judgment, that negotiations conducted in a proper spirit, would have prevented the difficulties and evils which occurred to the United States; and that more decision and firmness would have prevented war and preserved commercial prosperity. In France, the American Envoys spoke with far more independence and propriety, than their instructions from the President could have inspired; and they even expressed surprise that some resentment was not manifested by the federal administration. They could not believe, that the terms dictated by the Emperor would be received with so much readiness by the chief magistrate of a great republic. And the American ministers in England expressly declared, that a treaty might have been made with that government, which if not in all respects. such as was desired, might be accepted, without injury or dishonor to the United States. But the President expressed an opinion in favor of an embargo; and his wishes were then a law to the majority of Congress. What were his secret views can only be matter of conjecture, from the events of the time. He, however, declared it to be a measure of coercion, and not directly of war, towards Great Britain, whose conduct he deemed most unjust, while many of the people viewed the measures of France equally arbitrary and improper. War has usually been considered a peculiar measure of coercion; but the President made a distinction between open and declared hostilities, and other measures designed to compel the government of England to accede to the terms proposed by the United States.

The British Envoy, appointed to offer reparation, or to make explanation and apology, for the attack on the Chesapeake, arrived at Washington, in December; and soon after the embargo Act had been adopted by Congress. He had been sometime expected; and the object of his mission. was well understood. Whether the embargo was hastened, with an expectation that he might offer to make reparation or apology for that injury, of which prudence would require the acceptance, could not be fully decided. But such an opinion was entertained by a large portion of the citizens. And though the President had declared his desire. to avoid war with England, and had made efforts at negotiation to prevent such a calamity, the various acts of submission to French usurpation, and a tenacious adherence to particular terms of peace with England, to which it was known, that nation would not consent, gave strength to the belief, that he was not very anxious to avoid hostilities;

or would prefer war with Great Britain to the resentment of the rulers of France. The ostensible reason for the embargo, however, was the arbitrary decrees and the injurious practice both of England and France, and the only way for saving commercial property from the grasp of each for it might be said with much truth, that those two belligerent nations had been long waging a maritime. war with the United States.

It was expected, that a discussion would take place without delay, with the new British Envoy, respecting the special object of his mission; and that it would soon be known, whether the explanation and reparation offered would be accepted, or the dispute with England, on that and other subjects, would issue in open war. But there was an unaccountable delay in conducting the negotiation; and it afterwards appeared, that various obstacles were presented by the President to an early commencement of correspondence on this subject; such as a desire to hear again from the American Envoy in England, and the feeble health of the Secretary of State, whom he wished to conduct it.

When the correspondence between the Secretary and the British Ambassador, at the call of the House of Representatives, was published, sometime after, it appeared, that the special Envoy from England had been very urgent to adjust the affair of the Chesapeake; and had declared his authority to offer what his government considered an honorable reparation, as well as a disavowal of the act; with an assurance that an agreement be made not to search the public armed vessels of the United States. for their seamen. And he also made it known to the President and Secretary of State, at an early day, that he was instructed to treat solely on this act, and without reference to any other matter in dispute between the two nations. But the President saw fit to decline treating on this single subject, and to introduce several other topics to be connected with it, and settled at the same time. The British Envoy replied, that his instructions did not permit him to connect any other subject with this case; and declined all farther correspondence, except a general reference to former difficulties, in answer to a long note of Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State, in order to show, that in his opinion. those difficulties might be easily removed, if there was a sincere desire to remove or adjust them, and that his government did not consider them just causes of war. As in many other cases of a public nature, and especially those relating to the conduct of the federal administration with

respect to the policy both of England and France, at that period, there were different opinions expressed, as to the propriety of the course pursued by the President. And perhaps there were too strong party feelings existing, to secure or call forth an expression of sentiments entirely impartial and just.

As there was some provocation given, by enlisting and refusing to give up British seamen, and even British deserters, which was the occasion and pretext for the rash and violent act of the British commander, as it was supposed to be unauthorized by his government; and as the British cabinet promptly disavowed and regretted it, and immediately sent a special ambassador to make an apology and reparation for it, it was the general opinion of the people, that the unhappy affair should be settled at once, if the explanation tendered was proper, and not be embarrassed or delayed by a reference to other subjects. And some believed, that a wish to please the Emperor of France, or to avert his displeasure, who had said, "that the American government could not submit to the British conduct, but would declare war against that nation," had an influence in leading to the course pursued by the President.

