probability," says he, "arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind is not allowed to fix on either side; but is incessantly tossed from one to another, and is determined one moment to consider an object as existent, and another moment as the contrary."

"Suppose, then, that the object concerning which we are doubtful, produces either desire or aversion, it is evident that, according as the mind turns itself to one side or the other, it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow."

"The passions of fear and hope may arise, when the chances are equal on both sides, and no superiority can be discovered in one above the other. Nay, in this situation, the passions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, and is tossed with the greatest uncertainty. Throw in a

superior degree of probability to the side of grief, you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition, and tincture it with fear. Increase the probability, and by that means the grief; the fear prevails still more, till at last it runs insensibly, as the joy continually diminishes, into pure grief. After you have brought it to this situation, diminish the grief by a contrary operation to that which increased it, to wit, by diminishing the probability on the melancholy side, and you will see the passion clear every moment, till it changes insensibly into hope; which again runs, by slow degrees, into joy, as you increase that part of the composition by the increase of the probability." Mr. Hume concludes by this question: "Are not these as plain proofs that the passions of Fear and Hope are mixtures of Grief and Joy, as in optics it is a proof that a colored ray of the sun, passing through a prism, is a composition of two others, when, as you diminish or increase the quantity of either, you find it prevail proportionally, more or less, in the composition ? "*

These views are exceedingly ingenious, and, to a certain extent, sound; but Phrenology presents us with still more distinct and accurate elucidations of the nature of grief and joy. Each propensity desires to attain its object, and the attainment affords to the mind a feeling of gratification. Acquisitiveness desires wealth; Love of Approbation longs for praise and distinction, and Self-Esteem pants for authority. The obtaining of wealth gratifies Acquisitiveness; this is attended with pleasing emotions, and these emotions constitute Joy. The losing of wealth robs Acquisitiveness of its object; this, again, is accompanied with painful sensations, and these are grief. The same remarks may be applied to Love of Approbation, Self-Esteem, or Philoprogenitiveness. When a lovely child is born, the delight experienced by the parents will be in proportion to the ardor of their desire for offspring; or, in other words, their joy will be great in proportion to the gratification of their Philoprogenitiveness. If they lose the child, their grief will be severe in proportion to the intensity of this feeling, lacerated by the removal of its object. In all these

* Hume's Dissertation on the Passions, sect. 1.

instances we find joy and grief existing without involving either hope or fear.

Let us now advert to Mr. Hume's analysis. Cautiousness and Hope are both primitive sentiments, the former producing fear, and the latter an emotion sui generis, attended with delight. Both have relation to future objects, and in this respect differ from the other faculties, the gratification of which relates to present time; but this circumstance does not change the laws of their operation. If the prospect of future evil be presented to the mind, this excites Cautiousness, and fear is produced; this emotion is painful, but fear is not grief. It is to be observed, however, that there must be the fear of something; and as evil is a disagreeable affection of some primitive faculty, of Acquisitiveness or Philoprogenitiveness for example, Cautiousness is never affected alone, but always in conjunction with some other power. Thus, if a son is sick, Cautiousness fears that he will die, and Philoprogenitiveness is painfully affected by the prospect of that event, which painful emotion is grief. Here fear and grief are conjoined; but they arise from different sources, and although the fear cannot exist without the grief, in some degree or other, yet the grief might exist without the fear; and would do so, if the child were carried in a corpse without a moment's warning. In the same way, if a person hopes, he must hope for something. If for gaining £1000, the prospect gratifies Acquisitiveness, and this is joy. Here the active Hope and gratified Acquisitiveness mingle in producing Joy, but still their sources are separate; and if the £ 1000 were realized, Joy would exist without the Hope, although Hope can scarcely be active without Joy. The principles here unfolded will be found to elucidate every instance of the operation of Hope and Fear, Joy and Grief, which can be supposed, and this is a strong proof that we have found the truth. They explain beautifully, for instance, how, with many individuals, the anticipation of good is more delightful than the enjoyment of it. If Acquisitiveness and Hope be both strong, the prospect of gain excites and gratifies both faculties at once; whereas, the actual attainment pleases only Acquisitiveness, and excludes Hope. But Hope being one

of the higher sentiments, and Acquisitiveness only a lower propensity, the delights attending the activity of the former are greatly more elevated and excellent than those accompanying the latter; and it is easy to conceive that the exercise of both must be more delightful than that of either separately, and that when Hope is dropped from the combination, the better half of the pleasure is gone.

The converse of this holds equally good. The prospect of distant evil is more painful than the experience of it when actually present. While the loss of a child is contemplated at a distance, Cautiousness adds its melancholy and heart-sinking fears to the pains of a wounded Philoprogenitiveness; but when the event happens, the influence of Cautiousness is withdrawn, Philoprogenitiveness alone suffers, and the actual distress is less grievous than the anticipation of it.

Great wisdom and benevolence on the part of the Creator are displayed in this constitution of our minds; for we are thereby prompted, with double ardor, to avoid evil, while yet at a distance and subject to control from our efforts.

SYMPATHY* may be defined to be a fellow feeling, in one person, with emotions experienced by another. By attending to the laws which regulate the activity of the mental faculties, we shall discover the true nature of this affection, and the circumstances most favorable to its occurrence.

Every internal faculty, like each of the external senses, is most powerfully and most agreeably roused to activity by the direct presentment of its own objects; Cautiousness, for instance, by the aspect of danger; Benevolence, by that of suffering; and so on. Hence, if two individuals of nearly similar constitutions of mind be exposed to the operation of the same external causes, the same faculties being called into activity in both, will give rise to simila emotions; and they may then be said to sympathize with each

* I am indebted to the kindness of Dr. A. Combe for the following observations on Sympathy.

other. This is one kind of sympathy, but it is not the state of mind to which that term is most correctly applied.

The next source of stimulus to the faculties, is that afforded by Natural Language. When any faculty is predominantly active, it gives a peculiar expression to the features, and certain determinate attitudes to the body, the import of which is instinctively understood by all who possess the same faculty even in a moderate degree. Thus, Self-Esteem being predominantly active, communicates to the body a cold, formal, erect, and haughty air. This air is recognised instinctively by the spectator as indicating excessive pride in the individual who exhibits it; and it is called the natural language of Self-Esteem.* Now, by a law of our constitution, the natural language of any active faculty invariably excites the same faculty to activity, and, consequently, gives rise to the same emotions, in the minds of those who witness it. The forbidding strut of great Self-Esteem, for instance, in a person whom we never saw before, addresses itself directly to our Self-Esteem; we instinctively draw up, and feel moved to support our own consequence by a coldness proportioned to his. In like manner, when we meet for the first time with a person whose countenance and gestures express kindness, candor, and open-hearted friendship, which are the natural language of active Benevolence, Conscientiousness, and Adhesiveness, the same emotions are excited in ourselves, and we instinctively return his advances with a kindness corresponding to his own. Or, let us imagine that we hurry to meet a friend, whom we expect to find all happiness and gaiety, and that, instead of this, seriousness, anxiety, and grief, are depicted on his countenance, and indicated by his gestures, these being the natural language of Cautiousness and other faculties painfully affected, will call up a corresponding affection of the same faculties in our minds, and, without knowing what has distressed him, our features and attitudes will instantly assume an expression consonant with his own. It is to this involuntary and almost unconscious communication of feelings and emotions from the mind of