of cases and does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the plaintiff in a particular case." As accurately stated by Judge Sanborn, of the Federal bench: "Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power. It is not confined to cases in which the particular facts constitute a good cause of action, but it includes every issue within the scope of the general power vested in the court, by the law of its organization, to deal with the abstract question. Nor is this jurisdiction limited to making correct decisions. It empowers the court to determine every issue within the scope of its authority according to its own view of the law and the evidence, whether its decision is right or wrong, and every judgment or decision so rendered is final and conclusive upon the parties to it, unless reversed by writ of error or repeal, or impeached for fraud." § 682. Distinction between superior and inferior judicial officers with respect to liability. In respect to the liability of judicial officers for the results of their official and judicial acts, a distinction must be observed between judges of courts of superior and inferior jurisdiction. The rule of nonliability only applies, it will be remembered, when the judicial officer is acting officially within his jurisdiction and in respect to a matter over which he has jurisdiction. In judicial systems as they exist in the states and the United States, are to be found courts of superior or general jurisdiction and those of inferior or of special and limited jurisdiction. The presumption of law with respect to acts of a judicial officer of a superior court is that he is acting within his powers and within the powers of the court. 448 No such presumption exists with reference to the judicial action of an officer of an inferior or subordinate court. The jurisdiction 445 Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 308; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. 446 Foltz v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 316. 447 Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546; Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486. 448 Haynes v. Butler, 30 Ark. 69; Huey v. Richardson, 2 Har. (Del.) 206. of the latter must appear; 49 that of the former is presumed and the burden of proof is upon the one attacking the jurisdiction.450 The results of this distinction when considering the question of liability are apparent. A judge of a superior court possesses greater freedom of action, not only in passing upon matters clearly within his jurisdiction but also in determining whether he has the jurisdiction to try particular cases and a wrong decision in this respect will not render him civilly liable. 451 On the other hand, a judge of an inferior or subordinate court of limited jurisdiction is restricted in his action, and, in cases of doubtful jurisdiction, the doubt should be resolved against a retention of jurisdiction rather than in favor of it. A wrong decision, therefore, in regard to the jurisdiction of the court in a particular case may lead to a personal liability when this would not be the case in considering the responsibility of the judge of a superior court.452 § 683. Quasi judicial officers. The rule of nonliability attaches to quasi judicial or ministerial offices performing judicial or quasi judicial duties under substantially the same conditions and circumstances as applying to a strictly judicial officer.453 Some authorities go to the extent of 449 Levy v. Shurman, 6 Ark. 182; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1; Kenney v. Greer, 13 Ill. 432; Lowry v. Erwin, 6 Rob. (La.) 192; Rossiter v. Peck, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 538; Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Dough. (Mich.) 433; Reynolds v. Stansbury, 20 Ohio, 344. 450 See authorities cited in preceding note. 451 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 523; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 335; McCall v. Cohen, 16 S. C. 445. 452 Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Kelly v. Moore, 51 Ala. 366; Inos v. Winspear, 18 Cal. 397; Lanpher c. Dewell, 56 Iowa, 153; Piper v. Pearson, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 121; Kelly v. Bemis, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 83; Hendrick v. Whittemore, 105 Mass. 28; Palmer v. Town of Car roll, 24 N. H. 314; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 282; Morrill v. Thurston, 46 Vt. 732; Vaughn v. Congdon, 56 Vt. 111; Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 491. But see Maguire v. Hughes, 13 La. Ann. 281; Jordan v. Hanson, 49 N. H. 199; Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N. J. Law, 654; Bocock v. Cochran, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 521; Clark v. Holdridge, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 61, and McCall v. Cohen, 16 S. C. 445. 453 Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94; McConoughey v. Jackson, 101 Cal. 265, 35 Pac. 863; Porter v. Haight, 45 Cal. 631; Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536; Campbell v. Polk County, 3 Iowa, 467; Wasson v. Mitchell, 18 Iowa, 153; Green v. Talbot, 36 Iowa, 499; State v. Hastings, 37 Neb. 96, 55 N. W. 774; Inhabitants of Morris Tp. v. Carey, 27 N. J. Law (3 holding that there can be no liability under the conditions noted in the preceding sections, but the true rule undoubtedly is that quasi judicial officers are personally liable for the results of their official action when actuated by corrupt or malicious motives."55 The same rule of nonliability will apply to executive officers for acts done in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity.456 § 684. Legislative and quasi legislative duties. The power of making laws for the government of separate communities is vested in the legislative or law-making branch of the government. It is a discretionary duty; one which cannot be Dutch.) 377; Wilson v. City of New York, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 595; Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caine (N. Y.) 312; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 117. "The act complained of in this case was, therefore, a judicial determination. The assessors were judges acting clearly within the scope and limit of their authority. They were not volunteers, but the duty was imperative and compulsory; and acting, as they did, in the performance of a public duty, in its nature judicial, they were not liable to an action, how. ever erroneous or wrongful their determination may have been. This case might be disposed of on narrow ground, for there was no evidence to justify the conclusion that the defendants acted maliciously in fixing the value of the property of the plaintiff or of any one else; and surely it will not be pretended they were liable for a mere error of judg ment. But I prefer to place the decision on the broad ground that no public officer is responsible in a civil suit, for a judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however malicious the motive which produced it. Such acts, when corrupt, may be punished criminally, but the law will not allow malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit against such an officer, for what he does in the performance of a judicial duty. The rule extends to judges from the highest to the lowest; to jurors, and to all public officers, whatever name they may bear, in the exercise of judicial power." People v. Stocking, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 573; Rail v. Potts, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 225; Grant v. Lindsay, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 651; State v. Kinsbury, 37 Tex. 159; Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393. 