court of the United States,123a it was held that where the United States has laid out a piece of public land in Chicago into streets and lots and public ground and recorded a plat thereof and has sold all the lots to individuals, its interest ceases and it cannot afterwards maintain a suit to restrain the diversion of such public ground from the purposes to which it was so donated to private uses but such public ground passed by the state law to the city. If the government charged with the duty of disposing of a tract of public land within a state chooses to proceed under the provisions of a particular statute of that state, the same legal effect should be given to its proceeding as in the case of an individual proprietor; the effect of the recording of the plat in this case was, therefore, to vest in the City of Chicago the legal title to the streets, alleys and public ground in Ft. Dearborn addition and after its execution and record and a sale of abutting property, the United States retained no interest, legal or equitable; that interest was as completely extinguished as if made by an unconditional conveyance and in the ordinary form. The United States possesses no jurisdiction to control or regulate within a state the execution of trusts or uses created for the benefit of the public or of particular communities or bodies therein. The jurisdiction in such cases is with the state or its subordinate agencies. But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Brewer and Brown in which it is said: "I agree that the only rights which the United States have are those which any other owner of real estate would have under a like dedication; but I think the law is that he who grants property to a trustee, to be held in trust for a specific purpose, retains such an interest as gives him a right to invoke the interposition of a court of equity to prevent the use of that property for any other purpose. Can it be that, if the government, believing that the Congressional Library has become too large for convenient use in this city, donates half of it to the city of Chicago, to be kept and maintained as a public library, that city can, after accepting the donation for the purposes named, give away the books to the various

issippi river for use as a way and for other public uses, the state of Iowa cannot itself or any of its subordinate agencies forbid the erection of a railway along the strip or impose burdens upon the proper use of the strip by requiring dam

ages to be paid owners of abutting lots. The use of the strip for a railway is consistent with the purposes for which it was originally dedicated.

123a United States v. Illinois Cent.. R. Co., 154 U. S. 225.

lawyers for their private libraries, and the government be powerless to restrain such disposition? Do the donors of libraries or the grantors of real estate in trust for specific purposes, though parting with the title, lose all right to invoke the aid of a court of equity to compel the use of their donations and grants for the purposes expressed in the gift or deed? I approve the opinion of the supreme court of Iowa, in the case of Warren v. Lyon City, 22 Iowa, 351, 355, 357. In that case the plaintiffs had years before platted certain land as a site for a city, and on the plat filed by them there was a dedication of a piece of ground as a 'public square.' After the city had been built up on that site, the authorities, for the purposes of gain, and under the pretended authority of an act of the legislature, attempted to subdivide the public square into lots and to lease them to individuals for private uses. A bill was filed by the dedicators to restrain such diversion of the use, and a decree in their favor was affirmed by the supreme court. I quote from the opinion: 'Nothing can be clearer than that if a grant is made for a specific, limited, and defined purpose, the subject of the grant cannot be used for another, and that the grantor retains still such an interest therein as entitles him in a court of equity to insist upon the execution of the trust as originally declared and accepted. Williams v. First Presbyterian Soe., 1 Ohio St. 478; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 498; Webb v. Moler, 8 Ohio, 548; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio, 298, 27 Am. Dec. 255.'

"And again, after picturing the injustice which in many cases would result by permitting such a diversion, the court adds: 'Such a doctrine would enable the state at pleasure to trifle with the rights of individuals, and we can scarcely conceive of a doctrine which would more effectually check every disposition to give for public or charitable purposes. No, if it must be, that if the right vested in the city for a particular purpose the legislature cannot vest it for another; that when the dedicator declared his purpose by the plat, the land cannot be used or sold for another and different one; that while the corporation took the premises as trustee, it took them with the obligations attached as well as the rights conferred; that while the legislature might give the control and management of these squares and parks to the several municipal corporations, it cannot authorize their sale and use for a purpose foreign to the object of the grant." "

Property dedicated to a public use cannot be occupied

or used by private individuals or for private purposes. The subject embraced in this section will be further considered in those sections discussing the control of a public corporation over its property since such control is restricted by the character of ownership. In some cases property is dedicated by an individual to a public corporation for a special use other than those of a highway and pleasure grounds. Grants of lands for sites of public buildings or educational institutions must remain devoted to the use named.124 In these instances, the estate acquired by the public

is limited. The owner donating property may also make reservations of mineral or other rights and they will be considered valid.125 The rights of the public in property dedicated by whatever manner to a public use will also depend upon the title a public corporation obtains in the property thus dedicated. If the fee remain in the owner of the abutting property of which it is a part, subject only to the public easement, the public can acquire no title to minerals, wood, soil or gravel except as may be necessary to use in the improvement of the highway at that particular point,128 though some authorities hold that such material may be used for the improvement of the highway at any point within a reasonable distance.127 Where the public corporation acquires the fee to the property dedicated for a public use it will retain all of the rights which accompany that ownership in the state in question.128 These questions will be further discussed under those sections relating to the power of a public corporation to improve its highways and other public property.

