politics would cease to oppose vesting Congress with powers adequate to that great and important object.

but

I intended to have devoted this day entirely to writing to you, I was unexpectedly called upon to attend a committee of Congress this morning, and the business before them makes it necessary for me immediately to report on another matter connected with it. I am, dear sir, &c.,

JOHN

JAY.

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, October 15, 1785.

Dear Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write me the 6th September.

The act of Congress of the 18th of August, which you enclose, shall be communicated as directed.

I have the honor to agree fully with you in your opinion, that "it is manifestly as much the interest of this country to be well with us as for us to be well with them;" but this is not the judgment of the English nation, it is not the judgment of Lord North and his party, it is not the judgment of the Duke of Portland and his friends, and it does not appear to be the judgment of Mr. Pitt and the present set. In short, it does not at present appear to be the sentiment of any body; and I am much inclined to believe they will try the issue of importance with us.

I have insisted upon the surrender of the posts with as much earnestness as prudence would warrant, but can obtain no other answer than certain hints concerning the debts, and some other points, which are sufficient to convince me that the restoration of the posts will have certain conditions tacked to it. I have insisted in conversation, and have inquired in writing, but have not yet made a formal requisition by a memorial, in the name and by order of the United States; if I had done it, I should have compromitted my sovereign, and should certainly have had no answer; whenever this is done, it should be followed up. I shall certainly do it, if I should see a moment when it can possibly prevail. If it is the judgment of Congress that it should be done immediately, I should be glad of their orders, which shall be exactly obeyed, I should even wish they would prescribe to me the form of the memorial.

It is, indeed, as you observe, in the power of Congress to take a certain step, which would be longer and more sensibly felt by Britain, than the independence of the United States. You have not hinted at the nature of this measure. I can conceive of more than one exclusion of British ships from all our exports, and a heavy duty upon British manufactures, is one; a defensive alliance with France, Spain, and Holland, is another. A case may happen in which this last might be justifiable; but I presume it will not hastily be adopted, nor ever without Canada and Nova Scotia, to be admitted into our Confederation, and one half, at least, of the best of the English West India Islands, besides stipulations for the admission of our produce freely to the French West India Islands, and some articles into France, duty free, with similar stipulations with Spain and Holland. I hope, however, the first measure will be adopted forthwith, and not the smallest article of our produce be permitted to be exported in British bottoms.

Mr. Barclay is appointed to go to Morocco, and Colonel Franks goes with him. Mr. Lamb to Algiers, and Paul R. Randall, Esquire, with him. There will be captives to redeem, as well as treaties to form.

I can obtain no answer from the Ministry to any one demand, proposal, or inquiry. In this I am not alone. It is the complaint of all the other foreign Ministers. The Dutch Envoy, particularly, told me yesterday that he could obtain no answer to any of his memorials, some of which were presented as long ago as last April. The Ministry, since the ill fortune of their studies in Ireland, have been in a lethargy; but they must soon awake. Mr. Pitt has long had with him in the country our project of a treaty, and it cannot be long before he comes to some determination. They have had lately evidence enough of the utility to them of the public hope of a commercial agreement with America. Holding up the idea of a treaty has rapidly raised the stocks; but I cannot entertain any sanguine hopes, for all experience, all evidence, seem to be lost upon this nation and its rulers. According to most appearances, a nation so entirely given up to the government of its passions, must precipitate itself into calamities greater than it has yet felt. I still think, however, that a decided opinion concerning the system it will pursue, cannot be formed before the opening of the next budget. JOHN ADAMS.

With great esteem, &c.,

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, October 17, 1785.

Dear Sir,

It has been the general sense of our country since the peace that it was their duty and their interest to be impartial between the Powers of Europe, and to observe a neutrality in their wars. This principle is a wise one, upon the supposition that those Powers will be impartial to us, and permit us to remain at peace. But it is natural for England and France to be jealous of our neutrality, and apprehensive that, notwithstanding our professions, we may be induced to connect ourselves with one against the other. While such uncertainties and suspicions continue, we may find that each of these rival kingdoms will be disposed to stint our growth and diminish our power, from a fear that it will be employed against itself and in favor of its enemy. If France could be sure of our perpetual alliance, it is to be supposed she would favor our increase in every thing which could be reconciled to her own interest. If England could obtain such an alliance with us, she, for the same reason, would favor our interests in all cases compatible with her

own.

I need not point out to you instances in proof of such a jealousy in France. Yet it may not be amiss to refer you to some hints in Mr. Necker's late work.

