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They are commonly classified into regular and special, and the powers of deliberative assemblies at such meetings in respect to legislation is limited and restricted by the character of the meeting.50 At regular meetings, all of the powers possessed ordinarily by such bodies may be exercised;51 at special meetings only such action can be taken as specified or designated in the call for the meeting.52 Statutory provisions with respect to the calling of a special meeting are considered of a mandatory nature and have been deemed necessary in order to prevent hasty, ill-advised and ill-considered legislation.53

lution fixing the time and place thereof, of which all must take notice; whereas, as to special meetings, called by the mayor, personal notice must be served in the manner provided by the charter; and as these two are the only modes provided by the charter for convening the council, a meeting assembled under any other authority, or in any other manner, would be so far unauthorized and illegal that no valid action could be taken by a mere quorum, neither would any alderman be under any obligation to take any notice of it, nor could his attendance be enforced." Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 47 N. W. 280, 9 L. R. A. 786. But a meeting irregularly called is valid if all the members of the council and the necessary officers are present and act as a body. Moore v. Pitt County Com'rs, 113 N. C. 128.

50 State v. Cumberland County Com'rs, 78 Me. 100; Lyon v. Rice, 41 Conn. 245; City of St. Louis V. Withaus, 16 Mo. App. 247.

51 Hamilton v. State, 3 Ind. 452; Kearney County Com'rs v. Kent, 5 Neb. 227.

52 People v. Carver, 5 Colo. App. 156; Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 10 So. 688, 15 L. R. A. 42; White v. Fleming, 114 Ind. 560, 16 N. E. 487.

An oral notice of a special session sufficient. See, also, cases cited in following note. Torr v. State, 115 Ind. 188, 17 N. E. 286. The presumption exists that a special meeting was legally and regularly called. See, also, City of St. Louis v. Withaus, 90 Mo. 646; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo. 543; Boyce v. Auditor General, 90 Mich. 314, 51 N. W. 457; Id., 90 Mich. 326, 52 N. W. 754, and Wayne County Sup'rs v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 106 Mich. 166, 64 N. W. 42.

Walker v. Inhabitants of West Boylston, 128 Mass. 550; City of St. Louis v. Whitaus, 90 Mo. 646. But see Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.

Smith v. Tobener, 32 Mo. App. 601. A municipal council is not limited in its action strictly to an ordinance mentioned in the call for a special meeting, but may consider generally the subject-matter involved by the ordinance. See, also, Dollar Sav. Bank v. Ridge, 62 Mo. App. 324, 79 Mo. App. 26.

53 Goedgen v. Manitowoc County, 2 Biss. 328, Fed. Cas. No. 5,501; Harding v. Vandewater, 40 Cal. 77; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214; Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 15 L. R. A. 42; Mitchell County Sup'rs v. Horton, 75 Iowa, 271; Paota & F. R. R. Co. V. Anderson County

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Place of meeting. The provisions of the law are not considered so mandatory in their character in respect to the place of the meeting of a deliberative body although it must be held at some public place of which notice must have been duly given.5

Com'rs, 16 Kan. 302; City of Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 90 Me. 71; Russell v. Wellington, 157 Mass. 100, 31 N. E. 630; Beaver Creek Tp. Board v. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528; Lewick v. Glazier, 116 Mich. 493, 74 N. W. 717; Lord v. City of Anoka, 36 Minn. 176; Forry v. Ridge, 56 Mo. App. 615; State v. Washoe County Com'rs, 22 Nev. 15, 34 Pac. 1057; People v. Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128.

London & N. Y. Land Co. v. City of Jellico, 103 Tenn. 320, 2 Mun. Corp. Cas. 704. "The result of the authorities upon the subject is that, as a general rule, every member of a municipal council is entitled to reasonable notice of special meetings and that no important action can lawfully be taken at such meeting unless such notice has first been given or unless the members not notified actually attend and participate in the business of the meeting." City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 107 Tenn. 647, 64 S. W. 1075, 61 L. R. A. 888.

Hamilton v. Tucker County, 38 W. Va. 71. But see City of Greeley V. Hamman, 17 Colo. 30, 28 Pac. 460, where it is held that the presumption is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a special meeting of the council was a legal meeting duly and regularly called by the proper officers although the record does not show in the affirmative service of notice as required by Mills Ann. St. §§ 4490, 4492. See, also, Schofield v. Village of Tampico, 98 Ill. App. 324, which holds that where all the village trustees

and president were present at a special meeting and participated in the proceedings, their action will not be held invalid because some of the provisions of the law in respect to notice of meeting may have been defective.

54 Stafford County Com'rs v. State, 40 Kan. 21, 18 Pac. 889; State v. Harris (Miss.) 18 So. 123; Harris v. State, 72 Miss. 960, 33 L. R. A. 85; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ashland County, 81 Wis. 1, 50 N. W. 937. But see on this point the dissenting opinions of Judges Winslow and Lyon. "At the annual town meeting of the town, held April 5th, 1887, a resolution was adopted to the effect that the next town meeting of the town should be held at the court house in the city of Ashland. It was lawful for the town to thus provide for holding its next town meeting in the city. The time for opening the polls at such town meeting to be so held at the court house in the city was April 3, 1888, at nine A. M. The town board met at the time and place named and adjourned to the Shores block. *** The statute provides that 'whenever it shall become impossible or inconvenient to hold a town meeting at the place designated therefor the town board of inspectors, or a majority of them, after having assembled at or as near as practicable to such place, and opened the meeting and before receiving any votes, may adjourn such meeting to the nearest convenient place for holding the same, and at such adjourned place forthwith proceed with the meeting.

