steam railroad cars and engines.415 It is, of course, within the power of the state legislature to authorize subordinate corporations to pass ordinances or laws which shall have a restricted effect beyond their limits.416 This has been done in some cases for City of Gallatin v. Tarwater, 143 Mo. 40. 415 Whitson v. City of Franklin, 34 Ind. 392; Crowley v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 658; Merz v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 88 Mo. 672; Pacific R. Co. v. James, 81 Pa. St. 194. "It may be said that the public has no right to inhibit the speed of train within the company's own domain, provided the company checks up and crosses the street at the legal rate of speed. But in the exercise of police power such as this, the actual state of affairs must be taken into account: thus not only the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of reducing a speed at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour to four or five miles an hour in the short space of three or four hundred feet, but also the fact that (though without right) many persons are found walking upon the tracks of the railroads at all hours. Now as a matter of police regulation it will not do to answer, 'Let the people, who go where they have no right, take care of themselves.' The police power is enacted not only for those who exercise proper degree of reflection, but for those who may not. Life is too sacred to place its security on a basis so uncertain. The a safety of a dense population is to be guarded by the police power in a great city, even though in doing this the power may be called into exercise within the dwellings, the lots and private ways of the citizens. We do not see that the rail road company has greater rights within the city than others." But see Meyers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 57 Iowa, 555, and Green v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.) 51. 416 Snell v. Town of Belleville, 30 U. C. Q. B. 81; Chicago P. & P. Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 II. 221; Town of Centerville v. Miller, 51 Iowa, 712; State v. Shroeder, 51 Iowa, 197; Town of Toledo v. Edens, 59 Iowa, 352. "In February, 1878, the town passed an ordinance providing 'that no person shall sell within the limits of said town, or of any territory over which the town may have jurisdiction for that purpose, any beer or wine, or any malt or vinous liquors, the sale of which is not prohibited by the laws of the state of Iowa, without first producing from the mayor a license, etc.' On the 3rd day of September, 1878, the defendant sold beer outside of * the corporate limits of the town, and without any license to make such sale. Chapter 119 of the acts of 1878 became a law on the 4th day of July of that year and it contains the following among other provisions. 'Sec. 9. The power and jurisdiction of every municipal corporation, whether acting under general or special charter to regulate, prohibit and license the sale of ale, wine and beer and of the courts and officers thereof to enforce said regulations, hereby extended two miles beyond the city limits of said corporation, .' The ques the purpose of enabling a particular municipal corporation to suppress nuisances detrimental to the public health and morals.417 Upon the annexation of territory to a municipal corporation, the operation and force of then existing ordinances without any affirmative action in respect to them extends over and applies to such new territory. The ordinances or resolutions of public corporations designed for the regulation of the corporation at large. operate at all times throughout its actual boundaries and this rule is not affected by the fact that these may be enlarged or diminished at times.418 § 563. Ordinances invalid in part. It often happens that certain provisions or sections of a municipal ordinance are invalid while other sections and portions are valid. This fact or condition does not authorize a court to declare or hold void parts distinct and separate which can be enforced.419 In these cases the separable provisions or parts that are valid must stand as the law, 420 while the others should be held tion to be determined is, did the ardinance in question operate to Orohibit unlicensed sales within two miles of the city limits? We Chink it did. The section above quoted is an absolute extension of The jurisdiction of the city to all points within the two miles' limit and an absolute extension of the Jurisdiction and power of the Courts and officers of the city two miles beyond the city limits." 417 Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App. 441. 418 Virginia v. Smith, 1 Cranch, C. C. 47, Fed. Cas. No. 16,967; Swift v. Klein, 163 Ill. 269; St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 121. 419 McQuillin, Mun. Ord. § 295, and many cases cited. 