ions, subjects and cases, which it is only conjectured may have been within their intent. Revenue laws are not to be construed from the standpoint of the tax payer alone, nor of the government alone. Construction is not to assume either that the tax payer, who raises the legal question of his liability under the laws, is necessarily seeking to avoid a duty to the state which protects him, nor, on the other hand that the government, in demanding its dues is a tyrant, who, while too powerful to be resisted, may justifiably be obstructed and defeated by any subtle device or ingenious sophism whatsoever. There is no legal presumption either that the citizen will, if possible, evade his duties, or, on the other hand, that the government will exact unjustly or beyond its needs. All construction, therefore, which assumes either the one or the other, is likely to be mischievous, and to take onesided views, not only of the laws, but of personal and official conduct. The government in its tax legislation is not assuming a hostile position towards the citizen, but, as we have elsewhere said, is apportioning for and as the agent of all, a duty among them; and the citizen, it is to be presumed, will perform that duty when it is clearly made known to him, and when the time of performance has arrived. Unjust exactions, if such are made, must be attributed to human imperfection, not to intent; and frauds and evasions are to be supposed exceptional. A recent decision of the supreme court of Connecticut lays down a rule, which, as applied to those provisions of the revenue laws which apportion the taxes and give ordinary remedies for their collection, seems not objectionable, though more liberal than is recognized by the authorities generally. The case was a revenue case, and the question was whether a statute for imposing a personal tax on "persons who are residents" of the taxing districts, could be applied to the personalty belonging to the estate of a deceased person. In support of such a construction it is said: "The greatest, and perhaps the only, objection that can be urged against this rule is, that we cannot say in strictness that the deceased or his estate is a resident of the district. This objection assumes that the statute is to be strictly construed. But we do not think that the doctrine of strict construction should apply to it. Statutes relating to taxes are not penal statutes, nor are they in derogation of natural rights. Although taxes are regarded by many as burdens, and many look

upon them even as money arbitrarily and unjustly extorted from them by government, and hence justify themselves and quiet their consciences in resorting to questionable means for the purpose of avoiding taxation, yet, in point of fact, no money paid returns so good and valuable a consideration as money paid for taxes laid for legitimate purposes. They are just as essential and important as government itself; for without them, in some form, government could not exist. The small pittance we thus pay is the price we pay for the preservation of all our property, and the protection of all our rights. But there is not only a necessity for taxation, but it is eminently just and equitable that it should be as nearly equal as possible. Hence it is the policy of the law to require all property, except such as is specially exempted, to bear its proportion of the public burdens. Not only so, but the law manifestly contemplates that property rated in the list shall be liable for all taxes, town and school district taxes alike. This is evident from the provision that district taxes shall be laid on the town list, with special provision for certain changes rendered necessary in order to tax all the real estate situated within the district, and none situated without, and also to assess the tax in each instance upon the right person. In construing statutes relating to taxes, therefore, we ought, where the language will permit, so to construe them as to give effect to the obvious intention and meaning of the legislature, rather than to defeat that intention by a too strict adherence to the letter."1

1 Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn., 443,447, per Carpenter, J. So it is said in Hub. bard v. Brainard, 35 id., 563, 568, by Butler, J.: "A law imposing a tax is not to be construed strictly because it takes money or property in invitum (although its provisions are for that reason to be strictly executed), for it is taken as a share of a necessary public burden; nor liberally, like laws intended to effect directly some great public object, but fairly for the government and justly for the citizen; so as to carry out the intention of the legisla ture, gathered from the language used, read in connection with the general purpose of the law, and the nature of the property on which the tax is imposed, and the legal relation of the tax payer to it." And in Rein v. Lane, Law R., 2 Q. B., 144, 150, Blackburn, J., says: We must construe the words of the statute imposing the duty according to the intention which those words express when used in such a statute for such a purpose." And in Lord Foley v. Commissioners of Revenue, Law R., 3 Exch., 263, 268, Kelley, C. B., justly remarks that "it is better for the subjects and the state that the ordinary rules of construction should be applied." Prof. Parsons in his Treatise on Con

If there should be any leaning in such cases it would seem that it should be in the direction of the presumption that every thing is expressed in the tax laws which was intended to be expressed. The laws are framed by the government for its own needs, and if imperfections are found to exist, the legislature, in the language of Mr. Dwarris, "is at hand to explain its own meaning, and to express more clearly what has been obscurely expressed." But there can be no propriety in construing such a law either with exceptional strictness amounting to hostility, or with exceptional favor beyond that accorded to other general laws. It is as unreasonable to sound a charge upon it as an enemy to individual and popular rights, as it is to seek for sophistical reasons for grasping and holding by its authority every subject of taxation which the drag net of the official force has brought within its supposed compass. The construction, without bias or prejudice, should seek the real intent of the law; and if the leaning is to strictness, it is only because it is fairly and justly presumable that the legislature, which was unrestrained in its authority over the subject, has so shaped the law as, without ambiguity or doubt, to bring within it everything it was meant should be embraced.

