tion taken under the second and third classes or the implied powers of the corporation, the rule is different and the courts may inquire into the character of the action and determine whether it is reasonable or unreasonable.307 546. Tests of a reasonable ordinance. It has already been suggested that when the courts have the right to determine the question of whether an ordinance is reasonable or unreasonable, they will consider all of the circumstances surrounding the purpose of, the necessity for and the passage of the ordinance. In detail some of these tests will be given. Purpose for which passed A public corporation, it must be remembered, although a governmental agent, is still an artificial person, having as the necessity for its creation the accomplishment of specific objects. If an ordinance as passed by a municipal corporation does not have in view the accomplishment of some object for which the corporation was especially created, it will not be considered as reasonable.3 308 Consistency with superior law. Again, an ordinance is a law of inferior class or grade, and, to be reasonable, it must conform to all laws of a superior grade or class. An ordinance or resolution, therefore, which is not in harmony with the constitution, the general laws of the state or the charter of the municipality, will not be regarded as reasonable 309 without considering the proposition that such ordinances would be also invalid because of such lack of harmony. the matter of morals. The ordinance exceeds the power and is therefore void." Skinker v. Heman, 64 Mo. App. 441; Littlefield v. State, 42 Neb. 223, 28 L. R. A. 588; State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424; Johnson v. Borough of Asbury Park, 58 N. J. Law, 604; Town of Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C. 570, 26 S. E. 906, 38 L. R. A. 326, affirmed by divided court, McIver, C. J., and Pope, J., dissenting. 307 Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421, 45 N. E. 587, 35 L. R. A. 684; Champer v. City of Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339, 24 L. R. A. 768; Skaggs v. City of Martinsville, 140 Ind. 476, 33 L. R. A. 781; State v. Stone, 46 La. Ann. 147; Skinker v. Heman, 2 Mo. App. Rep'r, 1095; Dreyfus v. Lonergan, 73 Mo. App. 336; City of Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1. 308 Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Cemetery Ass'n, 124 Cal. 344; People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 2 L. R. A. 721. 309 City of Placerville v. Wilcox, 35 Cal. 21; City of Durango v. § 547. Same subject; surrounding conditions. 311 The reasonableness of an ordinance or a resolution in many cases is determined entirely by the surrounding conditions and circumstances, and its operation upon the object the ordinance was designed to affect.310 The population of a municipality, its character, its area, physical characteristics and charter, whether manufacturing, mercantile or otherwise, are a few of the many conditions that courts have to consider.3 Ordinances or resolutions when enacted by a densely populated city with a large number of foreign-born residents are reasonable 312 but would not be considered so if passed by a city sparsely settled extending over a larger area, and the population of which is well educated and law abiding.313 The importance of this test cannot be emphasized too strongly in a determination of the reasonableness of a municipal law. 31 § 548. Amendment or repeal of legislative action. The power to legislate carries with it by implication, except as specially prohibited or limited by charter or constitutional provisions, the right to repeal or amend such legislation by subsequent Reinsberg, 16 Colo. 327; Simrall v. 310 City of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; City of Helena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark. 424, 39 L. R. A. 266; Wills v. City of Ft. Smith, 70 Ark. 221, 66 S. W. 922; City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 Ill. 90; City of Clinton v. Phillips, 58 Ill. 102; City of Chicago v. Wilson, 195 Ill. 19, 57 L. R. A. 127; Evison v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 45 Minn. 370, 11 L. R. A. 434; City of Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Ass'n, 87 Tex. 330. See, also, cases cited under M, Horr & Bemis Mun. Ord., §§ 127 et seq., and 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) "Ordinances." 311 Kip v. City of Paterson, 26 N. J. Law (2 Dutch.) 298; City of Hudson v. Thorpe, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 261. 312 Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318. 