by perform ance of 1584. Performance of the conditions of a propo- Acceptance sal, or the acceptance of the consideration offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal. conditions. must be 1585. An acceptance must be absolute and un- Acceptance qualified, or must include in itself an acceptance of absolute. that character which the proposer can separate from the rest, and which will conclude the person accepting. A qualified acceptance is a new proposal. NOTE.-Hough vs. Brown, 19 N. Y., pp. 114, 115; tion of 1586. A proposal may be revoked at any time Revocabefore its acceptance is communicated to the proposer, proposal. but not afterwards. NOTE.-Stephens vs. Buffalo and N. Y. R. R. Co., 20 Barb., p. 332; Eskridge vs. Glover, 5 Stew. & Port., p. 264; see Boston & Me. R. R. vs. Bartlett, 3 Cush., p. 224; but a proposal cannot be revoked after acceptance is communicated.—Routledge vs. Grant, 4 Bing., p. 653; Head vs. Diggon, 3 Man. & R., p. 97; Cooke vs. Oxley, 3 T. R., p. 653. 1587. A proposal is revoked: tion, how 1. By the communication of notice of revocation by Revocathe proposer to the other party, in the manner pre- made. scribed by Sections 1581 and 1583, before his acceptance has been communicated to the former; 2. By the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or if no time is so prescribed, the lapse of a reasonable time without communication of the acceptance; Ratification of contract, void for want of consent. Assumption of 3. By the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance; or, 4. By the death or insanity of the proposer. NOTE.-Subd. 1.-See note to last section. Subd. 2.-An owner of land proposed to the plaintiff that he might take timber from the land upon paying for it in a certain way. The plaintiff said he would accept the proposition if he could get his brother to assist him. The owner told the plaintiff that plaintiff need not give a decided answer then, but might do so thereafter. Plaintiff after ward engaged his brother to assist him in cutting the timber, but never notified the land owner that he had accepted his proposition. Subsequently the owner made the same proposition to defendants, who entered upon the land, cut, and carried away the timber. The plaintiff brought an action on the case against them. Held: that what passed between the plaintiff and the land owner was a mere proposition, not accepted; that no contract was made, and the action could not be maintained.-Beckwith vs. Cheever, 1 Fost., N. H., p. 41; see, also, Peru vs. Turner, 1 Fairf., p. 185; Moxley vs. Moxley, 2 Metc., Ky., p. 309. Subd. 4.-The Palo Alto, Daveis, p. 356. 1588. A contract which is voidable solely for want of due consent, may be ratified by a subsequent con sent. NOTE. "Solely for want of consent."-Gray vs. Hook, 4 N. Y., p. 449. "Subsequent consent."— Newton vs. Bronson, 13 N. Y., p. 595; Bronson vs. Wiman, 8 id., p. 188; see Sweetman vs. Prince, 26 id.. p. 224. 1589. A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a obligation transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligaacceptance tions arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or by of benefits. ought to be known, to the person accepting. NOTE.-Bennett vs. Judson, 21 N. Y., p. 238. CHAPTER IV. OBJECT OF A CONTRACT. SECTION 1595. Object, what. 1596. Requisites of object. 1597. Impossibility, what. 1598. When contract wholly void. 1599. When contract partially void. what. 1595. The object of a contract is the thing which Object, it is agreed, on the part of the party receiving the consideration, to do or not to do. NOTE.-Martin vs. McCormack, 8 N. Y., p. 335. of object. 1596. The object of a contract must be lawful Requisites when the contract is made, and possible and ascertainable by the time the contract is to be performed. NOTE. For a definition of the word "lawful," see Chapter V of this Title. "And possible."-Tufnell 17 Barb., p. 260; Abeel vs. Radcliff, 13 Johns., p. 300; bility, what 1597. Everything is deemed possible except that Impossiwhich is impossible in the nature of things. NOTE.-Impossibility is to be determined, not by the means or ability of the party, but by the nature of things.-Code La., ?? 1885, 2028; see McNeill vs. Reed, 9 Bing., p. 68; Beebe vs. Johnson, 19 Wend., p. 500; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 N. Y., p. 99; Warfield vs. Watkins, 30 Barb., p. 395; Tufnell vs. Constable, 7 Ad. & El., p. 798. Thus, a promise to procure the assent of a third person to any lawful and proper act is valid.-Lloyd vs. Crispe, 5 Taunt., p. 249; McNeill vs. Reed, 9 Bing., p. 68. When contract 1598. Where a contract has but a single object, wholly void and such object is unlawful, whether in whole or in When contract partially void. part, or wholly impossible of performance, or so vaguely expressed as to be wholly unascertainable, the entire contract is void. NOTE. "Object unlawful."-See Smith vs. Wilcox, 24 N. Y., p. 353; Porter vs. Havens, 37 Barb., p. 343; Devlin vs. Brady, 32 id., p. 518. "In whole or in part."-Brown vs. Brown, 34 Barb., p. 533; Hopkins vs. Prescott, 4 C. B., p. 578. "Impossible of performance."-See Faulkner vs. Lowe, 2 Exch., p. 595. "The entire contract is void."-Haskell vs. McHenry, 4 Cal., p. 411; Norris vs. Harris, 15 Cal., p. 226; Valentine vs. Stewart, 15 Cal., p. 387. 1599. Where a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least is lawful, and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the latter and valid as to the rest. NOTE.-See Bank of Australasia vs. Bank of Australia, 6 Moore P. C., p. 152; Leavitt vs. Palmer, 3 N. Y., p. 37; Chase's Ex'r vs. Burkholder, 18 Penn. St., p. 50; Kerrison vs. Cole, 8 East., p. 236. CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATION. SECTION 1605. Good consideration, what. 1606. How far legal or moral obligation is a good considera tion. 1607. Consideration lawful. 1608. Effect of its illegality. 1609. Consideration executed or executory. 1610. Executory consideration. 1611. How ascertained. 1612. Effect of impossibility of ascertaining consideration. 1613. Same. 1614. Written instrument presumptive evidence of consid eration. 1615. Burden of proof to invalidate sufficient consideration. sideration, 1605. Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be con- Good conferred, upon the promisor, by any other person, to what. which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise. NOTE." Any benefit conferred."-Comstock vs. |