states, it is liable to assessment for local improvements to the same extent as private property similarly situated.301 The ob one governmental agency cannot be required to pay for the care and support of another, the property of a reform school held not subject to assessment for local improvements. City of Louisville v. Hexagon Tile Walk Co., 103 Ky. 552, 45 S. W. 667; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Nehan, 23 Ky. L. R. 889, 64 S. W. 457. The fact that public property is leased to a private corporation and the city derives a revenue therefrom does not make it liable for local assessments. Baltimore County Com'rs v. Mary land Hospital for Insane, 62 Md. 127; Inhabitants of Worcester County v. City of Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; City of Big Rapids v. Mecosta County Sup'rs, 99 Mich. 351. The power given a city council to determine what portion of the cost of a local improvement shall be paid by local assessments on property benefited does not, by implication, authorize the assessment of public property belonging to a county and used for public purposes. City of Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; City of St. Louis V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Von Steen v. City of Beatrice, 36 Neb. 421, 54 N. W. 677; Green v. Hotaling, 44 N. J. Law, 347; Elwood v. City of Rochester, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 102; Mansfield v. City of Lockport, 24 Misc. 25, 52 N. Y. Supp. 571; Smith v. City of Buffalo, 159 N. Y. 427. A public street of a city as such cannot be benefited by the construction of a local improvement and therefore cannot be assessed as property benefited by such improvement. City of Toledo v. Board of Education, 48 Ohio St. 83, 26 N. E. 403. School property not liable for assessment on street improvements. 301 Warner v. City of New Orleans (C. C. A.) 87 Fed. 829; Board of Improvement v. School Dist., 56 Ark. 354, 16 L. R. A. 418; City of San Diego v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 108 Cal. 189, 35 L. R. A. 33; City of Hartford v. West Middle Dist., 45 Conn. 462; Trustees of Illinois & M. Canal v. City of Chicago, 12 Ill. 403; Higgins v. City of Chicago, 18 Ill. 276; McLean County v. City of Bloomington, 106 Ill. 209; Adams County v. City of Quincy, 130 Ill. 566; In re City of Mt. Vernon, 147 Ill. 359, 23 L. R. A. 807; Sioux City v. Independent School Dist., 55 Iowa, 150; Edwards & Walsh Const. Co. v. Jasper County, 117 Iowa, 365, 90 N. W. 1006; Franklin County Com'rs v. City of Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747. Under Gen. St. 1889, c. 19, § 32, a city of the second class has the power to levy a special assessment on public property for the improvement of a street in front of a court house. State v. Recorder of Mortgages, 45 La. Ann. 566, 12 So. 880; Marquez v. City of New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 319; Correjolles v. Succession of Foucher, 26 La. Ann. 362; St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468; City of Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; Ross v. City of New York, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 333; In re Turfler, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 46; In re Extension of Church St., 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 455; People v. City of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291; Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528; Harris County v. Boyd, 70 Tex. 237; Boyd v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 456, 66 N. W. 603. jections to the levy of local assessments upon public property may be briefly stated as based, first, upon the fact that such obligations although paid by the public corporation can only be met by it through the levy and collection of general taxes upon all property within the jurisdiction, and second, that delinquent assessments are usually collected through the enforcement of a tax lien upon property liable; this as against public property would be against public policy.302 On the other hand, the argument in sustaining the principle that public property should share its proportion of the cost of a local improvement is that if private property were compelled to pay the entire cost, it would result in the levy of an excessive tax upon it which, in many cases, might be an amount equal or even in excess of the value of the property.303 The cost of improving public property cannot be assessed on abutting land.304 § 344. The manner of determining local assessments; conversely, benefits. In a preceding section, the suggestion has been made that the manner of determining the amount of local assessments particular property shall pay is one of legislative expediency.3 302 Town of West Hartford V. Hartford Water Com'rs, 44 Conn. 360. The principle that the product of one taxation ought not to be made the subject of another was applied in this case and land purchased by municipal authorities for reservoir purposes was held not subject to general taxation or the levy of special assessments for the construction of local improvements in its vicinity. City of St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545; Dowdney v. City of New York, 54 N. Y. 186. 