pp. 355, 372; Mortimer vs. Hartley, 3 De Gex and Sm., 1323. Where the meaning of any part of a will is ambiguous or doubtful, it may be explained by any reference thereto, or recital thereof, in another part of the will. NOTE.-See Hyatt vs. Pugsley, 23 Barb., p. 285; taken in 1324. The words of a will are to be taken in their Words ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear inten- ordinary tion to use them in another sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained. NOTE.-Words are used in their grammatical sense, unless a clear intention otherwise is manifest.-Hone vs. Van Schaick, 3 N. Y., p. 538; Cromer vs. Pinckney, 3 Barb. Ch., p. 466; Bullock vs. Downes, 9 H. of L. Cas., p. 24; to be collected and ascertained.-De Nottebeck vs. Astor, 13 N. Y., p. 98; affirming S. C., 16 Barb., p. 412; Bradhurst vs. Bradhurst, 1 Paige, p. 331; Covenhoven vs. Shuler, id., p. 122; Rathbone vs. Dyckman, 3 id., p. 9; Crosby vs. Wendell, 6 id., p. 548. sense. receive an construc 1325. The words of a will are to receive an inter- Words to pretation which will give to every expression some operative effect, rather than one which will render any of the tion. expressions inoperative. NOTE.-Griffen vs. Ford, 1 Bosw., pp. 123-140; 1326. Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is Intestacy to be preferred which will prevent a total intestacy. 1327. NOTE.-Booth vs. Booth, 4 Ves., p. 407. Technical words in a will are to be taken in to be avoided. Effect of technical their technical sense, unless the context clearly indi- words. cates a contrary intention. NOTE.-Technical words are taken in their technical sense.-Moore vs. Lyons, 25 Wend., pp. 154, 155; Technical words not necessary. Certain words not necessary to pass a fee. Power to devise. how Campbell vs. Rawdon, 18 N. Y., p. 417; Brown vs. Lyon, 6 N. Y., p. 419; Jackson v. Luquere, 5 Cow., p. 228; Jenkins vs. Hughes, 8 H. of L. Cas., p. 571; Doe vs. Perratt, 6 Man. & Gr., pp. 335, 342, 350; unless the contrary clearly.-Doe vs. Gallini, 5 B. & Ad., p. 621; 3 Ad. & El., p. 340; Jesson vs. Wright, 2 Bligh., p. 57; indicates a contrary intention.-Corrigan vs. Kiernan, 1 Bradf., p. 208; Sherwood vs. Sherwood, 3 id., p. 230; De Kay vs. Irving, 5 Den. p. 646; Parks vs. Parks, 9 Paige, p. 107. 1328. Technical words are not necessary to give effect to any species of disposition by a will. NOTE.-Jackson vs. Luquere, 5 Cow., p. 228; Parks vs. Parks, 9 Paige, p. 117. 1329. The term "heirs," or other words of inherit ance, are not requisite to devise a fee, and a devise of real property passes all the estate of the testator, unless otherwise limited. NOTE. To similar effect is 1 Vict., ch. 26, Secs. 26-28. 1330. Real or personal property embraced in a executes of power to devise, passes by a will purporting to devise all the real or personal property of the testator. will. Devise or bequest of all personal NOTE.-Van Wert vs. Benedict, 1 Bradf., p. 123; Amory vs. Meredith, 7 Allen, p. 397. See a similar provision, 1 Vict., ch. 26, Sec. 27, as regards a general and beneficial power. 1331. A devise or bequest of all the testator's real all real or or personal property, in express terms, or in any other terms denoting his intent to dispose of all his real or personal property, passes all the real or personal property which he was entitled to dispose of by will at the time of his death. Residuary clause. NOTE.-McNaughton vs. McNaughton, 41 Barb., p. 50; see, also, notes to Secs. 1274, 1317, 1318. 1332. A devise of the residue of the testator's estate, property, or real property, passes all the real property which he was entitled to devise at the time of his death, not otherwise effectually devised by his will. NOTE. It has been doubted (Van Cortlandt vs. Kip, 1 Hill, p. 596; 7 id., p. 352; see Prescott vs. Prescott, 7 Metc., pp. 141, 146) whether this is the effect of a residuary devise, except where the beneficial taker under the prior devise is the same person as the residuary devisee (see Tucker vs. Tucker, 5 N. Y., p. 421), where the prior devise has been revoked by the testator (Kip vs. Van Cortlandt, 7 Hill, p. 346), or where the prior devise is only a charge upon, and not an exception from the residuary devise (Cook vs. Stationers' Co., 3 Myl. & K., p. 262). 1333. A bequest of the residue of the testator's Same. estate, property, or personal property, passes all the personal property which he was entitled to bequeath at the time of his death, not otherwise effectually bequeathed by his will. NOTE.