260 follows that any interest or quantity less than the whole can be likewise appropriated. This principle warrants the conclusion that the use or an enjoyment of an easement or interest may be taken or interfered with to such an extent as to authorize a claim for compensation.258 The appropriation of an easement or a part of private property may constitute a taking, such as the construction of a ditch, sewer 259 or the laying of water or gas pipes or the stringing of electric wires for lighting purposes.261 These acts impair and injuriously affect the right of exclusion which is one of the essential rights of property. Lateral support is alsoone of the rights of property and if a public corporation in the construction of any work of public improvement interferes with this, it will amount to a taking of property for which compensation must be made.262 This question is also considered in a later section. 258 Boston Gaslight Co. v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 444; Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N. E. 858; Arnold v. Hudson River R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661; Storey v. New York El. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122. 259 Plummer v. Sturtevant, 32 Me. 325; Ward v. Peck, 49 N. J. Law, 42; People v. Haines, 49 N. Y. 587; Watson's Ex'r v. Pleasant Tp. 21 Ohio St. 667. 260 Smith v. City of Atlanta, 92 Ga. 119, 17 S. E. 981. 261 Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62, 22 L. R. A. 340; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L. R. A. 79; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Moyle, 51 Kan. 203, 32 Pac. 895; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285, 6 L. R. A. 621. 262 Armstrong v. City of St. Paul, 30 Minn. 299; Nichols v. City of Duluth, 40 Minn. 389. "Every person has a right ex jure naturae to the lateral support of the adjoining soil, and is entitled to damages for its removal. A municipal corporation has no greater rights or pow ers in that regard over the soil of the streets than a private owner has over his own land, and will be liable in damages for removing this lateral support the same as would a private owner if improving his property for his own use. It is no defense that the excavation was necessary for the purpose of grading the street. If the city desires greater rights than those possessed by private owners, it must acquire them by the exercise of eminent domain. It must either do this, or else itself substitute other lateral support in place of the soil which it removes. The liability of the city in these cases does not depend as appellant assumes, upon its negligence in making the excavation. This right of the lateral support of the adjoining soil, being a natural one, is absolute, and independent of any question of negligence." Keating v. City of Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 142; Stearns v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847; Darke v. City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 1, 31 Pac. 310, 32 Pac. 82, 20 L. R. A. 68. But see Fellowes v. City of New Haven, 44 § 753. Annexation of land to a municipality not regarded as a taking. It is a well known fact that through the larger increased expenditures of a municipal corporation for police, fire and educational purposes and for local improvements, the right of taxation upon property within the limits of such organizations is largely in excess of that levied in adjacent districts. Frequently municipal corporations for the purpose of increasing their revenues by an increase of taxable property attempt to annex tracts of land immediately adjoining their limits. The constitutionality of this action has been raised, the claim being made that since the land annexed is of an agricultural and suburban character, it cannot receive the benefits which are supposed to be derived from municipal organization and, therefore, its annexation amounts to a taking of private property without the payment of compensation.203 The weight of authority is to the effect that the annexation of territory is not a taking of property and the owners, therefore, are not entitled to compensation.264 This doctrine is largely based upon the large, if not absolute possession by the sovereign over all territory within its jurisdiction; the limits of all municipal corporations being held, so it has been repeatedly declared, at the pleasure of the sovereign who possesses the right to enlarge, diminish or alter the technical boundaries of all its subordinate agencies at will.205 § 754. Right to labor or contract. The right to labor 266 and the right to contract 267 constitutes property, and any undue or illegal interference with it will come. Conn. 240; Mitchell v. City of Rome, 49 Ga. 19; City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231; Radcliffe's Ex'rs v. City of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.) 195. 263 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Fulton v. City of Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; City of Covington v. Southgate, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 491; Sharp's Ex'r v. Dunavan, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 223; Trustees of Elkton v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah, 288, 22 Pac. 159, 5 L. R. A. 444; Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210. 264 Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 68 Fed. 774; Stilz v. City of Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515; Groff v. Frederick City, 44 Md. 67; Giboney v. City of Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170; Appeal of Hewitt, 88 Pa. 55; Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Tex. 635. 265 Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54, overruling Bradshaw v. City of Omaha, 1 Neb. 16. See, also, §§ 84 and 85 ante. 266 Adams v. Brenan, 177 III. 194, 52 N. E. 314, 42 L. R. A. 718; Fiske But v. People, 188 Ill. 206, 52 L. R. A. 291; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 29 L. R. A. 257; Marshall & Bruce Co. v. City of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S. W. 815. McQuillin on Municipal Ordinances, § 553, on the validity of ordinances restricting competition involving union labor. see St. Louis Quarry & Const. Co. v. Frost, 90 Mo. App. 677; In re Ten Hour Law for St. Ry. Corporations, 24 R. I. 603, 54 Atl. 602. See, also, § 535, ante, and authorities cited. See, also, note citing many cases taken from vol. 3, Current Law, in the note following. 267 United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400. In the head notes by Mr. Justice Hunt it is stated: "1. The Act of Congress, declaring 'that eight hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, or workmen * employed by, or on behalf of the Government of the United States,' is in the nature of a direction by the United States to its agents. "2. It is not a contract with laborers to that effect, and does not prevent the officers of the Government from making agreements with laborers by which the day's labor may be more or less than eight hours. "3. The Act does not prescribe the amount of compensation to be paid for labor of eight hours or of any other time." Ex rarte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 24 Pac. 737, 9 L. R. A. 482; In re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo. 27; City of Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 36 S. E. 932, 51 L. R. A. 335; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454, 29 L. R. A. 79; McChesney v. People, 200 Ill. 146, 65 N. E. 626. "The contract is to be awarded to the responsible bidder offering to do the work for the lowest sum, and any provision