The language and conduct of the Emperor, at this period, manifested such an interference with the measures of the United States, as to justify the prevailing opinion, that great firmness was necessary in resisting his unjust claims; and that, when this was not manifested, there must be an improper fear of his displeasure, or an equally improper desire for his favor and friendship. The course of the administration at this time was not generally considered to be strictly impartial. The letters received from the American Envoys, both in France and in England, were long kept from Congress; and afterwards only partially communicated, and several of these required to be returned to the President, without being made public. Some of those citizens who had been the warm political friends of the administration, were dissatisfied with this conduct. And when the letters, permitted to be laid before the people through the press, some months after, were read, it appeared, that the British government was really desirous of maintaining peace with the United States, and of making some sacrifices. to prevent a war; while the spirit of the French Emperor indicated little respect for the government, and little regard for the interests of America; especially, if his object could

21

be obtained, of inflicting the greater injury on the commercial and naval power of England.*

The conduct of the Emperor was considered, by a great portion of the people, alike unjust and dishonorable. Decrees of an injurious tendency to neutral commerce, when remonstrated against by the American Envoy, were declared not to be in force towards the citizens of the United States; and yet, in several instances, within a year from such assurances, they were put in execution, even on the cargoes of vessels driven into France by stress of weather, or wrecked on its coasts. And the allies, or the vassals of France were required by the Emperor to conduct in a similar manner towards American vessels and property. And it was justly deemed dishonorable either to antedate a decree, or to pass it in secret, and afterwards to claim the benefit of having issued it at an earlier period than its publication.

When the people were possessed of these facts, they became still more dissatisfied with the embargo. Grievous and restrictive as the measure was, it would have been borne with patriotic patience, had it been supposed necessary to vindicate and preserve the rights of the nation; but when it was believed it had been adopted in conformity to the views of a foreign power, the complaints increased; and some of the members of Congress, who at first supported the measure, on the recommendation of the President, were desirous of repealing it. The majority, however, were in favor of continuing it; and additional acts were soon after passed by Congress, rendering its provisions more strict and more oppressive. The coasting vessels, and even the fishermen, on or near the coasts, were subjected to severe restrictions in their business, and required to give large bonds, on leaving a port, under the pretence of their having intercourse with British ports or vessels. And when, some months after, as the opposition to the embargo increased, the act was suspended, or withdrawn by the President, as he had been authorized by Congress, in April, 1808, on the repeal of the orders of the belligerents affecting neutral

* Mr. Armstrong, the American Envoy at the Court of France, wrote to the President, in January, 1808, "That the Emperor considered war as then existing between the United States and Great Britain; and that he considered it as declared, on the publication of the British orders in council, of November, 1807; which, though just cause of complaint by the federal government, were really retaliatory of the previous French decrees, and not more arbitrary and dangerous. No good apology can be offered for these orders, but it was said, they were less injurious to neutrals, than those issued by Cromwell, 1655.

commerce, and a system of non-intercourse with European nations was adopted, the embarrassments and hindrances to foreign trade were equally injurious; and the dissatisfaction with the policy of the administration continued unabated. Still, the majority of the people expressed their confidence in the wisdom of the President and his cabinet, and believed their views favorable to the liberty and independence of the nation, with a proper spirit of opposition to the claims and orders of Great Britain, affecting the maritime interests of the United States. The policy already adopted and pursued for two or three years, was therefore continued; the conduct of both England and France being injurious to neutral rights, and great deviations from the law of nations as generally admitted;-till it issued in a war with the former nation; which was prosecuted till the other met with great reverses, and became less formidable to neutral nations. The course of the American government was evidently surrounded with difficulties; and it was not an easy task to satisfy all parties; but the opinion prevailed to a great extent, that, by strict impartiality and firmness, united with a spirit of moderation, the difficulties might have been prevented, or removed; and war wholly averted.

It was often interrogated, at this period, what would have been the state of the country, if the policy which dictated a long embargo and non-importation and non-intercourse then pursued, had been adopted in 1794, when equal difficulties existed with England. An embargo was, indeed, then laid for a limited and very short period; not however as a measure of coercion, but of protection; and a non-importation was also then proposed, but rejected. And by nego tiation, in a truly friendly spirit, with a character of firmness and impartiality in the administration, peace was preserved, indemnity made for maritime wrongs and depredations; and commercial prosperity fully restored.

Some measures of defence were adopted during the session of Congress, which began in October, 1807, but not till the spring of 1808. For the measure of the embargo, with subsequent attempts to repeal or modify the act, and additional laws to enforce it, long occupied the time of the national legislature. The President was authorized to cause several fortifications on the seacoast to be repaired or completed; and to have others erected, as he might judge necessary for the defence of the harbors and the vessels therein. Provision was also made for building and manning a large number of gunboats for the same purpose. Two years before, the President was authorized to employ