313 Los Angeles County v. Hollywood Cemetery Ass'n, 124 Cal. 347; Com. v. Steffee, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 161; City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. An ordinance providing for the building of a sidewalk in an uninhabited portion of the city and disconnected with any other street or sidewalk is unreasonable. State v. Freeman, 38 N. H. 426; City of Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180, 48 Am. Dec. 679; Com. v. Stodder, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 562. 314 Cosgrove v. City Council of Augusta, 103 Ga. 835, 42 L. R. A. 711; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. action of the same body.315 The amendment or repeal of existing laws may be effected directly or through the application of the doctrine of implication.316 But courts are ever disinclined to repeal by implication in determining the effect of legislation upon that already existing, and,317 unless it clearly appears from the attendant circumstances and conditions that it was the intent of the legislative body to amend or repeal 318 or unless the legislation is 315 Southern Bell Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. City of Richmond, 98 Fed. 671, affirmed (C. C. A.) 103 Fed. 31. The motives inducing the passage of a repealing ordinance cannot be inquired into by the courts in determining the question of its validity. Foster v. Police Com'rs, 102 Cal. 483; Bishoff v. State, 43 Fla. 67, 30 So. 808; First Nat. Bank of Du Quoin v. Keith, 84 Ill. App. 103, affirmed 183 Ill. 475, 56 N. E. 179; Ryce v. City of Osage, 88 Iowa, 558; Lowry v. City of Lexington, 113 Ky. 763, 68 S. W. 1109; New Orleans El. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 39 La. Ann. 127, 1 So. 434; State v. Cozzens, 42 La. Ann. 1069, 8 So. 268; Robinson v. City of Baltimore, 93 Md. 208, 49 Atl. 4. Construing acts of 1898, c. 123, § 3. A new city charter for the city Baltimore. City of Kansas White, 69 Mo. 26. of V. O'Neil v. Tyler, 3 N. D. 47, 53 N. W. 434. An ordinance which is void cannot be made valid by the passage of an ordinance amending the former. City of Philadelphia v. Bowman, 175 Pa. 91; Schmalzried v. White, 97 Tenn. 36, 36 S. W. 393, 32 L. R. A. 782. 316 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158, Fed. Cas. No. 1,559; Goldsmith v. City of Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182, 24 So. 509; Booth v. Town of Carthage, 67 Ill. 102: First Nat. Bank of Du Quoin v. Keith, 84 Ill. App. 103; Holdom v. City of Chicago, 169 Ill. 109; Larkin v. Burlington, C. R. &. N. R. Co., 85 Iowa, 492, 52 N. W. 480; City of Des Moines v. Hillis,. 55 Iowa, 643; Ritchie v. City of South Topeka, 38 Kan. 368, 16 Pac. 332; De Lano v. Doyle, 120 Mich.. 258; State v. Enger, 81 Minn. 399,. 84 N. W. 218; Inhabitants of Burlington v. Estlow, 43 N. J. Law, 13; Hutchins v. Town of Durnham, 118 N. C. 457, 32 L. R. A. 706; Knight v. Town of West Union, 45 W. Va. 194, 32 S. E. 163. 317 Goldsmith v. City of Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182; People v. Harrison, 185 Ill. 307; Thompson v. City of Highland Park, 187 Ill. 265; Franklin v. Westfall, 27 Kan. 619; City of Louisville v. Young, 23 Ky.. L. R. 1429, 65 S. W. 599; In re Bailey, 64 Kan. 887, 68 Pac. 53; Ruell v. City of Alpena, 108 Mich.. 290, 66 N. W. 49; City of Monett v. Beaty, 79 Mo. App. 315; Ruschenberg v. Southern Elec. R. Co., 161 Mo. 70; In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537; Martineau v. Rochester R. Co., 81 Hun, 263, 30 N. Y. Supp. 778; City of Erie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. 435; City of Providence v. Union R. Co.,. 12 R. I. 473. See, also, cases cited in the two following notes. 318 Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. (Del.) 479; Greeley v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174; City of Grand Rapids v. Norman, 110 Mich. 544, 68 N. W.. 269; Quinette v. City of St. Louis,. 76 Mo. 402. so clearly inconsistent and repugnant that all cannot stand, the doctrine will not be applied.319 The character of the legislation may determine the manner of repeal or amendment. Legislation may differ in its character or application either considered from the question of time involved or the importance of the subject legislated upon. An ordinance cannot be amended or repealed by resolution which is usually recog nized as a law of inferior grade.320 General laws cannot be amended or repealed by the passage of special or special grants of powers by general laws.321 The general principle applies that the legislative action which repeals or amends must be of the same grade or dignity and its passage attended with the same formalities as that required for the adoption of the laws intended to be repealed or altered.322 § 549. Agency and time of repeal or amendment. The amendment or repeal may be effected through the adoption of a constitutional amendment or provision,323 the passage of a v. 319 Stevens Stoutenburgh, 8 App. D. C. 513; Virgo v. City of Toronto, 22 Can. Sup. Ct. 447; People v. Mount, 186 Ill. 560, 58 N. E. 360, affirming 87 Ill. App. 194; Cook & Rathborne Co. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 177 Ill. 599; People v. Harrison, 185 Ill. 307; Wethington v. City of Owensboro, 21 Ky. L. R. 960, 53 S. W. 644; Smyrk v. Sharp, 82 Md. 97. But an ordinance appropriating money for the improvement of a street when an amount has been appropriated by a former ordinance is not repugnant to the former and both will stand. Lenz v. Sherrott, 26 Mich. 139; People v. Furman, 85 Mich. 110; City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045; Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Mulcahy v. City of Newark, 57 N. J. Law, 513; Treasurer of Elizabeth v. Dunning, 58 N. J. Law, 554. 320 Backhaus v. People, 87 Ill. App. 173; Hibbard v. City of Chi- V. 321 Provisional Municipality Sullivan, 23 Fla. 1; Beiling v. City of Evansville, 144 Ind. 644, 42 N. E. 621, 35 L. R. A. 272; State v. Labatut, 39 La. Ann. 516, 2 So. 550; Trustees of Erie Academy v. City of Erie, 31 Pa. 515; Knight v. Town of West Union, 45 W. Va. 194. 322 Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 256; State v. Swindell, 146 Ind. 527: 323 Mulcahy v. City of Newark, 57 N. J. Law, 513. 324 statute either general or special when the latter is not prohibited, and through the local action of a municipal council in respect to its own transactions.325 Ordinances and resolutions may be amended or repealed through the adoption of a new charter or Of such charter provisions as will effect this result,326 but the Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Robinson v. City of Baltimore, 93 Md. 208; Kansas City v. White, 69 Mo. 26; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543; In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537; Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303. 324 Wethington v. City of Owensboro, 21 Ky. L. R. 960, 53 S. W. 644; People v. Furman, 85 Mich. 110; People v. Brill 120 Mich. 42; Treasurer of Elizabeth v. Dunning, 58 N. J. Law, 554; City of New York v. Tucker, 1 Daly (N. Y.) 107; City of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 156. 325 Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158, Fed. Cas. No. 1,559; Greeley v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 174; First Nat. Bank of Du Quoin v. Keith, 84 Ill. App. 103, affirmed 183 Ill. 475; Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 256; Robinson v. City of Baltimore, 93 Md. 208; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Ullman, 137 Mo. 543; In re Hall, 10 Neb. 537; Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303; Chenango Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; City of Philadelphia v. Bowman, 175 Pa. 91; Snyder v. Palmer, 32 Wis. 406; Ashland Water Co. v. Ashland County, 87 Wis. 209, 58 N. W. 235. "The question is whether the right of the county of Ashland to be supplied with water for its courthouse and the offices therein, free of charge, survived the enactment of the ordinance of September 22, 1884. It is, no doubt, a wellsettled rule in the construction of statutes that, where a statute provides that a certain former statute 'is hereby amended so as to read as follows,' any provision of such former statute which is not found in the new statute is repealed. The rules for the construction of statutes and of municipal ordinances are the same. The object of construction is to conform the statute or the ordinance to the intention of the body enacting it. It is assumed that the enacting body intended to omit from the law those provisions of the old statute or ordinance which are not preserved and re-enacted in the new. The provision that the county of Ashland should have water for the courthouse and the county offices, free of charge, did not survive the enactment of the ordinance of September 22, 1884. Nor was that provision of the ordinance of August 18, 1884, revived by the latter ordinance of the mayor and common council of the city of Ashland. It is obvious from the language used that the intention of that ordinance was to adopt as the legislation of the city, and to confirm as it then stood, the previous legislation of the town board of supervisors of the town of Ashland relating to the supplying of Ashland with water. So far as it affects the matter in contention, it had this scope; no more." Following State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631; Goodno v. City of Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; State v. Keaough, 68 Wis. 135. 826 Goldsmith v. City of Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182; Wethington v. City of Owensboro, 21 Ky. L. R. |