-Booth vs. Booth, 4 Vesey, pp. 399-407; Jones vs. Mackilwain, 1 Russ., p. 220. In Leake vs. Robinson, 2 Mer., pp. 363, 386, Sir William Grant, M. R., said: "There is certainly a strong disposition in the Courts to construe a residuary clause so as to prevent an intestacy with regard to any of the testator's property." "rela "issue," ants," etc. 1334. A testamentary disposition to "heirs," "re- "Heirs," lations," ""nearest relations," "representatives," "legal tives," representatives," or "personal representatives," or "descend"family," "issue," "descendants," "nearest" or "next of kin" of any person, without other words of qualification, and when the terms are used as words of donation, and not of limitation, vests the property in those who would be entitled to succeed to the property of such person, according to the provisions of the Title on Succession, in this Code. NOTE.-Norris vs. Hensley, 27 Cal., p. 439. In this case Mr. Justice Currey, with great ability and learning, and with many cogent authorities referred to in support of his positions, thoroughly and exhaustively treats of the rules of construction of wills, and particularly the rule in "Shelley's Case." 1335. The terms mentioned in the last section are used as words of donation, and not of limitation, when the property is given to the person so designated, directly, and not as a qualification of an estate given to the ancestor of such person. 1336. Words in a will referring to death or survivorship, simply, relate to the time of the testator's death, unless possession is actually postponed, when they must be referred to the time of possession. vs. NOTE.-Words in a will referring to death.-Adams Beckman, 1 Paige, p. 631; Ive vs. King, 16 Beav., p. 41; Howard vs. Howard, 21 Beav., p. 550; Schenck vs. Agnew, 4 Kay & J., p. 405. Or survivorship.Young vs. Robertson, 4 Macq., pp. 319, 330; Young vs. Davies, 9 Jur., (N. S.,) p. 339. The contrary was held as to real property in Moore vs. Lyons, 25 Wend., p. 119, on the supposed English rule; but that rule does not exist. Taaffe vs. Connor, 10 H. of L. Cas., p. 77; 22 Beav., p. 271. It makes no difference that there is a postponement without any preceding life interest.Hodgson vs. Micklethwaite, 2 Drewry, p. 294. This rule is not now law when the life tenant dies before the testator.-Spurrell vs. Spurrell, 11 Hare, p. 154. 1337. A testamentary disposition to a class includes. every person answering the description at the testator's death; but when the possession is postponed to a future period, it includes also all persons coming within the description before the time to which possession is postponed. NOTE.-Testamentary disposition to a class, includes every one answering to the description at testator's death.-Tucker vs. Bishop, 16 N. Y., p. 402; Campbell vs. Rawdon, 18 N. Y., p. 415. Persons who die before the testator are not included.-Stires vs. Van Rensselaer, 2 Bradf., p. 172; Campbell vs. Rawdon, 18 N. Y., pp. 414, 415. If possession is continued, it includes all coming within the description before the time to which it is continued.-See Tucker vs. Bishop, 16 N. Y., p. 402; Johnson vs. Valentine, 4 Sandf., p. 36. To the contrary.—Doubleday vs. Newton, 27 Barb., p. 444. F conversion takes effect. 1338. When a will directs the conversion of real When NOTE.-Direction of the will to convert real property 669. 1339. A child conceived before, but not born until after a testator's death, or any other period when a disposition to a class vests in right or in possession, takes, if answering to the description of the class. NOTE.-Rawlins vs. Rawlins, 2 Cox, p. 425; Trower vs. Butts, 1 Sim. & Stu., p. 181; Jenkins vs. Freyer, 4 Paige, p. 53; see Sec. 739, ante, and note. when after child born testator's death takes under will. and 1340. When, applying a will, it is found that there Mistakes is an imperfect description, or that no person or prop- omissions. erty exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic evidence; but evidence of the declarations of the testator as to his intentions cannot be received. NOTE.-Imperfect description, (Fleming vs. Fleming, 8 Jur. [N. S.], p. 1042,) of person (Connolly vs. Pardon, 1 Paige, p. 291; Smith vs. Smith, 4 id., p. 271; Wightman vs. Stoddard, 3 Bradf., p. 405; Hart vs. Marks, 4 id., p. 161; Lee vs. Pain, 4 Hare, p. 249,) or property (Roman Cath. Asylum vs. Emmons, 3 Bradf., p. 144; Smith vs. Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch., pp. 82, 88). Mistakes and omissions (Hart vs. Tulk, 2 De Gex, M. & G., p. 300,) must be corrected if the error appears from the context or extrinsic evidence (see Stanley vs. Stanley, 2 Johns. & Hem., p. 513; see Blundell vs. Gladstone, 1 Phillips, p. 279). The testator's declarations are generally inadmissible.-Doe vs. Hiscocks, 5 |