Mr. Hartley, you will remember, dwelt much too often upon the subject of an alliance with England for us to doubt that. However incident the suggestion of such an idea was, he nevertheless entertained it. He has lately renewed this topic with me, and I gave him the only answer which can ever be given, viz: that the moral character of the United States was of more importance to them than any alliance; that they could not, in honor, hear such a proposal, but that, if honor and character were out of the question, while England held a province in America, we could not safely forfeit the confidence of France, nor commit ourselves to the consistency of England.

But to rise higher. When the King was pleased to say to me that he would be foremost in favor and friendship to the United States, when he should see a disposition to give the preference to this country, he probably meant more than we can comply with. If a preference in commerce only had been meant, it was quite

unnecessary to make it a future condition, because the ardor of our citizens in transferring almost the whole commerce of the country here, and voluntarily reviving that monopoly which they had long complained of as a grievance, in a few of the first months of the peace, imprudently demonstrated to all the world an immoderate preference of British commerce. It was impossible that we could give stronger proofs of a preference in this sense. If the royal expression then was a deliberate one, it must have intended something more, and something which the United States cannot agree to.

The British Ministry, therefore, have now before them a question as important to the British Empire as any that ever was agitated in it-whether, by evacuating the posts, and fulfilling the treaty of peace in other points, and by opening their ports in the West Indies and on the continent of America, as well as in Europe, to our ships and produce upon equal and fair terms, they shall insure the impartiality and neutrality of America; or whether, by a contrary conduct, they shall force them into closer connexions of alliance and commerce with France, Spain, and Holland. A treaty of defensive alliance with France would deserve a long and careful deliberation, and should comprehend the East and West Indies. I mean our right to trade in them, as well as many other considerations, too numerous to hint at here. A new treaty of commerce might be made greatly beneficial to both countries. If we once see a necessity of giving preferences in trade, great things may be done. By the treaty between England and Portugal of 27th of December, 1703, Portugal promised to admit forever into Portugal the woolen cloths, and the rest of the woolen manufactures of the Britons, as was accustomed, till they were prohibited by the laws; nevertheless, upon this condition, "II. That is to say that Great Britain shall be obliged ❝ forever hereafter to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain, so that at no time, whether there shall be peace or war between the Kingdoms of Britain and France, anything more shall ⚫ be demanded for these wines by the name of custom or duty, or ' by whatsoever title, directly or indirectly, whether they shall be 'imported into Great Britain in pipes or hogsheads, or other casks 'than what shall be demanded, from the quantity or measure of French wine, deducting or abating the third part of the custom or duty. But if at any time this deduction or abatement of customs shall, in any manner, be prejudiced, it shall be just and lawful for

VOL. II.-31

'his sacred Royal Majesty of Portugal again to prohibit the woolen 'cloths, and the rest of the British woolen manufactures."

This treaty, which the Irish call the Methuen treaty, from the name of the Ambassador who signed it, and which they now claim the benefit of as Britons, although the Portuguese deny them to be Britons, and accordingly refuse their woolens, has had a vast effect both in Portugal and England. The consequence has been that Portugal has now for more than four score years clothed herself in British woolens, like an English colony, and has never been able to introduce woolen manufactures at home, and the British Islands have drunk no other wine than Port, Lisbon, and Madeira, although the wines of France are so much better.

The United States may draw many useful lessons from this example. If, from the blind passions and rash councils of the Britons, they should be compelled to deviate from their favorite principle of impartiality and neutrality, they might make a new commercial treaty with France, for a term or forever, exempting all the manufactures of France from one-third, or one-half, or all the duties which shall be stipulated to be laid upon the English manufactures. In this case, what becomes of the manufactures of Britain? What of their commerce, revenue, and naval power? They must decline, and those of her rival must rise.

I hint only at these things. They open a wide field of inquiry, and require all the thoughts of the people. We should stipulate for the admission of all our produce, and should agree upon a tariff of duties on both sides. We should insist upon entire liberty of trade and navigation, both in the East and West Indies, and in Africa, and upon the admission of our oil and fish, as well as tobacco, flour, rice, indigo, pot-ash, &c., &c.

This country boasts of her friends and partisans in this and the other assemblies, particularly in New York and Virginia, and are confident we can do nothing, neither exclude their ships from our exports nor lay on duties upon their imports into our States, neither raise a revenue, nor build a fleet. If their expectations are not disappointed, we shall be, and that in a few months, not only a despised but a despicable people. With the power in our hands of doing as we please, we shall do nothing. With the means of making ourselves respected by the wise, we shall become the scorn of fools. I am under embarrassments in treating with the Ministers here, to