of the municipal corporation, so as to include an entire district or districts, correspondingly extends the boundaries of the independent district.

Though the opinion quoted has special reference to the extension of the boundaries of the municipal corporation, we think the holding applicable in the case before us.

We can not find that the board violated law, abused its discretion, nor acted with prejudice or malice.

The decision of the county superintendent is, therefore,

July 3, 1900.

REVERSED. RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

G. N. WILSON V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF HITEMAN.

Appeal from Monroe County.

EXPULSION OF SCHOLAR. The board may, by a majority vote, expel any scholar from school for immorality, or for any violation of the regulations or rules established by the board.

NOTICE. The law does not require school boards to give parents or pupils notice or a chance for defense before ordering suspension or expulsion.

ACTION OF THE BOARD. Must be affirmed in the absence of showing of malice, prejudice, or violation of law.

The majority of the board of the Independent District of Hiteman expelled a son of the appellant, a pupil in room No. 3, from the school and school grounds for bad and immoral conduct. From the action of the board, appeal was taken to the county superintendent, who sustained the board, and an appeal is taken to the superintendent of public instruction.

Section 2782 provides that the board may, by a majority vote, expel any scholar from school for immorality, or for any violation of the regulations or rules established by the board; and it may also confer upon any teacher, principal or superintendent the power temporarily to dismiss a scholar, notice of such being at once given in writing to the president of the board.

The record presented shows that the board had by Rule No. 2 conferred upon the principal the "power to suspend any pupil for repeated disobedience; for filthy or immoral habits or language, for injuring or defacing school property, or for any intentional violation of the rules." Under the authority thus conferred, the principal did, on the seventeenth day of December, 1900, notify the president of the board of the dismissal of J. Wilson, for conduct unbecoming a pupil. On the following day the board in special session sustained the order of the principal "until such time as his parents shall give assurance to the school board that he will comply with the rules of the school."

In appealing to the county superintendent, appellee alleges that said pupil was "expelled without cause and without legal notice or chance to defend." Appellant seems to have an erroneous idea regarding the power of a board to dismiss a pupil. The law does not demand that the board shall give parents or pupils notice or chance for defense before ordering suspension or expulsion.

The power to expel a pupil is wholly within the discretion of the board. However, the undisputed testimony of the principal goes to show that the father of the boy was notified by a member of the board of the meeting to be held for the purpose of investigating the case.

A careful examination of the entire record submitted fails to reveal that the action of the board is in any way tainted by malice or prejudice, or that there has been a violation of law. In expelling the pupil until such time as he was willing to conduct himself properly and obey the reasonable regulations of the school, we think the board acted in a very conservative and proper manner, and that the county superintendent was justified in sustaining its action. The decision of the county superintendent is

Des Moines, Iowa, May 27, 1901.

AFFIRMED.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

H. A. TOPPING AND THOMAS WILLIAMS V. SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF UNION.

CORRECTION OF DECISION.

Appeal from Van Buren County.

The superintendent, in the discharge of his judicial duties, may, within a proper time, recall and correct a decision erroneously rendered.

DECISION. The county superintendent is warranted in rendering a decision based upon certain conditions.

This case arises from the action of the board of directors of the school township of Union in voting to remove the schoolhouse in subdistrict number four from its present location to a site one-half mile south and one mile west.

Upon appeal to the county superintendent, it was shown that the children from the families of appellants would be nearly or quite two and one-half miles from the schoolhouse located upon the new site. The county superintendent remanded the case to the board July 1st, with the recommendation that it make provision for the schooling of the children in adjacent districts, provided they desire to attend, "but if that is not done we will be compelled to reverse the action of the board." On July 16th a statement signed by the president and secretary pro tem. of the board of directors of Union township was filed, alleging that the board had made arrangements to send appellants' children to school in accordance with the decision. On the same date attorneys were notified that the action of the board was sustained. On July 23d counsel for appellants filed a statement from the board of directors of the Independent District of Winchester to the effect that "no provision has been made with the board of the school township of Union for the schooling of the children of Thomas Williams." On the following day counsel filed a motion, asking that the decision rendered July 16th be set aside, since the board had failed to carry out its provisions.

In passing upon this motion the superintendent held, that since notices had been sent to interested parties that the action of the board was sustained, the case was closed and could neither be reopened nor the decision set aside.

In this conclusion we think the superintendent unintentionally erred. In the case of Desmond v. The Independent District of Glenwood, 71 Iowa, page 23, the supreme court held:

"The superintendent of public instruction, in the discharge of his judicial duties, has the power to correct mistakes in rendering judgments in a case before him possessed by all courts and judicial officers. If, through mistake, he should announce a decision differing from the decision actually rendered, he possesses the power to recall such an announcement, and publish the decision correctly; or if, mistakenly, he should render a decision, he could, before rights had been acquired under it, and within a proper time, upon discovering the mistake, recall it and decide rightly." We think that the county superintendent has the same power.

By the provisions of section 2774 the board of directors has power to contract with boards of other school townships or independent districts for the instruction of children who live at an unreasonable distance from their own school; and we think the county superintendent was warranted in rendering a decision based upon certain conditions.

The case is remanded to him with the suggestion that he reopen the same, and give all parties interested the opportunity to show clearly and definitely that there has or has not been a compliance with the decision.

If such showing is not made within a reasonable time, it is recommended that he make such decision as to him appears just and equitable, after taking into consideration the geographical position, number and convenience of pupils. From the decision, any party aggrieved will have the right to appeal.

REMANDED.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Des Moines, Iowa, November 13, 1901.