420 Cooper v. District of Columbia, 4 McArthur & M. (D. C.) 250; City of Birmingham v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 98 Ala. 134, 13 So. 141; In re Ah Toy, 45 Fed. 795; Shelton v. City of Mobile, 30 Ala. 540; City of Eureka Springs v. O'Neal, 56 Ark. 350, 19 S. W. 969; Ex parte Holmquist (Cal.) 27 Pac. 1099, following Ex parte Christensen, 85 Cal. 208; In re Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400, 39 Pac. 775; San Luis Obispo v. Greenberg, 120 Cal. 300, 52 Pac. 797; City of Tampa v. Salomonson, 35 Fla. 446, 17 So. 581; Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509, 27 So. 30; State v. Dillon, 42 Fla. 95, 28 So. 781; Harbaugh v. City of Monmouth, 74 Ill. 367; City of Alton v. Foster, 74 Ill. App. 511; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. People, 161 Ill. 244; City of Belleville v. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 152 Ill. 171, 26 L. R. A. 681; Schofield v. City of Tampico, 98 Ill. App. 324; City of Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575, 28 N. E. 853, 15 L. R. A. 321; City of Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. E. 857; City of Eureka v. inoperative and, therefore, of no effect.421 If, however, an ordinance is in part invalid and that part is so commingled with the valid portions as to render a separation impossible, the whole will be regarded as fatally defective.422 This principle is also true where the ordinance is to be considered as an entirety and where each part has some bearing or influence over the rest.423 § 564. Construction of ordinances. An ordinance or resolution is a local law and, therefore, those rules of construction which ordinarily apply to statutes or laws of a higher grade are adopted by the courts in determining the force and effect of doubtful or ambiguous words, phrases, and Jackson, 8 Kan. App. 49; Baker v. City of Lexington, 21 Ky. L. R. 809, 53 S. W. 16; State v. Riley, 49 La. Ann. 1617; Village of Wykoff v. Healey, 57 Minn. 14, 58 N. W. 685; State V. Sendeng, Minn. 528; City of Rockville v. Merchant, 1 Mo. App. Rep'r, 84; City of Lamar v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 507; Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 47 N. W. 280, 9 L. R. A. 786; Bailey v. State, 30 Neb. 855, 47 N. W. 208; Doran v. City of Camden, 64 N. J. Law, 666, 46 Atl. 724; Sterling v. City of Camden, 65 N. J. Law, 190, 46 Atl. 781; Haynes v. City of Cape May, 52 N. J. Law, 180; Rahway Gaslight Co. v. City of Rahway, 58 N. J. Law, 510; Anderson v. City of Camden, 58 N. J. Law, 515; Town of Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564; Wade v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 256; City of Eureka v. Wilson, 15 Utah, 67, 48 Pac. 150. 421 State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377; Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 9 L. R. A. 786; Bailey v. State, 30 Neb. 855; In re Langston, 55 Neb. 310, 75 N. W. 828. "It is urged that the portion of said ordinance is invalid which makes it a crime for one to conduct or carry on a business upon which there is imposed an occupation tax, without first paying such tax and procuring a license. Whether the provision relating to the occupation tax is valid or void is not now important, inasmuch as the petitioner was not prosecuted for having failed to pay his occupation tax. Eliminate from the ordinance the clause or provision relating to such tax, the remainder is a complete ordinance in itself, capable of being enforced, and is valid." State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789, distinguishing State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796, 8 L. R. A. 529. 422 City of Birmingham v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 98 Ala. 134; Lucas v. City of Macomb, 49 Ill. App. 60; Town of Kirkwood v. Meramec Highlands Co., 94 Mo. App. 637, 68 S. W. 761; Chamberlain v. City of Hoboken, 38 N. J. Law, 110; State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962. 423 City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Ill. App. 539; Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 42 L. R. A. 696; Second Municipality v. Morgan, 1 La. Ann. 111; City of Omaha v. Harmon, 58 Neb. 339, 78 N. W. 623. clauses.124 That construction is ordinarily adopted which gives a reasonable meaning and effect 425 and this is especially true where the validity of the ordinance is questioned because of its alleged unreasonableness.426 It is not necessary for courts to go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of words or phrases employed. A strained, or forced interpretation, where unnecessary to sustain the validity of an ordinance, should be avoided.427 Where the power to regulate only an act or occupation is granted, the right to pass prohibitive ordinances cannot be implied.428 That construction of the ordinance should be given if possible which will sustain or uphold the validity, not only of the different parts or clauses, but considering it as a whole. This applies, as a general rule, to all legislation but especially to ordinances and resolutions passed by inferior legislative bodies.429 In many cases 424 Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 102 Mich. 551, 61 N. W. 1; Denning v. Yount, 62 Kan. 217, 61 Pac. 803, affirming 9 Kan. App. 708, 59 Pac. 1092; Heath v. Hall (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 160. 