a crop of spring grain and share the crop with the lessor agreeable to the original contract or lease. Ibid.

30. Conditions precedent. Where a lease for the term of two years, with privilege of renewal, contained the provision that the tenancy shall cease on the 1st day of March, 1867, unless the lessee shall have notified the lessor of his election to continue three years longer, on or before the 1st day of October, 1866, and unless he shall on or before that day satisfactorily secure to the parties entitled, the rent to accrue from the 1st day of March following, held, that | giving the notice and security were both conditions precedent to the renewal of the lease, and that no demand therefor is necessary by the lessor. McFadden v. McCann, 25 Iowa, 252.

31. Tenant must pay rent to his landlord while lease continues. A tenant who leases land of the apparent owner, to whom he paid his rent, is not afterward liable to one who is decreed the owner of the land after the termination of his tenancy, even though he had notice not to pay his lessor; a tenant's duty is to pay his rent to his landlord. Gardner v. Gard. ner, 25 Iowa, 102.

32. Statute construed. Revision, section 3598 (Code of 1873, § 3264), applies only to suits brought for the recovery of land, and not to a case where the tenant acted in good faith, and was not made party to the suit against his

landlord. Ibid.

IV. RENTS, LIEN FOR, ETC.

33. Landlord's lien: property on which it attaches. The landlord's lien, provided by section 1270,* Code of 1851 (§ 2302, Rev. of 1860; §2017, Code of 1873), attaches to all personal property kept by the tenant upon the leased premises in the prosecution of the business for which the tenancy was created. Grant v. Whitwell, Marsh & Talbott, 9 Iowa, 152. But only on such property as belongs to the tenant, and not exempt from execution. Wells, Pettit & Co. v. Seguin & Johnson, 14 Ibid. 143.

34. The lien attaches only to property used and incident to the business for the prosecution of which the premises were leased. Grant v. Whitwell, Marsh & Talbott, 9 Iowa, 152.

35. Such lien is not limited to leases of farms, and the word " use," as it occurs in section 1270,

*See note at commencement of title wherein sections referred to will be found.

Code of 1851, is not employed in the limited sense in which it is applied to agricultural implements. Ibid.

36. It does not attach to goods sold before the lien is enforced when selling was the business for which the property was leased. Ibid.

37. A cow purchased in good faith from the tenant of a farm, and which had been used on the farm, but was not shown to have been purchased there, was held not subject in the purchaser's hands to lien of the landlord. Nesbitt v. Bartlett, 14 Iowa, 485, following Grant v. Whitwell et al., 9 Ibid. 152, which latter case is also reaffirmed in Carpenter v. Gillespie, 10 Ibid. 592.

38. A lien is an obligation, tie or claim which attaches itself to property, for the satisfaction of which such property is bound. Statutory liens without possession have the same virtue that existed in common-law liens accompanied by possession. Grant v. Whitwell, Marsh & Talbott, 9 Iowa, 152.

39.

when landlord's lien attaches. The

landlord's lien attaches as the rent accrues under the contract of lease, and not from the time of the commencement of proceedings to enforce it. lbid.

40. A landlord's lien attaches as the rent accrues, instead of from the date of the commencement of proceedings to enforce it; and a mortgage of goods may, after being garnished by a creditor of the mortgagor, pay over out of the surplus in his hands to the landlord, rents accrued upon the building in which the goods were kept, and which were in arrear at the time that the mortgagor took possession. Doane & Co. v. Garretson, 24 Iowa, 351.

41. Where a tenant leases property-for a term of years, the lien of the landlord attaches at the commencement of the term, upon the property brought upon the demised premises, for the rent to become due or that will accrue during the entire term. Garner et al. v. Cutting et al., 32 Iowa, 547.

42. And the landlord may have an injunction to restrain the sale and removal of the property from the demised premises, by the tenant or his assignee. Ibid.

43. Covenants: reservation of rents. In a contract of lease a reservation of rent was in the following words: "At a yearly rent of $1,000 for the first ten years, and $1,250 for the remaining nine years, payable at the expiration

landlord, he will not be regarded as a tenant a will, but one holding under a definite lease; and if, after quitting the service of the landlord, he refuses to yield up possession of the premises, he will be regarded as one holding over after the

44. When a tenancy is without stipulation as to the amount of rent reserved, the landlord may recover a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. Newell v. Sandford, 13 Iowa, 192.

45. Rent: definition. Rent is a certain profit, either in money, provisions, chattels or labor issuing out of lands and tenements as retribution or return for their use. Merrit v. Fisher, 19 Iowa, 354.

