Had the expected reinforcements from the lower provinces arrived at Cawnpore when due, General Havelock would doubtless have made another effort for the relief of Lucknow; but the mismanagement of the officer commanding at Dinapore, by which the whole plan of operations in Oude was disconcerted, and the very existence of the handful of men under the command of officer was not appreciated, but because he, being at the time totally unconnected with the corps, had availed himself of an opportunity afforded him as one of the general's staff, to usurp the position and proper duty of the officers of the regiment, who were equally competent with himself to lead their men to victory; and they naturally were annoyed at the apparently invidious selection of a stranger to the regiment for the distinction that should have properly belonged to one of its own officers. This uncomfortable feeling at length attracted the notice of the lieutenant-colonel of the gallant corps, and by him it was represented to Sir Colin Campbell, who subsequently expressed his idea of the affair in the following communication to the adjutant-general: "Head-quarters, Camp before Lucknow, March 30th, 1858. "Sir, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of his royal highness the general commandingin-chief, that a feeling of dissatisfaction, which has been testified in the most respectful manner, has arisen among the officers of the 64th foot, in consequence of a telegraphic despatch by the late Sir H. Havelock, K.C.B., which was published a short time back in the London Gazette. In the despatch alluded to, the most prominent notice was given to the fact of Lieutenant (now Captain Sir Henry) Havelock, Bart., having led the 64th foot into a redoubt, which was the object of attack, under the late Sir Henry Havelock's orders. The despatch is so worded as to make it appear, that the late Major Stirling, who afterwards became a lieutenant-colonel, was not properly leading his regiment; at least, such is the opinion of the officers of the 64th foot. Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, in the name of those officers, while he deprecates the idea of refusing just credit to Captain Sir Henry Havelock, maintains, in the most positive manner, that the late Lieutenantcolonel Stirling then commanded the 64th foot, as he did on all such occasions, most nobly and gallantly; and that he was on foot at the time, because, in consequence of a shell bursting, his horse had become unrideable. In short, he infers that it is very painful to the regiment that the memory and reputation of their late gallant commanding officer should have been so unfairly tampered with. I confess to have a strong feeling of sympathy with the office:s of the 64th regiment, and it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me if you would have the goodness to move his royal highness to give a gracious expression towards the memory of the late Lie atenant-colonel Stirling, for the benefit of the 64th regiment. This instance is one of many in whien, since the institution of the Victoria Cross, advantage has been taken by young aides-de-camp and other staff-officers to place themselves in prominent situations for the purpose of attracting attention. To them life is of little value, as compared with the gain of public honour; but they do not reflect, Havelock imperilled, had entirely prevented the desired junction, and left him for a time incapable of moving from his intrenched camp at Cawnpore. On the following day (the 19th of August), Brigadier-general Havelock reported to the commander-in-chief as follows: "Cawnpore, Aug. 19th, 1857; 1.10 P.M. "There is a combination against us, which and the generals to whom they belong also do not reflect, on the cruel injustice thus done to gallant officers who, besides the excitement of the moment of action, have all the responsibility attendant on this situation. We know that the private soldier expects to be led by his regimental officers, whom he knows and recognises as the leaders to whom he is bound to look in the moments of the greatest trial and danger, and that he is utterly regardless of the accidental presence of an aide-de-camp or other staffofficer, who is an absolute stranger to him. There is another point, also, having a great importance. By such despatches as the one above alluded to, it is made to appear to the world, that a regiment would have proved wanting in courage, except for an accidental circumstance. Such a reflection is most galling to a regiment of British soldiers, indeed almost intolerable, and the fact is remembered against it by all the other corps in her majesty's service. Soldiers feel such things most keenly. I would, therefore, again beg leave to dwell on the injustice sometimes done by general officers when they give a public preference to those attached to them over old officers, who are charged with the most difficult and responsible duties.