303 City of New Orleans v. Warner, 175 U. S. 120, modifying decree in (C. C. A.) 81 Fed. 645; School Dist. of Ft. Smith v. Board of Improve ment, 65 Ark. 343; City of Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557. 304 Bennett v. Seibert, 10 Ind. App. 306 369, 35 N. E. 35, 37 N. E. 1071; City of Harrisburg v. Shepler, 190 Pa. 374. 305 See § 337. 306 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282; Cass Farm Co. v. City of Detroit, 181 U. S. 396, affirming 124 Mich. 433, 83 N. W. 108; City of Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. 399, reversing Parker v. City of Detroit, 103 Fed. 357; King v. City of Portland, 184 U. S. 61, affirming 38 Or. 402, 55 L. R. A. 812; Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Commission, 182 U. S. 398, 21 Sup. Ct. 860; Hadley v. Dague, 130 Cal. 207; Ahern v. Board of Imp. Dist. No. 3, 69 Ark. 68, 61 S. W. 575; Craw v. Village of Tolono, 96 Ill. 255; Douglas v. Craig, 4 Kan. App. 99, 46 Pac. 197; Kelly v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 So. If reference is made to this question in organic law, the provisions or recommendations there found will control.307 And where, by such organic law, statutory provision or local ordinance, the method of apportioning a local assessment is fixed, an assessment according to some other rule or method will be fatally defective.308 The usual constitutional provision, howev 295. Where a legislative body has fixed a standard for the levy of special assessments, the judiciary cannot substitute their own standard based upon actual benefits received as measured by established values. Kelly v. Chadwick, 104 La. 719; Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39. "The legislature of Michigan has power to authorize municipal corporations to assess the whole or any part of the expenses of local improvements upon the property deemed to be particularly and especially benefited thereby, in proportion to the benefit received, if in the judgment of the legislature that rule of apportionment is most just and equitable. There is nothing in the constitution which expressly prohibits this, and nothing in the nature of the power of taxation which is unconstitutional with it. The legislature may, moreover, empower the common council to judge what property is specially benefited by the improvement and define the taxing district accordingly. As the question in such case is one which can only properly and intelligently be decided upon personal inspection of the improvement and the manner in which it will affect the neighboring property, naturally a proper course is to report to some local tribunal." Uhrig v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 458; Wilson v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 55 N. J. Law, 220, 26 Atl. 83; Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261; 634. In re Amberson Ave. 179 Pa. The legislature may ratify an assessment levied under a void act. Cruikshanks V. City Council of Charleston, 1 McCord (S. C.) 360; Woodhouse v. City of Burlington, 47 Vt. 301; City of Spokane v. Browne, 8 Wash. 317. The legislature may change the method of determining the amount of local improvements properly chargeable to specific property after the making of a local improvement and before the payment of the assessment has been completed. A property owner has no vested right in a particular method but the legislature cannot arbitrarily change the amount and time of payment of such assessments. Cooley, Taxation (2d Ed.) pp. 622, 646. 307 City of Pueblo v. Robinson, 12 Colo. 593; Hurford v. City of Omaha, 4 Neb. 336; State v. Dodge County Com'rs, 8 Neb. 124; Parrotte v. City of Omaha, 61 Neb. 96, 84 N. W. 602; Reynolds v. City of Paterson, 48 N. J. Law, 435. Local assessments based on the lineal frontage instead of the value of land as assessed would be invalid under N. J. Const. art. 4, § 7. 