454 Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536; Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65; Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239; Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa, 74; Wall v. Trumball, 16 Mich. 228; Amperse v. Winslow, 75 Mich. 234, 42 N. W. 823; Waldron v. Berry, 51 N. H. 136; Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238; East River Gaslight Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557; Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St. 346; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393. 455 Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239; Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548; Lilienthal v. Campbell, 22 La. Ann. 600; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Larned v. Wheeler, 140 Mass. 390; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665. 456 Elliott v. City of Chicago, 48 coerced 457 and for a failure to perform which or for the passage of unjust and oppressive laws there can be no personal or civil liability to any individual member of the community or of the community at large for the damages which may have been suffered because of such legislation.458 The weight of authority is to the effect that the motives influencing legislators in the passage of laws cannot be inquired into and cannot be made the basis of civil action for damages, whether such motives be corrupt, dishonest or malicious.459 The principle, however, applies that these officers must act within their authority and this is especially true of members of subordinate legislative or quasi legislative bodies like city councils, boards of town or village trustees." 460 Freedom from arrest. To protect the members of law-making bodies in the performance of their duties and to avoid all semblance of coercion or undue influence, not only is the rule of non Ill. 293; Muscatine Western R. Co. v. Horton, 38 Iowa, 33; Merchant v. Bothwell, 1 Mo. App. Rep'r, 131. 457 Wells v. City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Baker v. State, 27 Ind. 485; Ann Arundel County Com'rs V. Duckett, 20 Md. 469; Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109; Borough of Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. 253; Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 443. "If we take the case of legislative officers, their rightful exemption from liability is very plain. Let it be supposed that an individual has a just claim against the state which the legislature ought to allow, but neglects or refuses to allow. In such a case there may be a moral wrong, but there can be no legal wrong. The legislature has full discretionary authority in all matters of legislation, and it is not consistent with this that the members should be called to account at the suit of individuals for their acts and neglects. Discretionary power is, in its nature, independent; to make those who wield it liable to be called to account by other authority is to take away discretion and destroy inde some pendence. This remark is not true, exclusively, of legislative bodies proper, but it applies also to inferior legislative bodies, such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils and the like. When such bodies neglect and refuse to proceed to the discharge of their duties, the courts may interpose to set them in motion; but they cannot require them to reach particular conclusions, nor, for their failure to do so, impose the payment of damages upon them, or upon the municipality they represent." 458 Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856; Jones v. Loying, 55 Miss. 109. 459 Coverdale v. Edwards, 155 Ind. 374, 58 N. E. 495; Amperse v. Winslow, 75 Mich. 234; Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109. See, also, § 508, ante. But see Baker v. State 27 Ind. 485. 460 Pine Bluff Water Co. v. Sewer Dist., 56 Ark. 205, 19 S. W. 576; Larned v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393, 29 N. W. 22; Barger v. City of Hickory, 130 N. C. 550, 41 S. E. 708. liability above stated applied and maintained, but constitutional provisions usually exist exempting members of legislative bodies from arrest 461 or the service of process in civil actions 462 while they are engaged in the actual performance of their duties; this including not only the actual length of a legislative session, but also a reasonable time for assembling and the return of members to and from the place of meeting,463 the exemption applying as a rule in all cases except for crimes of the gravest character such as treason or felony.464 § 685. Rights of a public official. The relation which exists between a public official and the corporation is one created by law and not partaking in the least of the nature of a contract.465 A public official is regarded in respect to the performance of his public and official duties as a trustee for the corporation which he represents and for its interests whatever may be their character. 466 The duties of a public official are those attached by law to a particular office; they are fixed and prescribed by law and the question of compensation is dependent upon the terms of the law which creates the office and prescribes its duties.407 If there is no compensation provided, the services. must be performed gratuituously.468 If one is not willing to enter 461 United States Const. art. 1, § 6; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168; Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 136; Washburn v. Phelps, 24 Vt. 506; Prentis v. Com., 5 Rand. (Va.) 697. 462 Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 136; Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Prentis v. Com., 5 Rand. (Va.) 697. 463 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. 464 Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Worthen, 46 Ark. 312; Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea) 121. 465 See §§ 596 et seq, ante. 466 Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309. County supervisors are regarded as trustees for the property interests of their counties and the same good faith towards the county is required of them as of an ordinary trustee to his cestui que trust. 467 Yates v. National Home, 103 U. S. 674; Dunwoody v. United States, 143 U. S. 578; Merwin v. Boulder County Com'rs, 29 Colo. 169, 67 Pac. 285; Gross v. Whitley County Com'rs, 158 Ind. 531, 64 N. E. 25, 58 L. R. A. 394. 468 Dunwoody v. United States, 23 Ct. Cl. 82; Kinney v. United States, 60 Fed. 883. "Plaintiff claims, irrespective of said deficiency acts, that she is entitled to payment for said services as part of the miscellaneous expenses of courts. I think that such was not the intention of congress, as evidenced by subse quent deficiency acts, appropriating money specifically to pay jury commissioners. Furthermore, this was a new office, without any specified emoluments. In the absence of a |