ment,595 has been questioned as being a violation of those constitutional guarantees noted. The question, however, has been decided by the general weight of authority, both on the grounds of public policy and expediency adversely to the contention that one is entitled to a trial by jury when charged with a violation of a petty police ordinance,596 the basis of this decision being, as suggested, public policy; the inexpediency of allowing jury trials in the numberless petty cases tried in police courts and also because of the trivial character of the offense.597 The cases almost universally hold that violations of petty police regulations are not to be considered as crimes or even as misdemeanors and as the constitutional guarantees only apply to such, their existence, therefore, cannot be invoked by the offender against a municipal police regulation. There are offenses, however, sometimes punishable by municipal courts, of a graver nature which come within the category of crimes or misdemeanors and in the trial of which, therefore, the accused is entitled to a trial by jury.599 Park, 44 N. J. Law, 162; Merkee v. City of Rochester, 13 Hun. (N. Y.) 157. 595 Ex parte Slattery, 3 Ark. 484; Newton v. Fain, 114 Ga. 833, 40 S. E. 993; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N. W. 458; Bregguglia v. Borough of Vineland, 53 N. J. Law, 168, 11 L. R. A. 407; State v. Nohl, 113 Wis. 15, 88 N. W. 1004. 596 People v. Van Houten, 13 Misc. 603, 35 N. Y. Supp. 186; Com. V. Shaw, 1 Pittsb. (Pa.) 492. But see State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403. See, also, §§ 552-553-554, ante, with cases cited. 597 State v. Powell, 97 N. C. 417. Sedgwick, St. Const. Law, 548. "Extensive and summary police powers are constantly exercised in all the states of the union for the repression of breaches of the peace and petty offenses; and these statutes are not supposed to conflict with constitutional provisions securing to the citizens a trial by jury." See, also, the subject fully considered in McQuillin, Mun. Ord. ch. X. 598 Williams v. City Council of Augusta, 4 Ga. 509; Vason v. City of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542; Dively v. City of Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa, 565; State v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Williamson v. Com., 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 146; City Council of Monroe v. Meuer, 35 La. Ann. 1192; Borough of St. Peter v. Bauer, 19 Minn. 327 (Gil. 282); City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N. J. Law, 213; People v. Justices of Ct. of Special Sessions, 74 N. Y. 406; Byers v. Com., 42 Pa. 89; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. 374; Ex parte Schmidt, 24 S. C. 363; Town of Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182. But see Plimpton v. Town of Somerset, 33 Vt. 283. 599 Rector v. State, 6 Ark, 187; Lewis v. State, 21 Ark. 211; Stebbins v. Mayer, 38 Kan. 573, 16 Pac. 745; In re Rolfs, 30 Kan. 758; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. Ann. 190; Welch v. Stowell, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 334; State v. Moss, 47 N. C. (2 § 588. Qualifications of judges or jurors in municipal courts. As has been said, every citizen in a community is interested in the prompt and vigorous enforcement of its local police regulations and in many instances also in the collection of fines imposed as a violation of such regulations in that it operates as a means of increasing the revenues of the municipality and decreasing in the same proportion the amount to be raised by taxation,600 the larger the fine imposed and their greater frequency tending more favorably to this end. It has been urged that the existence of these conditions with the necessary motive accompanying them are of such a character as to disqualify a resident of that community from acting either as a judge or as a juror in cases where a trial by jury is permitted. The argument, however, is too trivial to be considered and the cases universally hold against it. The theory that municipal courts are inferior and subordinate courts has sustained in some cases the rule that constitutional provisions in regard to the qualifications of members of the state judiciary do not apply to judges of municipal courts. § 589. Appeals. 601 The right of appeal from the findings or decisions of an inferior tribunal in all but exceptional cases is not an inherent one, but Jones) 66; Plimpton v. Town of 600 People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 388; Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 300. 601 Deitz v. Central City, 1 Colo. 323; Com. v. Worcester, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 462; Thomas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 9 Ohio, 290; City of Jonesborough v. McKee, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 167; City Council of Charleston v. Pepper, 1 Rich. Law (S. C.) 364. 602 People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 388. "Its (the constitution) language is 'No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court of this state who is not a citizen of the United States, and who shall not have resided in this state five years next preceding his election and who shall not for two years next preceding his election have resided in the division, circuit or county in which he shall be elected,' etc. * * "The fact that they are called by another name is evidence that the convention did not intend to include justices of the peace in the term judges, as used in the eleventh section. * * * Here, then is a numerous and important class of judges in the state holding courts in numerous places almost constantly and in whom is vested a portion of the judicial power of the state and who are not included in the term judges as used in the eleventh section. "It follows that the term is used in a restricted sense and does not dependent upon a statutory or constitutional provision.603 There- Respublica v. Dallas, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 300. 603 Town of Hawkinsville v. Ethridge, 96 Ga. 326; Stewart v. State, 98 Ga. 202; City of Salina v. Wait, 56 Kan. 283, 31 L. R. A. 538; City of Lyons v. Wellman, 56 Kan. 285; City of Topeka v. Wood, 62 Kan. 809, 64 Pac. 630; City of St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634, 34 S. W. 878; City of Water Valley v. Davis, 73 Miss. 521, 19 So. 235; People v. French, 63 Hun, 633, 18 N. Y. Supp. 550. 604 City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; In re Rolfs, 30 Kan. 758; Flanagan v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 44 N. J. Law, 118. 605 State v. Call, 41 Fla. 450; City of De Soto v. Merciel, 53 Mo. App. 57. 606 Miller v. O'Reilly, 84 Ind. 168, Irish v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 24 607 City of Baton Rouge v. Cre- ordinance violated. 44 La. Ann. 85. State v. Clesi, 608 Welborne v. State, 114 Ga.. 793, 40 S. E. 857. See, however, to the contrary, McFarland v. Donaldson, 115 Ga. 567, 41 S. E. 1000. 