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Intention

to be ascer-
tained
from

language.

Interpretation of written contracts.

interpretation of written instruments, see Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 1856 to 1870, inclusive, and notes.

1638. The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.

NOTE.-Code La., 1940; see Westcott vs. Thompson, 18 N. Y., p. 367; Norton vs. Woodruff, 2 id., p. 153; Buck vs. Burk, 18 N. Y., p. 339. In a written instrument defining a certain boundary line where the word "north" was used, parol evidence was admitted to show that it was not intended to be "north" by the true meridian, but that the intention of the parties was that it should mean "north" by the magnetic meridian, it being the custom of the locality to run boundary lines in that manner.-Jenny Lind Co. vs. Bower, 11 Cal., p. 195. Where the language of a contract is not ambiguous, but of plain and obvious import, the rule is imperative to follow the language employed in its interpretation.-Hawley vs. Brumagim, 33 Cal., p. 394. "If it does not involve an absurdity." When the words of a bond are not sufficiently explicit, or if literally construed the words would be nonsense, it must be construed with reference to the intention of the parties. In doing this, it is allowable to depart from the letter of the condition-to reject insensible words and to supply obvious omissions.-Frankel vs. Stern, July Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal. See further cases cited in note to succeeding section.

1639. When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible; subject, however, to the other provisions of this Title.

NOTE.-Hawley vs. Brumagim, 33 Cal., p. 394; Wescott vs. Thompson, 18 N. Y., p. 367. Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract.-Lennard vs. Vischer, 2 Cal., p. 37; Osborne vs. Hendrickson, 7 Cal., p. 282. The written contract is considered the definite agreement of the parties, and parol conversations and understandings are merged in it.-Conner vs. Clark, 12 Cal., p. 168. But the rule of evidence that where the parties to a contract have reduced their agreement to writing, parol evidence shall not be received to alter or contradict the written instru

ment, applies only between the parties to the agreement and those claiming under them, and does not apply to strangers to the agreement. When the rights of strangers are concerned, they are at liberty to show that the written instrument does not disclose the full or true character of the transaction; and if the stranger can do this, so also can a party to the agreement when contending with a stranger. Both must be bound by this rule, or neither.-Smith vs. Moynihan, July Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal.; 2 Iredell R., p. 30; Krider vs. Lafferty, 1 Wharton R., p. 314; Edgerly vs. Emerson, 3 Foster R., p. 564. The rule which refuses the admission of parol evidence to vary the terms of a written instrument is directed to the language employed by the parties, and does not exclude an inquiry into the objects and purposes of the parties in executing the instrument.-Pierce vs. Robinson, 13 Cal., p. 116. Oral evidence admissible to explain a contract and aid in its interpretation, when and to what extent. See Brannan vs. Mesick, 10 Cal., p. 95; Richardson vs. Scott River W. & M. Co., 22 Cal., p. 150; Hancock vs. Watson, 18 Cal., p. 137; Ruiz vs. Norton, 4 Cal., p. 355; Ferris vs. Coover, 10 Cal., p. 589; Reamer vs. Nesmith, 34 Cal., p. 624; Millard vs. Hathaway, 27 Cal., p. 119; Colton vs. Leavey, 22 Cal., p. 496; Pierson vs. McCahill, 21 Cal., p. 122; Pierson vs. McCahill, 23 Cal., p. 249; Gradwohl vs. Harris, 29 Cal., p. 150; Lockwood vs. Canfield, 20 Cal., p. 126; Verzan vs. McGregor, 23 Cal., p. 339; Brewster vs. Lathrop, 15 Cal., p. 21; Adler vs. Friedman, 16 Cal., p. 138; Palmer vs. Trip, 8 Cal., p. 95; Towdy vs. Ellis, 22 Cal., p. 650; McDonald vs. M. L. W. Co., 4 Cal., p. 335. A receipt acknowledging the payment of a debt, may be explained or contradicted by parol.Hawley vs. Bader, 15 Cal., p. 44. And a deed absolute on its face, may be construed as a mortgage where such was the intention of the parties.—Cunningham vs. Hawkins, 27 Cal., p. 603; Hooper vs. Jones, 29 Cal., p. 18; Lodge vs. Turman, 24 Cal., p. 384; Johnson vs. Sherman, 15 Cal., p. 287. And this is not restricted alone to cases of fraud, accident, or mistake.-Pierce vs. Robinson, 13 Cal., p. 116.