-I have, &c. "C. CAMPBELL, Commander-in-chief. "The Adjutant-general, Horse-guards, London." The letter of General Campbell was laid before the Duke of Cambridge in due course, and by command of his royal highness, the following reply was transmitted to the commander-in-chief at Lucknow : "Horse-guards, S.W., May 17th, 1858. "Sir, I have had the honour to lay before his royal highness the general commanding-in-chief, your letter of the 30th of March last, referring to a telegraphic despatch of the late Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, in which it is made to appear, that Captain Havelock led the 64th regiment to the attack of a redoubt, and that the character of the late Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, who commanded the regiment and fell in the attack, had suffered accordingly. His royal highness regrets sincerely that any unfavourable imputation of the courage or conduct of the lieutenant-colonel should ever for a moment have been supposed to attach to the character of that gallant and excellent officer. His royal highness enters fully into the feelings of Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, who has, in vindication of the character of his late commanding officer and of the 64th regiment, so honourably appealed to your sense of justice, and he has much gratification in now recording his entire satisfaction with the whole conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, and of the excellent regiment which he commanded with so much credit to himself and advantage to the service. "I have, &c.-G. A. WETHERALL A.G. "General Sir Colin Campbell, &c." will require our best exertions to baffle. The troops from Oude have come down to the left bank, and will threaten Cawnpore; meanwhile boats are collecting at Futtehpore, to enable a portion of their troops to cross there, and intercept the communication with Allahabad, whilst the Gwalior contingent (strong in artillery, and provided with a siege-train) passes at Calpee, and attacks my diminished force. I will do my best against them, but the risk is great. "I have sent the steamer down to destroy the boats at Futtehpore. I should bring into the field eight good guns; but the enemy are reported to have from twentynine to thirty. These are great odds, and my 900 soldiers may be opposed to 5,000 organised troops. The loss of a battle would ruin everything in this part of India. I could entice the enemy at Calpee, and prevent their crossing the Jumna, or permit them to cross and drive them back into it, if my force were adequate to the effort; but it is fearfully weak, and disease daily diminishes my numbers. or any one of their tributaries, such a thing as a steamboat adapted for the purposes of war! It is true that the navigation of those rivers, supplied by mountain torrents, and flowing through immense alluvial plains, with frequent inundations and shiftings of channel, was not very easy, or, indeed, always practicable; but in the months of August and September, there was at least depth of water for vessels capable of steaming with two or three guns and a hundred or two of men. Of all the vast marine appliances of naval England, but one steamer of the kind required, could be found available by General Havelock! This one, however, he dispatched as mentioned in his report, to prevent the rebels of Oude from crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore. But he was without any means of obstructing their passage across the Jumna at Calpee, to which point the Dinapore mutineers were directing their steps, with the intention of swelling the numbers gathered against him. Sir Colin Campbell had now arrived in India, and assumed command of the whole British forces; but hitherto no correspondence had arisen between himself and Brigadier-general Havelock. His presence in Calcutta had, however, the effect of infusing greater energy into the movements of the executive government of India; and from this time European troops were pushed forward to Cawnpore with all possible celerity. "As I am told in the camp that your excellency has heard nothing of my movements since the 4th of the month, I will mention that hitherto everything has gone on prosperously. I struck a heavy blow against the Oude troops on the 12th, at Busherut-gunge (third fight there), and recrossed the Ganges that day in less than six hours, without the slightest interruption. On the 16th, I defeated the Saugor troops at Bithoor, and destroyed everything there. I will make head against this new dan-in-chief, by the following telegram :ger with the like determination; but, without reinforcements, I do only hope for success." It was, as yet, a novelty in this Asiatic warfare, that the steam navigation of the country should be employed for other purposes than the quiet transport of men and material; and yet such employ would at this juncture have been most important in several directions, had the means for it been available. Unfortunately they were not; and it furnished ground for serious comment, that while England could encircle the earth