425 First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335; Rounds v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154. 426 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 195 Ill. 19, 57 L. R. A. 127; Stafford v. Chippewa Valley Elec. R. Co., 110 Wis. 331, 85 N. W. 1036. "It is elementary that the power of the city council to enact ordinances is not unlimited. It may go within the field delegated to it by the state legislature to the boundaries of reason. Within such field its discretionary power is supreme but it cannot legitimately go beyond. If it does in so far its enactments are void. Whether, in any given case, where the facts are undisputed a city council has exceeded its power by the enactment of an unreasonable ordinance is purely a judicial question to be considered substantially the same as that of whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority, reason able doubts being resolved in favor of municipal power." Citing Hayes v. City of Appleton, 24 Wis. 542; Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307; Clason v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 316. 427 Stadler v. Fahey, 87 Ill. App. 411; Village of Hyde Park v. Borden, 94 Ill. 26; People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hale, 94 Ill. App. 406; Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 102 Mich. 551; City of Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo. App. 365; Town of Wesson v. Collins, 72 Miss. 844. 428 Virgo v. City of Toronto, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447; Platte & D. Canal & Milling Co. v. Lee, 2 Colo. App. 184; Wagner v. City of Rock Island, 146 Ill. 139, 21 L. R. A. 519; Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 20 L. R. A. 692; City of Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co., 90 Ky. 193, 8 L. R. A. 484; State v. Robertson, 45 La. Ann. 954; Citizens' Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Sands, 95 Mich. 551, 20 L. R. A. 411. 429 Burr v. Town of Newcastle, 49 Ind. 322; Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woesten, 147 Mo. 467, 48 S. W. 939, 48 L. R. A. 279; Boice v. Inhabitants of Plainfield, 38 N. J. Law, 95; Cope members are neither well educated nor familiar with legislativė forms and procedure and, therefore, the result of their action is not as artificially and properly expressed as the action of higher legislative bodies.430 But the doctrine of implication should not be applied to give an ordinance effect in whole or in part,431 and the question of construction is one of law for the courts to deride. +32 § 565. Same subject continued. A construction adopted by the people or their representative officers should be followed, the principle of estoppel applying in so far as it can.433 In cases of doubt and of ambiguity, a cotemporaneous construction should be given great weight. The intent of the legislative body is to be ascertained and this intent is best evidenced by a construction made cotemporaneously with the passage of legislation.134 That construction should also be given which is based upon a state of things existing at the date of the v. Atlantic City (N. J. Law) 47 Atl. 440; Grace v. Walker, 95 Tex. 39, 64 S. W. 930, 65 S. W. 482. 430 Whitlock v. West, 26 Conn. 406. 431 Morton v. City of Burlington, 106 Iowa, 50, 75 N. W. 662; City of Austin V. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330, 47 Am. St. Rep. 114. 432 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Olsen, 4 Colo. 239; Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App. 708; Long v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. Law, 348; Wilson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 18 R. I. 598. 433 Harrison v. People, 97 Ill. App. 421; Goodrich v. City of Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422. 434 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552, Fed. Cas. No. 6,546. "The statements of supervisors in debate on the passage of the ordinance cannot, it is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms used; but they can be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed, and the mischiefs sought to be remedied. Besides we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men; and where an ordi nance though general in its terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it accordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the general terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a fact in its history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically become obsolete." Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 393; Barnes v. City of Mobile, 19 Ala. 707; In re Langston, 55 Neb. 310; |