tending to increase the cost, and make the bids less favorable to the public and the property owners, is against public policy, illegal, and void. The provisions in the specifications limiting the right of the contractor and laborer to agree with each other upon the length of time which shall constitute a day's work, and authorizing a forfeiture of the contract if the contractor should allow laborers to work more than eight hours in any one day, was pronounced illegal, unconstitutional and void in Fiske v. People, 188 Ill. 206, 52 L. R. A. 291, 58 N. E. 985, as infringing upon the freedom of contract to which every citizen is entitled under the law. Such a provision or restriction in a competitive bidding is unlawful and against public policy,and this is conceded by counsel for appellee. They insist, however, that to enable one whose lands have been assessed to pay for an improvement to avail himself of such an objection he must show that the existence of the provision has increased the cost of the work,and this must be a definite showing of a final injury to him, in dollars and cents. That is not the rule. The law entitled a property owner to the security afforded by its provisions, and it is sufficient for him to show that he has been deprived of the protection which the law gives him, of having bids made upon a lawful basis, and free from restrictions likely to produce a result detrimental to his interests. It would certainly be difficult, if not impossible, to prove in every instance that an illegal limitation worked unfavorably, or the amount of injury, in dollars and cents resulting from it. The property owner is not obliged to show in each instance that he was preju under the prohibition of the eminent domain clause of the constitution. The vacation or alteration of a highway, a change of its grade, the granting of the use of highways by a subordinate public corporation or by the state to railroad, telegraph or telephone companies, and the imposition of an additional use or change of use itself of property acquired by a public corporation, all involve the question of a taking of property but they are more appropriately considered under succeeding sections discussing the control and use of highways and streets by public corporations. diced by unlawful restrictions and disregard of the law, but it is for the authorities seeking to impose the burden upon his lands to prove a substantial compliance with all of these provisions designed for his benefit. It would be just as reasonable to insist that if the requirements of competitive bidding were disregarded, and the work done by hiring laborers by the day, the property owner may be able to show that the price was not reasonable, or that the work was done at a greater expense than it would have been if the law had been complied with. It is a material and important right of the property owner that there shall be free and open competition, unrestricted by illegal and unconstitutional provisions, the natural tendency of which would be to increase the cost of the work, and it is undeniable that the clauses in question in this case lay down rules which would naturally increase such cost, and be detrimental to the public. The question in this case is whether it was shown that the bidding was upon the basis of this specification. In Hamilton v. People, 194 Ill. 133, 62 N. E. 533, there was a clause contained in the specifications of the contract by which it was agreed that the contractor should not employ or permit to be employed on the work other than native-born or naturalized citizens of the United States. The clause was not found in the ordinance providing for the improvement, nor in any general or special ordinance of the city, and it was not shown that there was any such requirement in the advertisements for bids, or that the bidders knew of it. It was held that the mere fact that such a clause was found among the specifications was not sufficient evidence that it entered into the bidding in any way. In Givins v. People, 194 II. 150, 62 N. E. 534, a like provision in the contract was made the basis of an objection; but it was not shown that it was a requirement in bidding for the work, and the fact that it was ingrafted on the contract was not considered sufficient to prove that it could have affected the cost of the improvement. In Grey v. People, 194 Ill. 486, 62 N. E. 894, it was shown that the general ordinance of the city required that all bids for public work in Chicago should contain a clause binding the bidder to hire only such persons in the performance of the work as were members of labor unions. It was not shown, however, that the ordinance was enforced, or that the provision entered into the competition, so as § 755. The quantity and estate taken. The state through its legislative branch selects its agents for the exercise of eminent domain although it may directly exercise the power itself. By the same means, the state may determine the quantity of property and the particular estate to be taken. The to exclude bidders who employed or desired to employ persons not members of labor unions. While the ordinance was regarded as unconstitutional and void, it was held that the proof was not sufficient to connect it with the bidding for the work. In Treat v. People, 195 Ill. 196, 62 N. E. 891, the two conditions of a general ordinance, and a provision in the contract were made the basis of an objection. It was the same general ordinance offered in evidence in this case, and the same provision in the contract, but it was not shown that the requirements of the ordinance were enforced in the bidding, or that the bidders were required or invited to bid upon such specification, or with notice that it would be inserted in the contract. It was held that the objection was not good. Precisely the same condition exists here. The law requires that the notice to bidders shall state where the specifications for improvement are to be found, but there was no showing in this case what specifications were referred to in the notice, or that they contained this clause, or that the bids were based upon the specifications contained in it. What was said in some of the cases above mentioned with reference to showing that the cost of the work was increased by the obnoxious provisions of the contracts, or that they operated to increase the burden of taxation imposed upon the property of the objector, must be understood, not as requiring proof in a particular instance of increased cost or the amount of injury inflicted upon the public, but as meaning that property owners must show that the provision restricting competition and having a tendency injurious to the public actually entered into the competition in some way. There being no evidence that the bidding was upon the specifications offered in evidence, the court was right in overruling the objection." Mathews V. People, 202 Ill. 389; Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 59 N. W. 362, 24 L. R. A. 702; McCarthy v. City of New York, 96 N. Y. 1; People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 716, 52 L. R. A. 814; City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885, 59 L. R. A. 775; State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602, 70 Pac. 52, 59 L. R. A. 342. Vol. 3, Current Law, pp. 751 et seq. note 88. "The liberty to contract, subject only to such limitations as may be imposed by the legislature in the legitimate exercise of the police power for the public welfare is not only secured by the constitution of nearly every state, but is undoubtedly within the protection of the federal constitution and covered by the fourteenth amendment thereof (U. S. Const. art. 14, § 1). People v. Marx, 99 |