F. E. HAMMER V. WILL COOK.

Appeal from Adair County.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS. It is not the province of the county superintendent or of the superintendent of public instruction to determine the constitutionality of the law, since these officers exercise ministerial rather than judicial powers, and no appeal may be had to the supreme court.

JURISDICTION OF SUPERINTENDENT.

It is the duty of the county superintendent and of the superintendent of public instruction to give effect to the law as interpreted by the courts.

COSTS-TAXING OF. The costs in cases triable before the county superintendent should be paid by the party instituting the proceedings unless there were good and sufficient reasons for beginning the action and the allegations have been proved.

COSTS TAXING THE CORPORATION. Under section 2821, where the county superintendent could not under her findings tax the costs to the plaintiff because

there was reasonable cause for instituting the proceeding, nor to the defendant for the reason that she had to find for said defendant, she must tax them to the school corporation.

On the twelfth day of January, 1904, Mrs. Ella C. Chantry, county superintendent of Adair county, in rendering a decision in the above entitled case, taxed the costs amounting to $51.05 to the school township of Harrison. Thereupon the school township, through its attorney, filed a motion with the county superintendent to retax the costs, and on the ninth day of February, 1904, the motion was overruled. From this action of the county superintendent, the board of directors of the school township of Harrison appeals to the superintendent of public instruction.

Two questions only need be considered: First, had the county superintendent warrant in law to tax the costs to the school township; and, second, if she had such warrant, did she abuse her discretion in so taxing?

Section 2821 of the Code says:

"The county superintendent in all matters triable before him shall have power to issue subpoenas for witnesses, which may be served by any peace officer, compel the attendance of those thus served, and the giving of evidence by them, in the same manner and to the same extent as the district court may do, and such witnesses and officers may be allowed the same compensation as is paid for like attendance or service in such court, which shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the proper school corporation, upon the certificate of the superintendent to and warrant of the secretary upon the treasurer; but if the superintendent is of the opinion that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause therefor, or if, in case of an appeal, it shall not be sustained, he shall enter such findings in the record, and tax all costs to the party responsible therefor."

The transcript of this case shows that the plaintiff, F. E. Hammer, preferred charges against Will Cook, a teacher, and sought to secure the revocation of the certificate of said Cook. The two parties in interest were Hammer and Cook. Counsel for appellant argues that the school township "was in no way made a party to the proceedings, had no notice therein, nor any opportunity to appear, defend or prosecute said proceedings;" and that the order of the county superintendent in taxing the costs to the school township, if sustained, would deprive the school township of its property without due process of law. It is, therefore, urged that section 2821 of the Code, insofar as it attempts to confer jurisdiction to tax costs to school corporations, where such a school corporation was not a party to the proceedings, is unconstitutional, and we are asked to so declare it. This, manifestly, we can not do, since no appeal can be taken to the supreme court from a decision of the superintendent of public instruction. We are obliged to give effect to the law as it stands until the same is annulled by the supreme court. Section 2821 plainly makes it the duty of the county superintendent to tax the costs in "all matters triable before him," either to the school corporation or to the party responsible for bringing the case. If the county superintendent could not, under her findings, tax the costs to F. E. Hammer, she was obliged to tax the costs to the school township of Harrison, and if the constitutionality of the law under which this power was exer

cised is to be questioned, the school township should seek to secure an order from the district court to set aside the judgment.

But, had F. E. Hammer reasonable cause for instituting the proceedings? The county superintendent in her decision says: “I find that this proceeding was begun in good faith and that he (F. E. Hammer) had reasonable cause for filing the information." In support of this conclusion the evidence shows that the most serious allegations of the information were sustained-that the teacher had resorted to methods of punishment that can not be approved, and that in the course of a fight with two of the large boys of the school he had used obscene and indecent language. But there were extenuating circumstances, and the certificate was not revoked, the superintendent instead reprimanding the teacher for his errors.

We are of the opinion that the costs in cases triable before the county superintendent should be paid by the party instituting the proceedings, unless there is very good cause for beginning the same and the allegations are fully proved. In the case before us the allegations of the plaintiff were sustained by the evidence, and while the prosecution was, no doubt, prompted in part by malice, in the exercise of her discretionary powers conferred by section 2821 of the Code, the county. superintendent refused to tax the costs to the plaintiff, F. E. Hammer. We do not find sufficient cause for reversing this decision, it being a well recognized rule of the courts that in the absence of an affirmative showing of an abuse of discretion, the presumption is that it was properly exercised. (58th Iowa, page 131.) AFFIRMED. JOHN F. RIGGS,

Des Moines, Iowa, May 25, 1904.

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

G. E. HANCOCK et al. v. SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN.

Appeal from Allamakee County.

POWER OF COMMITTEE OF A SCHOOL BOARD. A school board may not confer upon a committee authority to purchase a site, contract for the erection of a schoolhouse or perform any other duty enjoined upon the board by the law.

SCHOOL PRIVILEGES-TRANSPORTATION. While it is incumbent on the board to furnish reasonable school privileges for all the children of the township, it is often the better plan to transport pupils to existing schools than to establish additional schools.

REDISTRICTING ENTIRE CORPORATION CONSIDERED. A school board in establishing subdistrict boundaries must consider the interests of all in the corporation. At a regular meeting of the board of directors of the school township of Franklin, held on the twenty-first day of March, 1904, a motion was adopted by unanimous vote by which the president of the school board was empowered and instructed to "appoint a committee of three to lease a schoolhouse site to set the No. 9 schoolhouse on. That this committee be empowered to let contract of moving schoolhouse, surveying school site, and all other work pertaining to such work, and are authorized to draw orders on the treasurer to pay for the same."