Secretary Marcy instructed Taylor to advance and occupy 1846 a position near the east bank of the Rio del Norte Jan. 13. (or Grande) and opposite Matamoras. At the same time our naval squadron was re-enforced in the Gulf of Mexico; for by this time the failure of Slidell's mission seemed prol able. Taylor's orders forbade him to contest the common navigation of the Rio Grande or to treat the Mexicans at once as enemies; but should Mexico assume that character by a declaration of war or by any open act of hostility he was not to confine himself to the defensive.* With a little corps of but thirty-five hundred men, — well drilled, however, as few armies have been, for efficient service, Taylor broke camp in March at Corpus Christi, in obedience of these orders, and advanced, as March. we have described,† into the heart of that now disputed country which none but Mexicans had hitherto possessed. Point Isabel, a rocky eminence at the seashore, he selected as his depot of supplies, and thither the greater part of his military stores were sent by water. Taylor, as a soldier, knew of no duty but to obey orders. On March 19, when the Little Colorado was reached, Mexican cavalry warned him that the passage of that stream would be considered an act of invasion; but he crossed without hesitation, and on the 24th halted at a village near Point Isabel, the inhabitants fleeing at his approach, after applying the torch to their dwellings. Arriving at length opposite Matamoras, Taylor opened a parley with the Mexican General Mejia across the river. The parley was fruitless except to confirm the protests which Mexican officers and deputations had already made so repeatedly, that Taylor's march to the Rio Grande was a wanton invasion of the soil of their republic and an act of war. Taylor next threw up his fortifications on the * U. S. Docs. 29th Cong. Sess. 1; 8 H. H. Bancroft's Pacific States, 346; 73 Niles, 235-238. † Vol. iv. p. 526. 1846. OUTBREAK OF WAR. April 12. 15 left bank, in front of Matamoras, and pointed his cannon at the town, feeling that a conflict might be precipitated at any moment. Mejia on the other bank prepared for an assault; the fortifications of the town were strengthened, and to increase the military force already concentrated there, Paredes, now President of the Mexican Republic, despatched General Ampudia with troops enough to swell the defending force to about five thousand, and placed him in command. This last was a military error; Ampudia's reputation was bad at Matamoras; and to allay the discontent of the people Paredes next supplanted him by Arista, another general, leaving Ampudia still as second in command. This was another military error; its effect was to sow dissension between the Mexican chiefs, and make their army quite inferior in confidence and capacity to the American force, ably handled and admirably disciplined, of little more than half its size. Ampudia, arriving first at Matamoras and supposing himself in secure command, warned Taylor peremptorily that unless he broke up his camp in twenty-four hours and retired. beyond the bank of the Nueces, Mexico would accept the challenged war. It was Arista, however, who reached Matamoras twelve days later with superior commission, and on the same day notified our American commander that he considered hostilities already begun and should prosecute them. Arista's plan was next to throw troops across the Rio Grande on the same day and force Taylor's troops to an engagement. While this plan was in awkward execution, a small party of American dragoons, sent under Captain Thornton to reconnoitre, fell into a Mexican ambuscade and were captured by a superior force after some fighting. This was the collision of arms, these were the circumstances of provocation, upon which President Polk based his impassioned message to Congress of the 11th of May, upon receipt of the news, - alleging with brazen effrontery that Mexico had passed our boundary, had invaded our territory, and had shed American blood upon American soil. And it was to meet this emergency, that our Congress at once responded with its auda April 24. cious declaration of war, as existing already "by the act of Mexico." That war had already begun, in the just estimation of the hostile commanders, is evident; but which of the two republics had provoked hostilities was quite another question. Captain Thornton's little skirmish, with its sanguinary results, was not magnified by Taylor too greatly; indeed he blamed Thornton for exposing his dragoons in too great contempt of the enemy, and had him court-martialled for disobedience of orders. But blood, whether Mexican or American, was not to be held so precious after Arista's plain declaration. To a people long disused to war, the first few drops that are spilt in token of an issue are redder than the seas incarnadine after war has begun in earnest. Arista went on, and so did Taylor, in warlike preparation, the one to regain the costly soil between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, the other to cross the river westward and strike into the very heart of Mexico. Taylor pursued instructions; he had no sanction of Congress to wait for. He anticipated Arista's design, which