609 Bale v. Pass, 64 App. Div. 302, 72 N. Y. Supp. 93. A municipal court of the city of New York has power under the charter of greater New York to set aside a verdict for a mistake of the jury in rendering a verdict for one party where it was intended for the other. "If the fact alleged is properly before us there should be no doubt either as to the right of the plaintiff to have or the power of the court to grant the relief demanded. It would be a reproach upon the administration of justice if a party could lose the benefit of a trial and a verdict in his favor by the mere mistake of the foreman of the jury in reporting to the court the result of the deliberations of himself and his fellows. The power of a court of record over its records and to make them truthful is undoubted, and has been exercised without ques-tion." Following Burhans v. Tibbits, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 21, and Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N. Y. 361. decision of a municipal court, whether secured by direct appeal 10 or by certiorari 611 is determined by statutory or constitutional provisions. In all cases, based upon a violation of a municipal ordinance or regulation, the municipality, if defeated, has no right of appeal or review.612 § 590. Methods of procedure. In the exercise of judicial powers however slight, there must be parties, a cause of action or question to be determined, and a judge, regular allegations, opportunity to answer and a trial according to some regular and settled course of procedure. These are essentials to a legal exercise of the power. The formalities attending the use of any of these essentials may vary according to the nature of the judicial body, the character of its jurisdiction and the questions considered and settled by it. In courts of general jurisdiction where grave questions affecting and concerning both personal action and private property are determined, the law recognizes and insists upon greater formalities and a stricter compliance with them. In municipal courts, as they are universally of limited and inferior jurisdiction, and deal in all cases 610 City of Emporia v. Volmer, 12 Kan. 622; In re Rolfs, 30 Kan. 758; Flanagan v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 44 N. J. Law, 118. 611 State v. Call, 41 Fla. 450; Archie v. State, 99 Ga. 23; State v. Recorder of First Recorder's Ct., 30 La. Ann. 450; Swift v. Judges of Wayne County Circ. Ct., 64 Mich. 479; Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166 (Gil. 153); Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Com'rs, 42 N. J. Law, 364; Watson v. Treasurer of Plainfield, 60 N. J. Law, 260; Reid v. Wood, 102 Pa. 312. 612 Cranston v. City of Augusta, 61 Ga. 572; Town of Hawkinsville v. Ethridge, 96 Ga. 326; State v. Vail, 57 Iowa, 103; City of Salina v. Wait, 56 Kan. 283, 31 L. R. A. 538; City of Lyons v. Wellman, 56 Kan. 285, 43 Pac. 267; Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603; City of Water Valley v. Davis, 73 Miss. 521; City of St. Louis v. Marchel, 99 Mo. 475; Village of Platteville v. McKernan, 54 Wis. 487. But see the following cases: City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94; City of Durango v. Reinsberg, 16 Colo. 327; City of Leavenworth v. Weaver, 26 Kan. 392. Com. v. Ingraham, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 106. An appeal can be taken by the municipality when the decision is against the validity of any ordinance or by-law of said city but in no other case. City of Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588; City of St. Charles v. Hackman, 133 Mo. 634; Village of Van Wert v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 477; State v. Rouch, 47 Ohio St. 478. either civil or criminal with petty and trivial questions, a less degree of strictness and formality is required in their procedure.613 This because of the nature of the offense and questions considered by them and also because that under the conditions surrounding them and which calls them into existence, all reasonable and legal means must be used to facilitate the transaction of their business. That their jurisdiction is restricted both in regard to the issuance of process and a determination of cases to the limits of the municipality is self-evident.14 613 People v. Burns, 19 Misc. 680, 44 N. Y. Supp. 1106. A warrant is necessary in misdemeanor cases where the offense is not committed in the presence of the officer making the arrest. Following People v. Howard, 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 763; People v. Pratt, 22 Hun (N. Y.) 300. 614 Brandon v. Avery, 22 N. Y. 469; Waters v. Langdon, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 408; Baird v. Helfer, 12 App. Div. 23, 42 N. Y. Supp. 484; Ziegler v. Corwin, 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. Supp. 855. "It is easily perceived that the effort of the legislature has been to confer upon the local courts of Rochester jurisdiction over the people of Monroe county outside of the city in both civil and criminal matters. In People v. Upson, 79 Hun, 87, as we have seen, the jurisdiction of the police court in criminal matters outside of the city was denied. The question remains whether the legislative command carrying the jurisdiction in civil matters into that portion of Monroe county which lies outside of the city of Rochester can be upheld. The judiciary of the state will not nullify the acts of the legislature unless the plain violation of the letter or the spirit of the state constitution is apparent. The legislature is primarily the judge of the validity of its own acts, as is as serted in many cases, and courts will not overrule that judgment, unless a plain duty exists to preserve the integrity of the constitution itself; but when that duty is apparent, the courts do not hesitate to meet the responsibility. It may be admitted that there is nothing in the constitution in terms absolutely forbidding the exercise of the legislative power which is here challenged. But was it not a violation of the intent and plan of the constitution in the organization and operation of the courts of this state? A statute which is opposed to the spirit and purpose of the constitution is as much within the condemnation of the organic law as though the intention to violate the constitution were written in bold characters upon the face of the statute itself. The question we are considering has in substance been before the courts of this state in many cases and those cases seem to establish beyond cavil or dispute that the court of the kind we are considering is not a court of general jurisdiction, but of local and inferior jurisdiction and limited to the territory embraced within the locality for which the court is constituted." Geraty v. Reid, 78 N. Y. 64; People v. Upson, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 87. |