In the state revenue laws the penal provisions are few and by no means severe. In the federal revenue laws, some of them are of a severity very seldom to be met with in penal statutes, and only to be justified by the supposed impossibility of collecting the revenue without them. In illustration of what is here said, reference need only be made to the case of forfeiture of property for the mere indulgence of a fraudulent intent never carried into effect; a forfeiture too, which may be visited upon a purchaser who has bought in good faith, and without suspicion of the intended fraud.1 If such provisions are to be construed with liberality, there is no reason why any other penal provisions whatsoever should not be.

tracts, vol. 3, p. 287, states the proper rule very clearly and concisely: "It is a well settled principle that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous words. * *But it is equally certain that no in. terpretation will be adopted which must defeat the purpose of the law, pro. vided the language of the statute admit fairly and rationally of an interpreta tion which sustains that purpose."

1 Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall., 44.

Construction of local powers to tax. In the construction of any grant of the power to tax made by the state to one of its municipalities, the rule which is accepted by all the authorities is, that it should be with strictness. The reasonable presumption is held to be, that the state has granted in clear and unmistakable terms, all it has intended to grant at all; and whatsoever authority the municipal officers assume to exercise, they must be able to show the warrant for in the words of the grant. There is no inherent power in the municipalities to levy taxes; they can tax only as the state in its wisdom has thought proper to permit, and if the state has erred in the direction of strictness, the legislature alone can correct the evil.1

'See the following cases which have laid down and will serve to illustrate this rule of strictness: Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 574; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66; Manice v. id., 8 id., 120; Cruger v. Dough. erty, 43 id., 107; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 id., 123; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. S., 268; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 id., 625; Reed v. Toledo, 18 id., 161; Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 id., 318; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Geo., 23; Augusta v. Walton, 37 id., 620; Sanders v. Butler, 30 id., 679; Vanover v. The Justices, 27 id., 354; Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat., 385; Orange & Alexandria R. R. Co., v. Alexandria, 17 id., 176; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186; Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 id., 18; Harmony v. Osborne, 9 Ind., 458; Kyle v. Malin, 8 id., 34; Indianapolis v. Mansur, 15 id., 112; Carron v. Den, 26 N. J., 594; Leavenworth v. Norton, 1 Kan., 432; Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 id., 82; Shawnee County . Carter, 2 id., 115; Chicago v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Ill., 286; Drake v. Phillips, 40 id., 388; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal., 643; Hewes v. Reis, 40 id., 255; Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 id., 206; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 id., 508; Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met., Ky., 171; Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick., 415; Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Humph., 252; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St., 401; Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 id., 15; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 id., 122; Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala., 156; Montgomery v. State, 38 id., 162; Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt., 460; Municipality v. Pance, 6 La. An., 515; Asheville v. Means, 7 Ired., 406; Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis., 522; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Fairfield v. Ratcliffe, 20 id., 396; Oregon Steam, etc. Co.. v. Portland, 2 Ore., 81; United States v. Burlington, 2 Am. L. Reg., N. S., 394; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss., 189; Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 605; Cooley's Const. Lim., 195.

"The power to tax is a high governmental power, but fortunately for the people it cannot be exercised by the legislative authority without limit, and when the legislature grants that high power to another tribunal, it can only be exercised in strict conformity to the terms in which the power is granted, and a departure in any material part will be fatal to the attempt to exercise it.” Peters, J. in Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush, 206, 208. It was held in this case that authority to the voters of a county to vote a specified tax was

This rule confines the municipalities, in the levy of taxes, strictly to the ordinary purposes for which such municipalities are accustomed to make levies. The customary grant does not go a step beyond this, and unusual purposes cannot be brought within the scope of their taxing power without an express grant which clearly indicates the special object. This is not only in accordance with the general rule that construes sovereign grants with strictness, but it is also obviously wise. The mischief of a strict construction is easily obviated by the legislature; but the mischief of a liberal construction may be irremediable before it can be reached. It is in accordance with this rule, that the authority conferred upon a county to levy a tax "for county purposes" was held, in Georgia, not to warrant a tax for the construction of public buildings; county purposes, as understood in that state, being the support of the poor, public education, and the like. In Maine, it was held that a general power in a town to tax for corporate purposes would not include the right to tax in order to make a toll bridge free. Whatever doubt might be

not exercised by a vote of the county excluding a city therein. See for a similar principle, Attorney General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Mich., 63. Authority to levy a tax on taxable property will not authorize a specific tax on an insurance company (not on their capital). Augusta v. Walton, 37 Geo., 620. It will authorize a tax on the shares in a bank without their being specially mentioned. Frederick v. Augusta, 5 id., 561; Pearce v. Augusta, 37 id., 597; Augusta v. National Bank, 47 id., 562. A statute authorizing a tax on dividends over a certain per cent. on capital, means capital actually paid in, and not merely authorized capital. Street Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 51 Penn. St., 465; Philadelphia v. Ferry Railway Co., 52 id., 177. A power to tax all personal property within a city, held not to reach shares in a railroad owned by a resident. Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat., 385. An interpretation of a statute for the assessment of a special tax which will interfere with the general tax law, is not to be adopted unless there is the clearest language to justify it. State v. Douglass, 33 N. J., 363.

1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me., 446. Where a city has authority to levy taxes only to a certain percentage on the assessment, the power to levy more is not to be implied from the fact that, by the charter, it is made the duty of the city to erect hospitals, poor houses, etc., and more would be needed for those purposes. Leavenworth v. Norton, 1 Kansas, 432.

3 Vanover v. The Justices, 27 Geo., 354. As to what are "county purposes" in Minnesota, see McCormic v. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252.

Bussy v. Gilmore, 3 Greenl., 191.