with a zone of floating castles, and had innumerable gun-boats, and other craft of every size and denomination, actually rotting and falling to pieces for want of use, in her harbours and ports throughout the world, there was not at this juucture, upon the Ganges or the Jumna, Further details of his operations were now forwarded by Brigadier-general Havelock, for the information of the commander "Cawnpore, August 20th, 1857. "I was appointed to the command of the Allahabad movable column in July last. Between the 12th of that month and the present date, I have been engaged with the enemy at Futtehpore, Pandoo Nuddee, Cawnpore, in Oude, at Oonao twice, at Busherutgunge, at Boorjah Keechowkee, and Bithoor. On every occasion I have defeated him, and captured in the field forty guns, besides recovering for the state sixty more. But I am unable, for want of troops, to march on Lucknow. "My force, which lost men in action, and has been assailed in the most awful way by cholera, is reduced to 700 in the field, exclusive of detachments which guard the intrenchments here, and keep open communication with Allahabad. I am threatened See vol. i., p. 600. by a force of 5,000 men from Gwalior, with which I have perused your excellency's telesome twenty or thirty guns. I am ready to gram of the 19th instant, which has just fight anything: but the above are great reached me. The approbation of my opeodds; and a battle lost here would do the rations and views, conveyed to me by so interest of the state much damage. I distinguished a soldier, more than repays me solicit your excellency to send me reinforce- for the labours and responsibilities of two ments. I can then assume the initiative, arduous campaigns, undertaken of necessity and march to Agra and Delhi, or wherever at a most unpropitious season: my soldiers my services may be required. With 2,000 will as highly and deeply value your excelBritish soldiers nothing could stand before lency's commendation. me and my powerful artillery. I shall soon have equipped eighteen guns (six of siege calibre); but I want artillerymen and officers, and infantry soldiers." The first communication direct from the new commander-in-chief (Sir Colin Campbell) to Major-general Havelock, was as follows, by telegraph, dated August 19th, 1857: "I have received your despatches, by telegraph, of the 6th and 12th instant, reporting the successful result of the attacks made on the enemy by the force under your command on those days respectively. "The sustained energy, promptitude, and vigorous action by which your whole proceedings have been marked during the late difficult operations, deserve the highest praise; and it will be a most agreeable duty to me to make known to his lordship the governor-general, the sense I entertain of the able manner in which you have carried out the instructions of Sir Patrick Grant. "I am for the present unable to give them shelter from the extreme inclemency of the weather, and the repose of which they stand in need; but sickness continues in our ranks. We lose men by cholera in the number of six daily. I will frankly make known to your excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2,000 or 2,500 men, I can hold this place with a high hand, protect my communications with anything that comes against me, and be ready to take a part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent, with 5,000 men and thirty guns; or by the Ghoorkas who are assembling at Furruckabad, under rebellious nabobs, and have a formidable artillery; but as they can only partly unite, I can defeat either or both in fights; still if regiments cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time. the advantages I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything will be organised for a trium "I beg you to express to the officers and men of the different corps under your command, the pride and satisfaction I have experienced in reading your reports of the intre-phant advance in the cold season. pid valour they have displayed on every occasion they have encountered the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and how nobly they have maintained those qualities for which British soldiers have ever been distinguished-high courage and endurance. "I entirely concur in the soundness of the view you have taken of your position in your telegraph of the 6th instant from Mungulwar, and of all the reasons which influenced you to defer, for the present, active operations. "I esteem myself most fortunate in having the benefit of your assistance, and that I should find you in the important situation in which you are placed at the moment." The highly gratifying communication of Sir Colin was acknowledged by the brigadier-general as follows: "Cawnpore, Aug. 21st, 1857; 12.30 P.M. "I cannot express the gratification with "It is painful to repeat that, in the latter event, Cawnpore and the surrounding countries, in fact the whole of the Doab, would be abandoned to rapine and misery, and Agra will fall