46. Unaccrued rent under a lease existing at the date of a conveyance of the real estate, passes to the grantee, and he can collect it by virtue of the grant, and the grantor has no right to receive rent becoming due after such convey ance; but his liability to the grantee for such rents collected, would be for money had and received, and not for a breach of the covenant. Van Wagner v. Van Nostrand, 19 Iowa, 422.

47. Judgment establishing lien. When in an action for rent in arrear, and for a landlord's lien, there was no issue tried or determined by the jury as to the lien, and the jury found for the plaintiff on the issue joined as to the indebtedness, it was held that the court did not err in recognizing the lien in the judgment, and in directing a special execution to issue to satisfy the same. Bartlett v. Gaines, 11 Iowa, 95.

48. Landlord's right of action. A landlord may maintain an action for rent due, and for a lien, without asking for an attachment as provided by section 1271, Code of 1851. (Rev. 1860, § 2303: Code of 1873, § 2018.) Ibid.

a

49. measure of damages. In an action by landlord against a tenant to recover the value of rent payable in property the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time it was demanded. Safely et al. v. Gilmore, 21 Iowa, 588.

50. Forcible entry and detainer. Where a tenant takes possession of premises under an agreement that he is to occupy them only so long as he shall continue in the employ of the

forcible entry and detainer on the part of his landlord, upon three days' notice to quit. Grosvenor v. Henry, 27 Iowa, 269.

See, further, FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

51. Action of landlord for damages. Where a lease stipulated that the tenant should cultivate land in a good farmer-like manner, and keep the fences in good repair, and where the tenant permitted the fences to become impaired and suffered sheep to go in the orchard by which young fruit trees were destroyed, the landlord may recover in assumpsit under the lease. Elbert v. Wilson, 3 G. Gr. 520.

52. Action of tenant: for trespass of landlord. Where a landlord takes possession of the premises before the expiration of the lease, without the consent or surrender of the lessee, he is a trespasser and liable for damages. Rees v. Baker, 4 G. Gr. 461.

53. In an action for damages by the tenant against the lessor for entering upon leased premises and harrowing up the ground leased, the plaintiff is entitled to recover even though no specific amount of damages is proved. Ibid.

54. measure of damages: general rule. In actions by lessees against lessors for damages for breaches of contracts of lease, by refusing to let the lessee into the possession, the general rule for the measure of such damages, is the

difference between the rent reserved and the value of the premises for the term. And it makes no difference that the rent reserved is payable in kind. Adair v. Bogle, 20 Iowa, £38.

55. In cases of this kind two principles should be impressed upon the jury: 1. The plaintiff should recover only such damages as have directly and necessarily been occasioned by defendant's wrongful acts; and, 2. that if the plaintiff, by reasonable exertions or care on his part, could have prevented such damages, he is bound to do so, and so far as he could have prevented he cannot recover therefor. Ibid.

56. special damages. The plaintiff is not confined to the general rule in cases in which particular damages have resulted from such

breach of contract, as by preparations made in good faith to enter the premises, rendered useless by the defendant's breach of the contract, loss of employment and loss of time in looking for another place, such loss always being the direct result of the lessor's wrongful act, and unavoidable by the use of due diligence and reasonable exertion on the part of the plaintiff. Ibid.

2. A land warrant possesses none of the qualities of negotiable paper, and is to be treated as a chattel only. Fort v. Wilson, 3 Iowa, 153.

3. F. placed in the hands of S. two land warrants to be located, and took from him a receipt as follows: "Received, Lansing, August 31. 1852, from James Fort, land warrants Nos. 10,711 and 75,279, to be located upon the south east

58. Evidence. In a suit between landlord and tenant it is not admissible on the part of the former for the purpose of establishing that the lease was made with certain stipulations, for him to show that he had that year rented premises to another tenant with like stipulations, and that that was his rule with all his tenants. Mc Kivitt v. Cone, 30 Iowa, 455.

59. Removal of improvements on leased ground. A lease contained the provision that the tenant might remove all his improvements at the expiration of the lease, provided all arrears of rent were fully paid, and other conditions of the lease complied with. The tenant subsequently, while in arrears for rent, had erected a frame building resting on posts. The builder put a mechanic's lien on it, foreclosed the same, and was about to remove it during the lease, and while the tenant's rent was still in arrear. Upon a bill for injunction filed by the landlord, held, that he could only remove it on the same terms as the tenant himself. Oswold v. Buckholtz, 13 Iowa, 506.

