to some highly important subjects, were called in question. But it was very evident, that party feelings and prejudices. had too much influence with those who condemned the measures of the Executive. After the excitement of the day, when men were governed more by their feelings than their reason, the wisdom of the President's conduct was more fully approved and admired. The suppression of the insurrection, growing out of an opposition to the excise laws, by the militia, after great forbearance and repeated attempts to dissuade the people from such dangerous combinations, was seen to have been indispensable to the welfare of the Union. And the measures pursued by the administration, for maintaining a neutral position, as to the two belligerent nations of Europe, and for averting war with either, were allowed to have been the most proper and effectual, both for the honor and the commercial prosperity of the United States. The firmness of the President prevented hostilities with the great maritime power of England, and saved the country from an alliance offensive and defensive with revolutionary France, which, at that period of anarchy and misrule, would have been fatal to the peace and prosperity of the country. In reply to the speech of the President, at this time, (Nov. 1794,) and in the debates on subjects suggested to their consideration, the language of members was almost invariably respectful towards him; but his measures were attacked, by severe and often bitter censures on the Secretary of the Treasury, who it was pretended originated them, and was supposed to have undue influence over the mind of the Chief Magistrate. The talents and public services of the Secretary were so eminent, that the discernment of the President could but highly appreciate them; but he had too much self-respect, as well as practical wisdom, to be under an undue influence from any man. With a great degree of sensibility and strong feelings of personal honor, with health much. impaired by incessant devotion to public duties, and with the desire of attending more closely to his own private business, for the benefit of his family, Mr. Hamilton retired from the treasury department, on the first of January, 1795; having some months before, given private notice to the President, of his wish to resign.

The resignation of General Knox, who was the first Secretary of War, under the federal government, soon followed. He too, had received the reproaches and censures of the opposition, on the pretence of extravagance in the expenditures of public monies, and of indulging in theories

inconsistent with that rigid economy which was necessary in the republic, already burthened by a heavy debt. Perhaps his views were less practical than those of Hamilton, but his probity, either as a public or private character, was never doubted, and his love of republican liberty was most sincere and ardent. During the war of the Revolution, he had acted a useful and conspicuous part; and by his liberal and magnanimous disposition had won the esteem and affection of General Washington. And such was his confidence and admiration towards that illustrious citizen, that, instead of officiously advising him, except when his opinion was expressly desired, he was always ready to follow the course pointed out by his chief.*

If the mission of Mr. Jay, to the British Court, to preserve peace with that nation, and to agree on a commercial intercourse between that country and the United States, was opposed as being humiliating on the part of the federal government, the treaty, to which he assented, and which the President submitted to the Senate for their approval, was even more generally condemned as dishonorable to the character of the nation, and highly unfavorable to its interests. No express provision was made for preventing impressments from American merchant vessels, which had been a subject of great and just complaint; the obligation to pay the debts due to the refugees, to which some States had objected, was renewed and recognized; and great restrictions were laid on the trade of the United States to ports in the British West Indies, which it was believed would operate very injuriously on the navigation and commerce. of the country. Only American vessels, under one hundred

* In his letter of resignation, the Secretary of War, observed,-" In whatever situation I shall be, I shall recollect your confidence and kindness with all the fervor and purity of affection, of which a grateful heart is susceptible." The President said, in reply, on receiving his resignation," I cannot suffer you to close your public life, without uniting to the satisfaction which must arise in your own mind from conscious rectitude, assurances of my most perfect persuasion that you have deserved well of your country." Col. T. Pickering, a very distinguished officer in the Revolutionary war, and at the time, Postmaster-General, was appointed Secretary of War, in the place of General Knox, in 1795; and Oliver Wolcott, of Connecticut, was placed at the head of the Treasury department. Edmund Randolph, sometime Attorney-General, had succeeded Mr. Jefferson as Secretary of State, the year before, and William Bradford, of Pennsylvania, was appointed his successor. Near the close of 1795, Mr. Pickering was advanced to the office of Secretary of State, on the resignation of Mr. Randolph, who found it proper to withdraw from the Cabinet, on account of the detection of his confidential correspondence with the French Minister, which the President highly disapproved. Mr. Mc Henry of Maryland, was also then made Secretary of War.

tons, were permitted to enter the British ports in the West Indies, with cargoes from the United States; and there was not so fair and full reciprocity relating to commerce as was justly desired. It was certainly far preferable to war; and seldom, indeed, are either the prosperity or welfare of a nation advanced by that last resort; for the effect would have been the ruin of commerce, and an immense public debt, which would have distracted and oppressed the people for many generations.

Meetings were held in many seaports in the United States, and the terms of the treaty reprobated even by those who had before approved the measures of the President; and who were entirely disconnected with the secret societies, which had most unjustly condemned all the public acts of the administration. But these hasty expressions against the treaty, before it was published, and when its terms were greatly misrepresented by a few disaffected individuals, were soon succeeded by a loyal acquiescence in the great body of the people, who became satisfied that it would operate more favorably than was at first apprehended; and especially on learning that it was approved and confirmed by the Senate, the constitutional branch of the government, whose prerogative it is, united with the President, to form treaties with foreign nations.