unsupported. I do not consider that our force would be compromised; for, in truth, the case* of the operation is, strange to say, like the Punjab. I have endeavoured briefly to state my case,. and must leave the decision of the important question involved in it to your excellency. "I do most earnestly hope that you will be able to provide prompt reinforcements. My communications with Allahabad will be quite safe as soon as detachments begin to pass upwards. I had sufficiently explained the danger to which I am exposed, should the enemy at Gwalior take the initiative, and move on Calpee with his imposing • Sic in original. : force it is to my left rear; and a force would at the same time endeavour to cross from Oude to Futtehpore. This would cut in my rear, and prevent even the advance of my reinforcements. I have sent a steamer to destroy his boats; but have no news of its success. The Furruckabad force would also assail me; and this column, hitherto triumphant, would be destroyed. The Gwalior force on the Jumna is 5,000 strong, with thirteen guns. The forces threatening Lucknow swell to 20,000, with all the disposable artillery of the province. The Furruckabad force is 12,000 men, with twelve guns. If I do not get any promise of reinforcement from your excellency by return of telegraph, I will retire at once towards Allahabad. I can no longer bear a defenceless intrenchment; that on the river being taken in the rear by the enemy assembling on the right bank of the Ganges." million sterling; and telegrams were forwarded, by command of the governor-general in council, to Havelock and Neill, directing both to convey, if possible, instructions to Inglis not to care about the money, but rather to use it in any way that might best contribute to the liberation of his heroic and suffering companions. On the 18th of August, just two days after General Havelock had completed an unbroken series of ten successive victories, Major-general Sir James Outram-who, after his successful termination of the Persian war, had been appointed to the military command of the Cawnpore and Dinapore divisions-arrived at the latter place to assume the delegated authority, which placed under his control the whole of the British troops engaged in the various struggles at Lucknow, Cawnpore, Allahabad, Benares, &c., &c. Sir Colin Campbell, who still remained at Calcutta, maturing his plans, and It is to be presumed that the promise organising his forces for the ensuing camof reinforcements so urgently requested, paign, immediately arranged with Outram was made, as the retrograde march to the necessary measures for reinforcing HaveAllahabad did not occur; and the re- lock, that no longer delay might take place mainder of the month of August was in an effort to relieve Lucknow; and with spent by Havelock hopefully, though in- this view, on the 22nd of August, the comactively. Although he was at this time mander-in-chief telegraphed to Major-genalmost surrounded at Cawnpore by gather-eral Outram as follows:ing hosts of rebel forces, who looked upon "I am rejoiced to hear of your arrival at his diminished band as certain prey, his Dinapore. The force under General Havecommunication by telegraph with Allaha- lock is reduced by casualties on service, and bad, Benares, and Calcutta was still open, by cholera (which has been and still rages and enabled him to learn that every possi- in his camp), to 700 men in the field, exble effort was being made by the governor- clusive of detachments which guard the general and the commander-in-chief to push intrenchment, and keep open the commuforward the aid he so much wanted; and nication with Allahabad. He is threatened he now wrote repeatedly to Brigadier Inglis by a force of some 5,000 men, with twenty at Lucknow, urging him to remain firm to or thirty guns, from Gwalior, besides the the last, in full confidence that succour would Oude force. He says he' is ready to fight reach him before the pressure of despair anything; but the above are great odds, should compel him to surrender to the enemy and a battle lost here would do the interest by which he was surrounded. He also of the state infinite damage: I solicit reinlearned, that some 2,000 men, belonging to forcements.' His applications for assistance the 5th, 64th, 78th, 84th, and 90th regi- have been frequent; and deeming his situa ments, the Madras fusiliers, and the artil- tion to demand immediate aid, I ordered lery, were either on their way from Cal- the 90th regiment to be sent to him with cutta, or would speedily be so; and that all possible speed, as also the detachthe naval brigade, consisting of 500 blue-ment of the 5th regiment, which was on jackets, under Captain Peel, of her ma- board the Benares steamer, if it could be jesty's steam-frigate Shannon, had left spared. Pray send the 90th regiment at Calcutta on the 20th of the month, for once to his aid. I will write to you again the purpose of co-operating with his land on this subject to-morrow." force. It was known at the time, at