well acquainted. Others are remote, and unsuited to our capacities; and of them therefore, our knowledge is exceedingly scanty. The wide difference between the two suggests, that what is a most accurate test of the one may possibly prove altogether unsuitable and inadequate to the other; and that such is the fact, we are assured by the experience of every day.

Let us add an illustration or two of the former class of truths. We are qualified, in general, to decide upon subjects which come under the observation of our senses. Of these, human knowledge, though not perfect, is yet sufficient for all practical purposes. Our competency in this respect is recognised by Scripture; and hence the main evidences of the divinity of the Bible are of this order. Such especially are miracles. Whether a fact alleged to have taken place under our immediate observation, really did take place, and whether that fact was of a natural or preternatural character, are questions absolutely determinable by human judgment. Upon all such relations, the testimony of our senses is so fully admitted as satisfactory, that whatever it contradicts, may be safely repudiated as unworthy of credit. If, for instance, the Bible is said to affirm, that what appears to our sight, and smell, and touch, and taste, to be bread, is nevertheless bone, and blood, and cartilage, and flesh; we have an undoubted right to maintain, that such cannot be the doctrine of Scripture; and that the passages supposed to make such a declaration are incorrectly interpreted.

On historical testimony, we are also allowed to be capable of forming correct conclusions; and hence, therefore, is derived another important line of Scripture evidence. We know the circumstances in which a spectator is qualified to judge of any transaction; we are certain that, in such circumstances, the statements of a virtuous man are worthy of credit; and that, so

prevailing is the love of ease, and reputation, and life, that no one, for an unprofitable fable, would risk these and all other advantages. Hence we receive the apostolic testimony on the history and work of Christ. Evidence of this kind indeed, to a much smaller amount, is adequate to our conviction. Thus if some interpreter of prophecy were to represent Scripture prediction as declaring, that in the year 1830, the ten tribes of Israel would be living, in grandeur and prosperity, in Constantinople and the adjacent regions, we should be perfectly warranted, apart from actual investigation, in rejecting such an interpretation, simply from our faith in the statements of ordinary travellers.

There are questions of morals, which may be decided in an equally summary way; since some of the laws of our moral constitution are as certain and as unrepealable as the laws of sense. Were it alleged, for example, that the Bible inculcated the commission of murder, or of theft, or the dishonouring of parents, we might lawfully resolve beforehand to interpret no scripture in such a sense. One of the evidences of revelation is to be found in its appeals to our moral instincts, our conscience of good and evil, in its broadest delineations; and whatever is opposed to these cannot be received as a divine communication.

In these, and the like cases, where the appropriateness of our faculties, and the adequacy of our knowledge is indisputable, sensible harmony is an available test of truth; and, except in very rare instances, we are warranted in refusing credence to any proposition incongruous with our current apprehensions. But here we must pause. On a subject which we do not understand, and to the apprehension of which our faculties are unapt, it is impossible for us to decide, how far a given proposition agrees with acknowledged truths; and hence our perceptions of harmony are no longer adequate as

tests of truth. Our only choice is, either to hold the judgment in suspense, or to seek information from a higher source.

Of all subjects which belong to this remote and inappreciable class, the nature of God is the most eminent and the most inscrutable. It is not enough to characterize our faculties as feeble; we are absolutely without the faculty by which this lofty subject can be realized; and hence are as incapable of independent reasoning, as is a man destitute of some bodily sense, respecting the objects with which that sense is conversant.

Some illustration of our condition might be supplied by an attempt to give to a blind man an idea of the nature and relations of light and colours. He is told, for example, that light is colourless, but that nevertheless, by the most satisfactory experiments, it is proved to be composed of seven colours; that as it falls upon one object, one colour only is perceptible; another object is tinged by a second; while, in a third instance, the blending of two or more may be detected. He is unable to decide on the truth, or even to apprehend the meaning of these propositions: yet, if he is duly sensible of the imperfection of his faculties, and has no personal reason to discredit his informant, he will admit the existence at least of a substance of whose nature he has no conception, and of phenomena, wholly distinct from those of the objects with which he is acquainted.

But let him begin to reason on the subject, and apply to it the test of his own sensations and knowledge, and the result will be very different. In such a case he will probably argue, that the entire representation is contradictory, and of consequence impossible. His reasoning may perhaps shape itself into something like the following. No substance at one and the same time can be one and seven. If you affirm the unity of light, you give up its septenity; if the septenity, you cannot main

tain its unity. Let it be replied, that seven sounds may be so blended as to produce one sound, and seven substances, each possessing its distinct taste, may be mixed so as to produce but one taste; and, even if he admit the correctness of the illustration, he will deny its appositeness. He will probably rejoin, that you must prove that seven sounds may be combined, and the result be silence; seven flavours, and utter insipidity. The only satisfactory answer is, that the objects of vision are wholly dissimilar from those of taste and hearing; and that these representations, though strictly and demonstrably true, are such as, in consequence of the absence of the necessary faculty, he is quite incapable of appreciating.

In compassion to our condition, God has graciously granted us a revelation of himself; but even this does not obviate our difficulties; since its design is not to supply us with new faculties, but to afford that information which, by the unaided efforts of our present faculties, we could not have realized. There can be no doubt also, that its discoveries are partial and incomplete. Many subjects, had they been stated, our mental feebleness would have prevented us from understanding; and it is highly probable that there exist moral reasons for the concealment of many others of a less recondite order. Hence, however diligently and devoutly we may avail ourselves of scriptural instruction, the divine nature will still remain shrouded in mystery, or rather "in light which no man can approach unto."

Let it be recollected also, that we are not only destitute of faculties suitable to the comprehension of the nature of God, but that we receive Scripture testimony upon the subject, in language accommodated to the faculties we possess. Carrying out the foregoing illustration, our situation is not unlike that of a blind man, to whom an effort should be made, to state the

theory of optics in terms belonging to that of music. Such an experiment, unless conducted with the utmost caution, could scarcely fail to lead him into error; for he would argue, that as he perfectly understood the words, he was competent to reason and decide upon the subject to which they were applied. It would be absolutely necessary to explain to what extent he might regard these terms as appropriate; and it is evident, that as soon as he ventured to carry his notions a single step beyond this limit, he would fall into gross absurdity.

These illustrations lead to the conclusion, which of itself indeed is all but self-evident, that the nature of God is so remote from the range of the human intellect, and so inscrutable by the faculties of man, that the doctrines which respect it can never be safely tested by our perceptions of harmony. In a degree, this is true of every doctrine of pure revelation. Our disposition to receive it may be confirmed by the perception of its agreement with ascertained truth; but our credence is demanded on a higher ground. Faith respects testimony; and its subjects claim our submission, not because we can discern their congruity, but simply because they are revealed. And there are no truths to which this rule is so applicable as those which respect the divine substance, nor any in treating of which our non-adherence to it exposes us to errors more pernicious.

Let us take another view of the question. That process of reasoning by which an ordinary truth is ascertained is often long and elaborate; and between the initial and final points there intervene many other truths, through the apprehension of each of which the mind regularly and consecutively proceeds to the object of its inquiry. But should one link of this chain be dropped, should one of the intervening doctrines be lost or vitiated, the entire process becomes useless; and no effort of human ingenuity will avail to set forth the connexion