was to throw troops above and below, and capture his base of supplies; and while fortifying his camp opposite Matamoras he found the communications already cut off. It was a dark hour for our army and its commander. Re-enforcements for the Mexican host were constantly arriving, while our troops were far from external aid. Arista's troops hovered in force upon our general's flank and rear. On the 1st of May, Taylor marched back to the relief of Point Isabel with his main body, leaving at the new fort he had built by the Rio Grande, now about finished, a small garrison under charge of Major Brown, whose orders were to defend this fort to the last, and if the enemy should surround it, to fire signalguns at intervals which might be heard on the road. The May. * See vol iv. pp. 526, 527. And see 73 Niles, 235-238; 8 H. H. Bancroft, 350-353. i Taylor to Crittenden, 1 Coleman's Crittenden, 251. Thornton's party was 63 strong. One account says that 7 were killed; another that about 16 were killed and wounded. 1846. SIEGE OF FORT BROWN. 17 Mexicans, as feared, took early advantage of Taylor's departure, and at daylight on Sunday morning, May 3d, opened their batteries upon the new fort. Their cannonade was returned, though with little effect on either side, until, on the 6th, Major Brown received a mortal wound from a falling shell, and the command devolved upon Captain Hawkins. On the 7th Arista summoned the garrison to surrender, and Hawkins called a council of war. But the unanimous voice followed Taylor's injunction: "Defend the fort to the death!" Arista resumed his cannonade; but the boom of Taylor's guns in the distance soon gave our garrison confidence that they had decided right. For one week altogether did this intrepid band sustain the bombardment, a week of fatigue and painful suspense, but of few serious casualties. In honor of the Major who breathed his last shortly before his general returned in triumph, the work was named Fort Brown. —a Taylor meantime had reached Point Isabel, with his main force on the 2d of May. He met no enemy during his march of some twenty-seven miles, and found all safe at this base upon his arrival. But signal guns broke the air from the distant fort, and on the 7th he started back to its relief, with ordnance supplies and provisions. His active force now numbered 2,300; for the raw recruits from home who had reached Point Isabel were fit only for garrison duty and left behind. Taylor's reverse march was not to be an easy one; for Arista, the Mexican commander, had now taken up a strong position on the road, at a place called Palo Alto, about nine miles from Matamoras, with united forces, variously stated from 4,000 to 6,000, and offered battle. An hour before noon on the 8th Taylor came in sight of the enemy drawn up in battle array, and stretching more than a mile across a level and grassy plain, which skirted the May 8. * 8 H. H. Bancroft, 365, and authorities cited; Ripley, Kendall, etc. Besides Major Brown, one sergeant was killed, and ten (or as some state, thirteen) were wounded. edge of a chaparral thicket, and was flanked by swampy pools. A squadron of Mexican cavalry supported the right; on the left stood Torrejon's command with a splendid corps of lancers; while along the rest of the line were infantry masses with an alternate battery. Taylor's troops were formed at once in attacking columns under protection of dragoons, and moved steadily forward to within cannon range, when one of the enemy's batteries opened. Our column being then deployed into line, while the infantry kept in the rear at supporting distance, Ringgold's artillery answered the Mexican battery with fearful effect. In a battle bravely fought Taylor maintained the prudent defensive, seeing how greatly he was outnumbered, and relied mainly upon his artillery. In short, Palo Alto, the first real engagement of the Mexican war, was purely a cannon fight, and a singular one, — in which the superiority of the American arm, as well as of American generalship, was quickly apparent. Posted simply to sustain their batteries, our infantry stood at a safe range and saw opposing artillery contest the field; while Arista, obtuse to the situation, and jealous, probably, of Ampudia's better advice, exposed his troops obstinately to the unequal fire, sacrificing them thereby about five to our one. Ringgold on our side was mortally wounded; but Duncan, posted with artillery at the other extreme, had managed his guns with equal skill and address, while two eighteen-pounders at the centre shook the field with a steady concussion. The wadding from Duncan's guns having set fire to the tall grass, thick smoke shut out the two armies from each other's sight for a space in the afternoon. The cessation of carnage thus caused was to the American advantage; for when Arista changed his front, Taylor moved to correspond; and soon the Mexican line grew restive and impatient under a cannonade more murderous and deadly than before. In vain did Ampudia urge his superior to order a charge with bayonets. Arista hesitated until it was too late for courage, and when the order was given the men advanced, dispirited and distrusting their commander, only to be rolled back in con |