tory, of whom, now that the mists have rolled away, we have learned to correct our old estimates, and to see them as upon the whole instruments of great benefits."

And still again, by way of further comment upon imperfect greatness:

THE GREATNESS OF MERE FORCE.

"Meanwhile we hate snivelling. We like the natural greatness of health and wild power. I confess that I am as much taken by it in boys, and sometimes in people not normal, nor educated, nor presentable-even in persons open to the suspicion of irregular and immoral living-as in more orderly examples. We must have some charity for the sense of the people which admires natural power, and will elect it over virtuous men who have less. It has this excuse, that natural is really allied to moral power, and may be always expected to approach it by its own instincts. Intellect at least is not stupid, and will see the force of morals over men, if it does not itself obey. Henry the Seventh of England was a wise king. When Gerald, Earl of Kildare, who was in rebellion against him, was brought to London, and examined before the Privy Council, one said: 'All Ireland cannot govern this earl.' The king replied, 'Then let this earl govern all Ireland.""

And again, and lastly, by way of summation of the whole matter of greatness :

THE ULTIMATE GREATNESS.

"Men are ennobled by morals and by intellect; but these two elements know each other, and always beckon

to each other, until at last they meet in the man, if he is to be truly great. The man who sells you a lamp shows you that the flame of oil, which contented you before, casts a strong shade in the path of the petroleum which he lights behind it; and this again casts a shadow in the path of the electric light. So does intellect― when brought into the presence of character. Character puts out that light.

"We are thus forced to express our instinct of the truth, by exposing the failure of experience. The man whom we have not seen, in whom no regard of self degraded the adorer of the laws-who by governing himself governed others; sportive in manner, but inexorable in act; who sees longevity in his cause; whose aim is always distinct to him; who carries fate in his eye-he it is whom we seek, encouraged in every good hour that here or hereafter he shall be found."

XIV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMERSON.

THE philosophical teachings of Emerson naturally group themselves into two great divisions: First, the philosophy of the Infinite-that is, of life itself and the absolute laws of life, or, as he sometimes phrases it, of existence; and second, the philosophy of the Finite-that is, in its special relation to humanity: the law or laws of the conduct of life.

Of this second division we may admit that his views are sound in the main, notwithstanding that they are often expressed in terms apparently contradictory of each other. This seeming contradiction is, after all, more apparent than real, arising from the natural tendency in his mind to present the one aspect of things which was uppermost in his thoughts at the moment in the strongest light, leaving out of view all the other aspects which, when they happen to present themselves, or to be called up by him, are in turn no less strongly expressed.

It is the first of these divisions of Emerson's philosophy which is now to be considered. Putting what we regard as a fair statement of it in concise terms, it resolves itself into three propositions: (1.) "Mind and matter are totally distinct phenomena; and mind is supreme over matter." (2.) "There is only one Infinite Mind in the universe, which includes in itself all finite minds." It is more than half suggested that there may be a like unity even in matter; so that it may ultimately be found that all which our natural philosophy regards as distinct elements are only modifications of this one matter; so that there may be no real difference between hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen; between carbon, gold, and iron; but that all is one, and one is all. (3.) "That all laws are the product and emanation of the Infinite Mind, and are really but one law;

so that, as he phrases it, "The law of gravitation is identical with purity of thought."

Passing over the first two of these propositions, and all that follows from them, we shall here consider only the third, which, in our judgment, involves such a lax use of the essential word "Law" as to vitiate the entire scheme.

There are the mathematical laws, which are expressed by numbers, forms, and dimensions, and with which arithmetic and geometry have to do. We can not conceive these to be in any true sense the emanation or product of the Infinite Mind. We can not imagine that they could be other than they are; or that the Infinite Mind could conceive them to be otherwise. For example: We hold that the Infinite Mind could not conceive of any number which, multiplied into itself, would produce three or five, or any other "surd number"; of a triangle, any two sides of which should not be greater than the third, or one in which the sum of the three angles should be either more or less than two right-angles; of any right-angled triangle, in which the sum of the squares of the base and perpendicular should not be equal to the square of the hypothenuse; or of any circle, all the radii of which should not be equal. And so on of all the laws of trigonometry, fluxions, and the integral calculus. Some of them the finite mind perceives without any conscious effort; some of them it perceives only by la

borious effort; the Infinite Mind perceives them at a glance. But, perceived or unperceived, they are, always will be, and always have been; and so, from their very nature, must be eternal and increate; as really and necessarily as the Infinite Mind is infinite and increate.

Then, again, there are the moral laws, those which we briefly sum up as the law of “right and wrong." These we hold to be alike eternal, immutable, and uncreated. They are as binding upon the Infinite Majesty of the Supreme Being as upon each and every sentient being capable of perceiving them. They bind God and man, because he and they can perceive them. If worm or dog can perceive them at all, they are binding upon it, and just so far as it can perceive them. If, without irreverence, we may conceive that there might be one Supreme Being, who should be the Ahriman and not the Ormuzd of some Eastern theosophists-infinitely malevolent instead of infinitely benevolent-this law of right and wrong would yet be binding upon him, and in violating it he would be an Infinite Malefactor. It is the glory of our faith, as it is the glory of all faiths worthy to be so called, that the Supreme Being is bound-does not bind himself-by this law of right and wrong. As Emerson has said : "There is no god dares wrong a worm." The law of right and wrong, like the laws of mathematics, is co-eternal with the Divine Being, and,