308 Ware v. City of Jerseyville, 158 Ill. 234; Gleason v. Barnett, 20 Ky. L. R. 1694, 50 S. W. 67. If a contrary mode is merely recommended, it does not render an assessment invalid. McKeesport Borough v. Busch, 166 Pa. 46. er, is one to be found in connection with a statement of the rules regulating and controlling the levy and imposition of taxes, prescribing the general principles which shall apply and giving perhaps to the legislature a discretion as to the method or the manner of the imposition and levy of special assessments. The phraseology used in the constitution of the state of Minnesota is that usually employed.309 "Provided that the legislature may by general law or special act, authorize municipal corporations to levy assessments for local improvements upon the property fronting upon such improvements, or upon the property to be benefited by such improvements, or both, without regard to a cash valuation, and in such a manner as the legislature may prescribe." Where such legislative discretion is given, laws passed authorizing the levy of special assessments according to the methods usually employed based, however, upon a benefit received by the property, are constitutional.310 It is useless at this time when the principle is so well established to give at length reasons for or against what has been discussed by the courts of every state in the Union. So long as the fundamental idea underlying a valid and legal levy of special assessments is not ignored, namely, the doctrine of benefits received, such legislation will be held constitutional.311 Fed. 409. An act which authorizes the levy of special assessments for the making of a local improvement based upon a special benefit to the property against which the assess ment is made, if it does not afford the property owner an opportunity to question the existence of such benefit, is unconstitutional as taking private property without the payment of just compensation. City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; Falch v. People, 99 Ill. 137; Adams v. City of Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467, 49 L. R. A. 797; McKee v. Town of Pendleton, 154 Ind. 652; Town of Bellevue v. Peacock, 11 Ky. L. R. 702, 12 S. W. 1042; Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Voris' Ex'rs, 22 Ky. L. R. 1873, 61 S. W. 474; Abraham v. City of Louisville. The legislature cannot, however, change the method of determining the liability of property for special assessments after they have been levied to pay the cost of a local improvement authorized,312 neither can it change the extent to which property shall be liable for local assessments after this has been determined by the ordering or construction of a local improvement, the principle being that the system for determining the liability of property for special assessments in vogue at the time a local improvement is ordered determines the manner and extent of its liability for the construction of that particular improvement.314 The method which is ordinarily adopted is what may be termed the "frontage rule. "'315 The property fronting upon a public it 23 Ky. L. R. 375, 62 S. W. 1041; Barfield v. Gleason, 23 Ky. L. R. 128, 63 S. W. 964. Such legislation is constitutional even though makes no provision for a preliminary hearing to ascertain the extent of special benefits to each piece of property resulting from the improvement. Weed v. City of Boston, 172 Mass. 28, 51 N. E. 204, 42 L. R. A. 642; City of St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537; Jersey City v. Howeth, 30 N. J. Law, 521. The manner of apportioning a local assessment upon property will be immaterial so long as it properly distributes the cost among the owners of the property benefited. Howell v. City of Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243. It is competent for the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to levy special assessments for local improvements upon real estate peculiarly and specially benefited and in proportion to such benefit. Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159; Maloy v. City of Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636; Bonsall v. Town of Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418; Paulson v. City of Portland, 16 Or. 450, 1 L. R. A. 673; City of Dallas v. Ellison, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 30 S. W. 1128; Wilson v. City of Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 543; Bond v. City of Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284; Meggett v. City of Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 326, 51 N. W. 566. 312 Keith v. City of Philadelphia, 126 Pa. 575. 313 Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289. 314 McPike v. City of Alton, 187 Ill. 62; Crawfordsville Music Hall Ass'n v. Clements, 12 Ind. App. 464, 39 N. E. 540, 40 N. E. 752; City of Cincinnati v. Seasongood, 46 Ohio St. 296, 21 N. E. 630. The rule also applies to municipal ordinances relative to the levy of local assessments. Douglass v. City of Cincinnati, 29 Ohio St. 165; Borough of New Brighton v. Biddell, 201 Pa. 96, 50 Atl. 989. 315 French v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 181 U. S. 324; Arndt v. City of Cullman, 132 Ala. 540, 31 So. 478; |