60. The remedy by landlord's attachment is purely statutory, and will be strictly construed. Merrit v. Fisher, 19 Iowa, 354.

61. When it will lie. A landlord's attachment will not lie for damages for a failure to till land, or by reason of the breaches of covenants in the agreements of the lease not connected with the demise of the land, etc. It can be maintained only for rent due. Ibid.

principal meridian," which was signed by S. Land warrant No. 10,711 was properly located in the name of F. on a part of the land. The other warrant, No. 75,279, was assigned in blank, when delivered to S., who sold it to W. On the 6th of October, 1852, W. located the warrant on a portion of the land described in the receipt of S. The warrant was sold to W. for a valuable cosideration, and without notice of the rights of F. F. then filed his bill against W. to compel a conveyance of the land on which the warrant was located. Held, 1. That W. could not hold the warrant as against F., were it now in his possession, and an action were instituted for it. 2. That there was no trust between F. and W., and the warrant could not be traced into the land. 3. That W. was liable to F. for the value of the warrant, which might be recovered in this action. Ibid.

LAND OFFICE.

See PUBLIC LANDS; CONVEYANCE; DEED OF TRUST; PATENT.

LARCENY.

See CRIMINAL LAW.

LEASE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT

LEGACY.

See WILL; EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

LAND WARRANT.

1. The title to a land warrant will not pass by delivery without assignment. Holland et ux. v. Hensley et al., 4 Iowa, 222.

LEGITIMACY.

1. A child born in wedlock though but a short time after marriage, is presumed legiti

mate, and the issue of a marriage which is voidable merely is legitimate, and cannot be bastardized in a collateral proceeding by showing that the marriage was voidable. Niles et al. v. Sprague et al., 13 Iowa, 198.

2. Acknowledgment of legitimacy. Slight evidence of a reputed relationship, accompanied by acknowledgments on the part of the reputed father, is not alone sufficient to establish the heirship of such father to the child. Ibid.

3. The recognition in writing of an illegitimate child by the father, provided for by the statute, is not required to be in the shape of a formal avowal, executed for the purpose of making known and perpetuating the fact, but may be sufficiently established from letters and correspondence. And when the recognition is thus established the illegitimate will inherit from his father, the same as a legitimate. Crane v. Crane et al., 31 Iowa, 296.

4. Evidence: declarations. The declarations of a husband and wife are not competent to establish the illegitimacy of a child begotten and born during wedlock; but the declarations of a mother and putative father are admissible for the purpose of showing that they were never lawfully married. Niles et al. v. Sprague et al., 13 Iowa, 198.

LETTER OF CREDIT.

See GUARANTY.

LEVY.

LIEN.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; BAILMENT; COMMON CARRIER; EXECUTION; INNKEEPER; JUDGMENT AND DECREE; MECHANIC'S LIEN; MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST; VENDOR AND VENDEE.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.*

I. GENERALLY.

II. IN ACTIONS FOR REAL PROPERTY. a. In general.

b. On the ground of fraud. III. IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. a. In general.

b. In foreclosure.

IV. IN OTHER ACTIONS OF A LEGAL NATURE. a. Against public officers.

b. On open account.

V. COMMENCEMENT AND GENERAL OPERATION OF THE STATUTE.

a. In general.

b. In actions accruing in another State. VI. WHAT WILL REMOVE THE BAR.

a. Acknowledgment and new promise. b. Testimony of defendant. VII. PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT. VIII. DISABILITIES AND EXCEPTIONS. IX. THE PLEA OF THE STATUTE.

*The following are the provisions constituting our statute of limitations and as referred to in this title. The figures in parentheses denote sections as they stood in Code of 1851. The others as they stood in Revision of 1860. They are, with the amendments that have been made thereto, reprinted in the Code of 1873, chap. 2, title 17, p. 432:

SECTION 2740. (1659.) The following actions may be

LEWDNESS.

See CRIMINAL LAW.

LEX FORI-LEX LOCL. See CONTRACTS; EVIDENCE.

LIBEL.

See SLANDER AND LIBEL.

after their causes accrue, and not afterward except when otherwise specially declared, that is to say: 1. Actions of slander. libel, malicious prosecution, injuries to the person, or for a statute penalty, within two years.

2. Those against a sheriff or other public officer growing out of a liability incurred by the doing of an act in an official capacity, or by the omission of an official duty, including the non-payment of money collected on execution, within three years.

3. Those founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery, and all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect, within five years.