son, 27 Wis. 492. Where the words "reserved public square" were written upon a block in a record plat of the village, it may be shown that it was the purpose to dedicate this to one particular public use.

125 Webb v. City of Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116, 21 L. R. A. 62; City of Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248; Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo. 479, 24 S. W. 142, 24 L. R. A. 507; Vossen v. Dautel, 116 Mo. 379; State v. Paine Lumber Co., 84 Wis. 205.

126 Smith v. City of Rome, 19 Ga. 89; West Covington v. Freking, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 121; Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L. R. A. 647; Cuming v. Prang, 24 Mich. 514; Schurmeier v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82 (Gil. 59); Rich v. City of Minneapolis, 37 Minn. 423, 35 N. W. 2; Baker v. Shephard, 24 N. H. 208; Gidney v. Earl, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 98.

127 Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165;

City of New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50, but compare Peckham v. Town of Lebanon, 39 Conn. 231. There is an implied power vested in the public authorities to remove material from place to place on highways for purposes of construction, improvements or repair. Bundy v. Catto, 61 Ill. App. 209; Overman v. May, 35 Iowa, 89. Stone within the limits of a highway may be used in a reasonable and proper manner for the purpose of its repair but this will not authorize the municipal authorities to quary stone in the body of a river spanned by a bridge constituting the highway in question, to repair other streets. Shawnee County Com'rs v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603; Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich. 277; Thom v. Dodge County, 64 Neb. 845, 90 N. W. 763.

128 City of La Salle v. Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co., 16 Ill. App. 69; Id., 117 Ill. 411.

129

Commencement of public use. In the dedication of property the rule holds that as it is primarily a gift, the donor has the privilege of determining when the dedication shall take effect and the rights of the public in its use of the property commence and, therefore, a dedication may be made in praesenti to be accepted or used by the public in the future." It is not necessary to effect a common-law dedication that a public corporation should be in existence at the time of the dedication so long as one is subsequently organized. It is sufficient if property is offered, sold and bought with the understanding that designated portions are public parks or commons.130 The public corporation upon its subsequent organization becomes the trustee of the public to the extent of the dedication and it is then estopped both by the original dedication and its own conduct from denying that the tracts are public tracts or grounds.131

129 Hoyt v. Gleeson, 65 Fed. 685; City of Denver v. Clements, Colo. 472; Waggeman v. Village of North Peoria, 160 Ill. 277, 43 N. E. 347. A dedication of land for a public highway may, prior to the corporate existence of a municipality vest in it on its organization. Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 Ill. 401, 45 N. E. 236; Hommel v. Lewis, 23 Ky. L. R. A. 2298, 66 S. W. 1041; Neal V. Hopkins, 87 Md. 19; Creamer v. McCune, 7 Mo. App. 91; City of Llano v. Llano County, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 132; 23 S. W. 1008; Gillean v. City of Frost, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371, 61 S. W. 345.

130 United States v. City of Chi cago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185; United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 15,437; Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 501; Conkling v. Village of Mackinaw City, 120 Mich. 67, 79 N. W. 6. Lands were platted and portions designated as "Public Park." Copies of the maps were circulated and lots sold. It was said in a learned opinion: "If, however, there was not a valid statutory dedication, then I think the

plat may operate as a common-law dedication, in which case the fee of the land would remain in the proprietors, but the use for the purposes designated would be in the public of the locality indicated. But there must be an acceptance by the public before the dedication would take effect. If in a village which is incorporated, and has a legal existence as a municipal corporation, the acceptance must be by the public authorities of such village. If, however, the public of the locality is not incorporated as a city or village, then I think the acceptance may be shown by acts in pais of the people of the locality." Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 12 N. J. Eq. (1 Beasl.) 553.

131 City of Cincinnati v. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431; City of New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 662; Waggeman v. Village of North Peoria, 160 Ill. 277. Here it was said: "It is wholly immaterial that the village of North Peoria had not been organized at the time of the dedication. If there is a common-law dedication of a public