The cases cited above in this note generally bear rather upon the admissibility of evidence, than upon the interpretation; but yet have some relation to the latter, and are therefore referred to in this place.

For cases involving the interpretation of contracts generally, see the able opinion of Justice Belcher, in the case of Frankel vs. Stern, July Term, Sup.

Writing. when disregarded.

Ct. Cal.; Mickle vs. Sanchez, 1 Cal., p. 200; Von Schmidt vs. Huntington, 1 Cal., p. 55; Morrison vs. Wilson, 30 Cal., p. 344; Racouillat vs. Sansevain, 32 Cal., p. 876; Hancock vs. Watson, 18 Cal., p. 137; McNeil vs. Shirley, 33 Cal., p. 202; Hawley vs. Brumagim, 33 Cal., p. 394; Saunders vs. Clark, 29 Cal., p. 299; Ingoldsby vs. Juan, 12 Cal., p. 564; Haskell vs. Moore, 29 Cal., p. 437; Jackson vs. Beers, 14 Cal., p. 189; Blen vs. B. R. and A. M. and W. Co., 15 Cal., p. 96; Pierson vs. McCahill, 21 Cal., p. 122; Verzan vs. McGregor, 23 Cal., p. 399; O'Connor vs. Dihgley, 26 Cal., p. 11; Anderson vs. Dall, 27 Cal., p. 607; Miller vs. Steen, 30 Cal., p. 402. Contract good in part, and

bad in part.-Jackson vs. Shawl, 29 Cal., p. 267; Treadwell vs. Davis, 34 Çal., p. 601.

1640. When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded.

NOTE. THROUGH FRAUD.-Where an applicant for a loan proposed to secure its repayment by a mortgage upon premises which he stated had been conveyed to him by a party named, and by false and fraudulent representations induced the lender to believe that certain valuable erections which were situate on adjacent premises were upon the premises so conveyed to him, and the lender made the loan and accepted the mortgage executed by the applicant containing a description of only these premises, and the applicant represented that the erections were embraced, and the mortgagor soon thereafter conveyed the lands on which the erections were situate, without consideration, in trust for his wife. In an action by the mortgagee against the mortgagor, his wife and her trustee, the trust deed was adjudged invalid against the mortgage. The mortgage was reformed so as to embrace the lands with the erections thereon, and a decree of foreclosure and sale was made as to all the premises.De Peyster vs. Hasbrouck, 11 N. Y., p. 582; see Pierce vs. Robinson, 13 Cal., p. 116; Wilcoxson vs. Burton, 27 Cal., p. 233.

MISTAKE OR ACCIDENT.-A lease was ordered to be surrendered and canceled, with perpetual injunction against the lessor's proceeding to recover the rent reserved upon evidence that the demised premises were destroyed by fire after the execution of

the lease and before the commencement of the
term thereby to be created, and that a condition
agreed upon by the parties, that the lease should de-
termine in case of a destruction of the premises by
fire, had been omitted by accident or mistake.-Wood
vs. Hubbell, 10 N. Y., p. 479. That a Court can
correct mistakes in written agreements, see Frankel
vs. Stern, July Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal.; Wiser vs.
Markly, 1 Johns. C. R., p. 607; Gillespie vs. Moore, 2
id., p. 585; Keisdback vs. Livingston, 4 id., p. 144;
Story Eq. Jur., Vol. I, pp. 152-161, and cases there
cited. If one of the terms of a written contract is left
out by mistake when the same is drafted, the agree-
ment will be interpreted and enforced to correspond
with the intention of the parties.-Pierson vs. McCa-
hill, 23 Cal., p. 249; see, specially, Pierson vs. McCa-
hill, 21 Cal., p. 122; Gradwohl vs. Harris, 29 Cal., p.
150; Pierce vs. Robinson, 13 Cal., p. 116; and see note
to preceding section. If a clause in a contract was
inserted by mistake, it will be held void.-Verzan vs.
McGregor, 23 Cal., p. 339. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure it is not necessary that the contract should be
reformed, but it should be construed according to the
actual intent of the parties.-See Bidwell vs. Astor
Ins. Co., 16 N. Y., p. 263; N. Y. Ice Co. vs. N. W.
Ins. Co., 12 Abb. Pr., p. 414; 23 N. Y., p. 357; see,
also, Burr vs. Broadway Ins. Co., 16 N. Y., p. 267.
The proof must be clear.-Coles vs. Bowne, 10 Paige,
p. 526; Lyman vs. Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch., p. 630.
Affirmed.-17 Johns., p. 373. But this is a rule of evi-
dence not necessary to be stated here.