4. Those founded on written contracts, on judgment of any courts (except those courts provided for in the next section), and those brought for the recovery of real property, within ten years.

5. Those founded on a judgment of a court of record, whether of this or of any other of the United States, or of the Federal courts of the United States, within twenty years.

SEC. 2741. (1660.) In actions for relief on the ground of fraud as above contemplated. the cause of action

I. GENERALLY.

1. Antecedent debts. A statute of limita tions as to a particular form of action may be made applicable to antecedent debts. It cannot be made to take away the entire remedy. Maltby & Boles v. Cooper, Mor. 57.

6.

The legislature has power to enlarge the time for the statute to run, to repeal one which has run as to a part of the time necessary to bar, to give past creditors whose claims are not completely barred, the same time allowed to future ones, and to reserve to debtors the time which has run under a repealed act. Ibid.

7. Construction of statute. The statute of

will not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud by the party aggrieved.

SEC. 2742. (1661.) In actions founded upon contract the above limitations shall not apply if from the answer of the defendant or from his testimony as a witness it appears affirmatively that the cause of action still justly subsists. But the answer of one of several defendants shall not prejudice the interests of others in this respect.

SEC. 2743. (1662.) Where there is a continuous open current account, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the last item therein as proved on the trial.

SEC. 2744. (1663.) The delivery of the original notice to the sheriff of the proper county with intent that it be served immediately (which intent shall be presumed unless the contrary appears), or the actual service of that notice by another person, is a commencement of the action.

ble. Like all other statutes, it should be construed to effectuate the intention of the legislature, that intention being to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may, from a variety of causes, be either forgotten or incapable of explanation. Penley v. Waterhouse, 3 Iowa, 418.

8. the word "hereafter " in section 1672,* Code of 1851, relating to the time of commencing an action, has reference to the time it took effect and not to the time of its passage. The object of this section was to prevent the appli cation of the general rule contained in section 1671, to causes of action which had accrued prior to July 1, 1851, but were not yet barred,

ions shall not apply to evidences of debt intended to circulate as money, but shall in other respects be applicable to all actions brought by or against all bodies corporate and politic except when otherwise expressly declared.

SEC. 2751. Causes of action founded on contract are revived by an admission that the debt is unpaid, as well as by a new promise to pay the same. But such admission or new promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. See 29 E C. L. R. 757; 7 Cranch, 168; 5 E. C. L. R. 90; 5 Seld. 362; 8 Johns. 407; 11 E. C. L. R. 311; 13 Ibid. 274 and 422; 24 Ibid. 530; 30 Ibid. 580; 32 Ibid. 405; 5 Seld. 85; 11 E. C. L. R. 66; 14 Ibid. 575; 4 Seld. 362; 2 E. C. L. R. 435; 83, 134; 23 Ibid. 181; 40 Ibid. 247; 24 Ibid. 446; 20 Ibid. 80; 1 Kern. 176.

SEC. 2746. (1665.) But when a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of any country where the defendant has previously resided, such bar shall be the same defense here as though it had arisen under the provisions of this chapter.

SEC. 2747. (1666.) The above limitation of actions for the recovery of real property shall not apply to minors so far as to prevent them from having at least one year after attaining their majority within which to commence such actions.

SEC. 2748. (1667.) If the person entitled to a cause of action die within one year rext previous to the expiration of the limitation above provided for, the limitation above mentioned shall not apply until one year after such death.

SEC. 2749. (1668.) If after the commencement of an action the plaintiff fail therein for any cause except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be brought within six months thereafter, the second suit shall for the purposes herein contemplated be deemed a continuation of the first.

SEC. 2750. (1669.) The above limitations and provis

SEC. 2753. (1671.) The provisions of this chapter are intended to apply to causes of action which have already accrued and are not yet barred, subject to the regulations contained in the following two sections.

SEC. 2754. (1672.) The times hereafter allowed for commencing actions in such cases shall not be less than one-half the periods of limitation herein respectively prescribed, except as provided in the next section.

SEC. 2755. (1673.) But where the period of limitation heretofore fixed by statute is not enlarged by the provisions of the first section of this chapter, the time allowed for the commencement of a suit shall in no case be greater than that fixed by the law heretofore in force as applied to those cases.

SEC. 2756. (1674.) The time of limitation in relation to actions for the recovery of real estate as prescribed in this chapter, shall not commence to run in favor of a settler on any public lands until such lands have been sold by the State.

* See note at commencement of title where section is set out.