There were serious objections to several articles of the treaty with the Senate; and after eighteen days consideration it was conditionally accepted, and that only by the constitutional majority. After this opinion of the Senate, the President took several weeks to reflect on the subject, before he gave his consent to its ratification. And then a strong memorial against the British order, subjecting to seizure all articles of provision, destined to French ports, was prepared to accompany the communication of the approval of the treaty. The British order was revoked, and the ratification by that government followed. The Secretary of State, Mr. Randolph, was opposed to the treaty; but the other members of the Cabinet advised to its acceptance, with a remonstrance against the order relating to provisions.

But though the treaty, made with Great Britain, by Mr. Jay, was accepted by the Senate and President, and, therefore, so far as it extended, had become the law of the land, and an obligation imposed to fulfil its conditions by Congress, great efforts were made to prevent the execution of some of its provisions on the part of the United States. Appropriations were necessary to be made by the legisla

ture, for carrying into effect certain Acts, stipulated to be performed on the part of the federal government. These appropriations were opposed, at the hazard of violating the treaty, and of thus giving occasion for just complaint by the British Ministry. It was said by the opposition, that there was no other method of preventing the operation of a treaty, made by the President and Senate, of the most injurious or dishonorable terms, but in the refusal of the Representatives to make the appropriations required: and as the popular branch of the government, they ought to have a voice in such a case. But it was urged, by the friends of the administration, that the Constitution gave the treaty-making power exclusively to the President and the Senate; and that, if a treaty, duly ratified by them, were disregarded, and any omissions to fulfil its provisions, deliberately sanctioned by another branch of the government, the character of the nation must greatly suffer; and no faith, no security could be justly given to a foreign power, for the observance of any treaty or compact entered into with the United States. After a long and angry discussion of the subject, in which the President did not escape equally unjust and dishonorable reproaches, as the enemy of republican freedom, and the secret friend of monarchy, the necessary appropriations were made by a vote of a small majority; several who were opposed to the treaty, and desirous of a close alliance with France, even at the hazard of a war with Great Britain, joining with the friends of the administration, from convictions of the bad faith which might otherwise be charged on the nation.

This was considered highly honorable to the opposition, and gave evidence that party feelings did not govern on all occasions. Had the motion prevailed which was offered for withholding the appropriations required by the treaty, the consequences would have been most disastrous to the United States.* It would have provoked England to retaliating and hostile measures, of incalculable injury to America; and shown to the rulers of revolutionary France, that the federal government was to be the servile instrument of their will. The long established character of the President for patriotism, and his decision and firmness, at this

* Mr. Ames, of Massachusetts, spoke in favor of appropriations for carrying the treaty into effect, with surpassing power and eloquence; and probably produced an influence with several members of the House to support the measure. With a clear head and a pure mind, he could not but perceive both the moral and political obligations of fulfilling the conditions of the treaty.

critical period, saved the American Republic from a contest, which her liberties probably would not have survived.

This unhappy division among the citizens of the United States continued, with more or less of opposing views, on political measures, for a long period. As in all parties, there were no doubt honest and patriotic individuals in each great division; and some who were unduly influenced by selfish considerations, or strangely governed by their prejudices. Those charged with a preference for monarchy, or with a desire to join with England to put down the rulers in France, were no doubt, unjustly accused. They were sincere republicans: they had exhibited the strongest proofs of their attachment to civil liberty, by their personal services and sacrifices. But they were alarmed by the extravagant conduct of the French nation, and had great reason to fear danger to the republican institutions of the United States, if the levelling doctrines advocated in that country should prevail in this. And it would be equally uncandid perhaps to suppose, that all those who were opposed to the measures recommended by Washington, and who expressed a strong sympathy in favor of France, were enemies of their own country, and would rejoice to see its government overturned. They had, indeed, mistaken notions of republican freedom, and laid less stress on the importance of constitutional authority and a settled order of political affairs than was proper, especially at that period of dangerous innovation and misrule. When such characters as Washington, and his associates in power, at that period, whose lives have given the strongest proof of devotion to liberty, and to their country's welfare, do not inspire confidence and secure support to government, there can be no stability in a republic; and political power will soon fall into the hands of the selfish and unprincipled.

The depredations on the Commerce of the country, by the Dey of Algiers, as well as the importance of providing protection for the interests of those engaged in navigation, liable as they were to injurious treatment from the nations of Europe then at war, led to a proposition for increasing the naval force of the United States. The administration was decidedly in favor of the measure; and the President had recommended the subject to Congress, early in 1794. There was, however, great opposition to it, on account of the expense, and it would be impossible, in a short time, to prepare a navy, which would be adequate for defence and protection against such powerful nations as Great Bri