country; it was therefore believed it had sufficient authority to legislate, by uniform acts, with a view to support the credit system, and to establish means, by a national bank, for general relief. But the principal act of this extra session was that for authorizing the issue of treasury notes, to the amount of ten millions of dollars, for the immediate wants of the government. This was no other than a loan, except in name; which it was probably a wish to avoid; and yet power was given to the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow, if he should find it necessary. The notes were made negotiable; and thus became in fact merely paper money; with no better credit, for there was no greater capital or certainty of payment, than there had been in the national bank. The like amount of treasury notes was authorized in 1838, and again in 1839 but a part of former issues had then been redeemed.*

The law of June, 1836, providing for the distribution of the surplus funds of the government, to and among the several States, was suspended in October, 1837; after threefourths of the same had been transferred to the States, in pursuance of the former act.

When the national funds were withdrawn from the bank of the United States, they were deposited in various State banks in most of the large and populous cities of the Union. But this proved unfortunate to the fiscal concerns of the government. Some of these deposite banks were imprudently managed, though under the sole direction of political friends of the administration; and large sums were thus entirely lost to the treasury. Had all the State banks been selected by the treasury department for their ability and faithful and prudent direction, and not for party purposes, to oblige its supporters, there would have been no reason to regret such deposites of the public funds. In the absence of a national bank, State banks, properly located and chosen with proper discrimination, have proved of great facility and advantage, both to the government and the people.

The administration of President Van Buren has been chiefly distinguished for proposing and urging the subtreasury system. The plan was suggested by his predecessor, when meditating the discontinuance of the national bank; and the course he pursued, in directing the Secretary of the Treasury to withdraw the public funds from that in

*Twenty thousand dollars were allowed to meet the expenses of issuing these notes from the treasury.

stitution, to take them into his own possession, and place them for safe keeping, in such other banks as he might select; thus assuming, as the executive officer of the government, the control and disposition of them; was the origin, and the first practical operation of the system of a subtreasury. Congress have as yet, indeed, the sole right to vote money, and to direct as to the objects for which it is appropriated; but as to its keeping, whether in banks known to be safe, or in any other specific manner or way, it is entirely under the control of the Secretary of the Treasury; and he again is the servant of the President; and not of Congress nor of the people. A door is thus opened for favoritism, for partiality to political friends, in the appointment of receivers and keepers of the national funds. And when the prejudices and passions of men are remembered, such a system will be, as in many cases it has already been, attended with great misapplication, detention, and loss of the people's money. A Secretary of the Treasury may be perfectly honest, and yet from mistaken lenity or political friendship, may permit delays and delinquencies highly improper in a public officer, and injurious to the interests of the government.

But

Political partiality in appointments to office, was manifested under President Van Buren to as great an extent as during the administration of General Jackson. Not a very large number were removed; for the offices of government were generally held by the friends of his predecessor. when the term fixed by law for a commission to run, if the incumbent was discovered to be in any way opposed to the policy of the administration, or to relax at all in his zeal or his efforts to support the candidates of the party, he was dismissed at the expiration of his first commission.

This partial and exclusive policy was indeed adopted by one of his predecessors, in an early period of the federal government; but it was very generally condemned as improper; the hope of office being thus held out to unprincipled men to attach themselves to the reigning administration. It was now more alarming and more reprehensible, as it was expressly declared by a prominent friend of President Jackson and President Van Buren, "that the spoils of office belonged to the victors."

The war in Florida was continued during the administration of President Van Buren; and very large sums, expended in maintaining it: During the year 1836, one million and a half of dollars were appropriated to prosecute that unfortunate contest. In January, 1837, two millions

more were voted for the purpose: Both of which were before the retirement of General Jackson. At the extra session in October, 1837, a large amount was again appropriated; and in 1838, the expenses for supporting an army in that quarter, against the Indians, were to as great an amount as in either of the two preceding years. When the difficulty arose with these Indians, President Jackson supposed that it would soon be terminated. And no one, at that time, had any reason to suppose it would continue for years, and have cost the government eight or ten millions. Other measures than those of force, would probably have terminated the difficulty at an early period. It would certainly have saved many valuable lives, now lost to the country; and been far more satisfactory to the friends of humanity throughout the Union.

Although generally opposed to the policy of internal improvements, at the expense of the federal government, large sums were expended for repairs on the Cumberland road, and for its continuance through the States of Indiana and Illinois. But this was an object of great national benefit, by opening a way from the Atlantic to the interior of the Union; and the work had originated with Congress several years before. The friends of the administration, who were also advocate of State rights, believed there was no inconsistency in this conduct. Large appropriations were also made in 1836, and in 1837, for lighthouses, lifeboats, buoys, and monuments, for the benefit of navigation; but for these purposes there was always far more agreement among the different parties in Congress.

The public expenses continued, almost invariably, to increase, from the year 1829 to 1838. Public agents were multiplied, and an increased compensation, in many cases, were allowed them for their services. And large sums were lost by the improper appropriation of monies put into the hands of the federal officers. There was often a pretence for charging for extra service, and thus obtaining more than was clearly allowed by law. The expenses of the public printing for Congress, and for the departments under the executive, were among those in which great sums were expended; and it was found that frequently the business could have been performed at ten or twenty per cent. less than was given. And this conduct could justly deserve no other name than corruption, or a gross abuse of the patronage of the government, for party purposes.

The full results of the peculiar and experimental policy

of President Jackson and President Van Buren, respecting banks and the currency, in their influence on the condition of the country, for good or for evil, for succeeding years, cannot be correctly estimated. The immediate consequences were a general disturbance of the trade and monetary affairs of the nation, and an unprecedented check to the accustomed pursuits of a people, so enterprizing in their spirit and so desirous of improving their condition, as are the citizens of the United States. The Sub-treasury scheme also gave alarm to the friends of the Constitution, generally, and to men of settled republican sentiments, who perceived in it a deviation from the essential elements of liberty recognized in the Constitution, and a weakening of the responsibility of public agents, who should always be controlled by the authority of law. They knew that power was corrupting; that it was necessary to impose checks on those who were clothed with political authority, and to make them constantly amenable to their constituents. The developments and effects of this fearful experiment must be left for narration to a distant day. The only just hope of the perpetuity and future purity of the republic, rests on the intelligence and virtue of the people; and on their wisdom in the choice of men for places of public trust; who, like WASHINGTON, shall make the Constitution their guide; and, under the controlling influence of its doctrines and requisitions, shall seek to preserve the integrity of the Union, and the rights and welfare of individuals.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from the Speeches of Mr. Webster, a Senator from Massachusetts, and of Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, January, 1830, on the subject of State Rights, and of the powers of the Federal Government, are deemed of such superior importance, and of such general interest, that they are here given.

MR. WEBSTER. There remains to be performed, by far the most grave and important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me, by this occasion. It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles of the Constitution under which we are here assembled.

*

I undestand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. Hayne,] to maintain that it is a right of the State legislatures to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws,

I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing under the Constitution; not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the States, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise of power by the general government, of checking it, and of compelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers.

I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority, is not lodged exclusively in the general government, or any branch of it; but, that, on the contrary, the States may lawfully decide for themselves, and each State for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its power.

I understand him to insist, that if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any State government, require it, such State government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government, which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.