1641. The whole of a contract is to be taken

together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the

other.

NOTE. "Giving effect to every part."-Frankel vs. Stern, July, Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal.; Mickle vs. Sanchez, 1 Cal., p. 200; Code La., 1950; Code Napoleon, 1161; Ward vs. Whitney, 8 N. Y., p. 446; Decker vs. Furniss, 14 id., pp. 615, 622; Hamilton vs. Taylor, 18 id., p. 358; Richards vs. Warring, 39 Barb., p. 42; James vs. Tallent, 5 B. & Ald., p. 889; Barton vs. Fitzgerald, 15 East., p. 541; see Simonds vs. Hodgson, 3 B. & Ad., p. 50. The recitals of a deed may restrict general words in its operative part.--Simons vs. Johnson, 3 B. & Ad., p. 175; Solly vs. Forbes, 2 Brod.

Effect to be given to

every part

of contract.

Several

contracts,

together.

& B., p. 38; Payler vs. Homersham, 4 M. & Selw., p. 423; Lampon vs. Corke, 5 B. & Ald., p. 606; Bell vs. Bruen, 1 How. U. S., p. 184; Lawrence vs. M'Calmont, 2 id., p. 449. "If reasonably practicable."Westcott vs. Thompson, 18 N. Y., p. 363. "Each clause helping to interpret the others."-Miller vs. Travers, 8 Bing., p. 244; Story Cont., Sec. 657; see Aikin vs. Western R. R. Co., 20 N. Y., p. 370; Heywood vs. Perrin, 10 Pick., p. 228; Gray vs. Clark, 11 Verm., p. 583; Merrill vs. Gore, 29 Me., p. 346; Sicklemore vs. Thistleton, 6 M. & Selw., p. 9.

1642. Several contracts relating to the same mat

when taken ters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.

Interpretation in

favor of contract.

1643.

NOTE.-Hamilton vs. Taylor, 18 N. Y., p. 358; Church vs. Brown, 21 N. Y., pp. 319, 330; Pepper vs. Haight, 20 Barb., p. 429. The same rule applies to deeds.-Huttemeier vs. Albro, 18 N. Y., p. 48; Wright vs. Douglass, 7 id., p. 574. Contracts between different parties (Craig vs. Wells, 11 N. Y., p. 315), or relating to different matters (Cornell vs. Todd, 2 Denio, p. 130), or not forming part of one transaction (Mann vs. Witbeck, 17 Barb., p. 388), cannot be taken together.-See case of Lockwood vs. Canfield, 20 Cal., p. 126; Verzan vs. McGregor, 23 Cal., p. 339, and note to Sec. 1636, ante. It is a familiar rule that where several papers concerning the same subject matter are executed by or between the same parties, at the same time, all are to be construed together as one instrument.-Ingoldsby Juan, 12 Cal., p. 564.

VS.

A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties.

NOTE. "Lawful."-Co. Litt., p. 42; 2 Blacks. Com., p. 380; Chit. Cont. (4th ed.), p. 80; Sterry vs. Clifton, 9 C. B., p. 110; Harrington vs. Kloprogge, 4 Doug., p. 5; see Clark vs. Pinney, 7 Cow., p. 681; Shore vs. Wilson, 9 Clark & F., p. 397. The language of a contract cannot be perverted in order to make it lawful.-See Porter vs. Havens, 37 Barb., p. 343: Mayor of Norwich vs. Norfolk Railway Co., 4 El. & Bl., p. 397. "Operative."-Richards vs. Warring, 39 Barb., p. 42; Archibald vs. Thomas, 3 Cow., p. 284; Boyd vs. Moyle, 2 C. B., p. 644; Russell vs. Phillips,

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