the seat of government, that the public treasure at Lucknow, in charge of Brigadier Inglis, amounted to about a quarter of allowing despatch : On the 24th of the month, Sir Colin Campbell further communicated with Major-general Sir James Outram, by the fol "The Commander-in-chief to Major-general with Havelock's reduced numbers, do you Sir J. Outram. think it would be equal to force its way over the numerous nullahs (necessarily full of water at this season) which are to be found on the road from the latter place to Lucknow? By this route all incumbrances, such as sick, &c., would be left at the different stations or posts along the road, and the troops, on being conveyed by steam, would suffer less than if obliged to march, and Havelock's anxiety about his post would be removed. "Calcutta, August 24th, 1857. "Sir, I am extremely happy, and deem myself most fortunate, to find myself associated with you on service, and to have the advantage of your able assistance in carrying on the duty in which we are now engaged. I send you, herewith, the different telegraphs received from General Havelock since my arrival: they will make you fully acquainted with his operations in Oude; his reasons for recrossing the Ganges; his sub- "In offering these remarks or suggessequent operations in the neighbourhood of tions to you, who are acquainted with the Cawnpore, with account of his loss by sick-country, people, and difficulties attending ness and casualties in the field; his present the movements you propose, it is not with numbers, and their condition as to health any view to fetter your judgment and perand efficiency. I have been favoured by fect freedom of action; but I mention these the governor-general with a perusal of yours as they occur to me in writing to you; and to his lordship of the 19th instant, in which I think I may venture to say, that the meayou propose to collect a force of about 1,000 sures you may deem most advisable to purinfantry and eight guns at Benares, with a sue, will receive the approval of the governorview to march to the relief of our garrison general. I hope to have the pleasure of in Lucknow, by the most direct route from hearing from you.-COLIN CAMPBELL." thence, and that the force under General It will be observed by the above commuHavelock at Cawnpore should co-operate nication, that Sir James Outram, as superior with you in this movement, by crossing the in military rank to Brigadier-general HaveGanges at Futtehpore and the Saye, subse-lock, had himself arranged a plan for adquently (with your assistance) at Rye Bareilly, and forming a junction with you beyond that place. vancing on Lucknow, entirely different from that on which the latter proposed to act. Sir James intended to advance from Be"General Havelock states, in his tele- nares direct to the besieged residency, by graph of the 20th instant, that his force is way of Jounpore, a route which would take reduced to 700 men in the field, exclusive him north-east of the Ganges and the Doab, of the detachments required to guard his leaving it to Havelock to join him on the intrenchments and keep open his com- march, provided he could overcome the diffimunication with Allahabad; and so inade- culties likely to impede his progress; but quate does he consider his force to be for when it became apparent that Brigadier the defence of his post, that he states, in his Inglis could not cut his way out of Lucktelegraph dated August 21, 12.30 P.M., that, now, and that Havelock was himself enif not assured of reinforcements by return dangered at Cawnpore, a reconsideration of of telegraph, he will retire to Allahabad. Outram's plan became imperative, inasmuch Hope of co-operation from General Have-as it was obvious that the advance of 189 lock (by a force equal to accomplish the movement you propose, by crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore) is not to be entertained. The march from Benares, by the most direct route, to Lucknow, is a long one-some 150 miles-and the population through which you would have to pass, hostile. Its great recommendation I presume to be that you (by that route) turn, or rather come in rear of, the many nullahs which, I am told, interpose between Cawnpore and Lucknow, and this would be an important advantage. But if the force you propose to collect at Benares were to be moved by the river to Cawnpore, and united miles from Benares to Lucknow, through a country almost entirely in the hands of the enemy, must, under any circumstances, be very perilous; while a march by Allahabad to Cawnpore would be less open to difficulty. The latter route was therefore adopted, and instantly acted upon. On the 1st of September, having made the necessary military arrangements for the safety of the Dinapore district, Major-general Outram arrived at Allahabad, making a brief sojourn at Benares on his way. On the 7th of September he left that city, taking with him en route for Cawnpore, the 5th fusiliers and 90th regiment, with detachments of the 33 |