The deliberations of a legislative body must be had at regular or stated intervals, and cannot be secret, either as to time or place.55

§ 506. Adjournments.

A meeting when properly called and legally organized can, if not prohibited by law, be adjourned from time to time or from place to place and the power of the legislative body at such

Upon such adjournment, the board of inspectors shall cause proclamation thereof to be made and shall station a constable, or some other proper person, at the place where such meeting was opened, to notify all electors arriving at such place that the meeting has been adjourned and the place to which it has been adjourned.' Sec. 784, Rev. St. The precise time of meeting at the court house does not appear. The court found that it was some time prior to nine A. M. That would be true, in a sense, if they met a few minutes after the previous midnight. The records in evidence show, in effect, that the meeting was after due and legal notice; that on motion it was voted that the board adjourned as inspectors to Room 15, Shores block; that the town board met pursuant to adjournment in that room; that the meeting was called to order by the chairman at nine o'clock A. M.,

that proclamation was then made declaring the polls open. Since the section of the statute quoted required the board, as inspectors, to proceed at such adjourned place forthwith with the meeting and since they did so proceed at nine o'clock A. M., it may fairly be inferred that the meeting at the court house was, at most, but a few minutes before that time. Besides, the board was composed of

officers acting under the sanction of an oath and some presumptions may be fairly indulged in favor of the legality of their action. * But it is contended, in effect, that even if the town board met at the court house at substantially the time prescribed by law, yet that it does not affirmatively appear from the findings or the records that it was 'impossible or inconvenient' to hold the meeting at that place. Manifestly, the statute did not require that it should be impossible to hold it at that place; otherwise, the words or inconvenient' would not have been used in the statute. Such words are flexible in their meaning and were necessarily addressed to the good judgment of the board."

55 But see State v. Rogers, 107 Ala. 444, 19 So. 909, 32 L. R. A. 520. "The remaining objection to the validity of the act is directed to the last clause of the seventh section: 'Nor shall any claim be passed on, or any contract awarded save when the said board and their clerk are in private.' The contention is that this clause is offensive to the declaration of the bill of rights that all courts shall be open.' * * In the making of contracts and in the audit and allowance or rejection of claims, the board is not in the exercise of judicial power nor sitting as a court. It is of peculiar constitution. It has powers which are

adjourned meeting will be full and ample to accomplish the work or transact the business which they could have legally done at the meeting from which the adjournment was taken.56 Some cases hold that such a meeting is but a part of a continuous session, and that until an adjournment is taken, sine die, it is to be considered, so far as legality of action is concerned, as one continuous session.57 At an adjourned special meeting that busi

in their nature judicial, other powers which are in their nature legislative, other powers, the powers of most frequent exercise, which are purely administrative or executive. It is in the exercise of mere administrative power in the making of contracts and in the allowance or rejection of claims. Then it bears a close resemblance to the board of aldermen of a municipal corporation or of directors of private corporations. It would, in the absence of statute, rest in its discretion, whether in the making of contracts and the audit of claims, its deliberations should be private or public. As the pecuniary interests of the citizens and of the county are brought into antagonism, there may be often manifest propriety in their deliberating in private free from all interference and from all extraneous influences. The act, it will be observed, affords no opportunity for avoiding responsibility for official action. It is only at the regular terms of the board that contracts may be made or claims allowed. A majority must concur in the making of a contract or allowance of a claim. The making of a contract or allowance of a claim is matter which will appear of record. If there is division in the board, the clerk records the vote of each member. The records of the board are public records, at all suitable times open to the inspection of any citiAbb. Corp. Vol. II -–21.

zen of the county. While the act compels the board to deliberate and act in private, it equally compels publicity of the result of the deliberations, securing official responsibility to the constituency of the board."

56 Hays v. Ahlrichs, 115 Ala. 239, 22 So. 465; State v. Rogers, 107 Ala. 444, 32 L. R. A. 520; Grimmett v. Askew, 48 Ark. 151, 2 S. W. 707. Where adjournments beyond a specified number are prohibited by law, action taken at a meeting in excess of such number is invalid.

Ex parte Mirande, 73 Cal. 365, 14 Pac. 888; Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 15 L. R. A. 42; State v. Hillyer, 2 Kan. 17; Tillman v. Otter, 93Ky. 600, 20 S. W. 1036, 29 L. R. A. 110. A charter provision is mandatory that when both boards are in session, one shall not adjourn without the concurrence of the other for a longer time than twentyfour hours. Banning v. McManus, 51 Minn. 289, 53 N. W. 635. A statutory provision that no regular session of the board of county commissioners shall continue longer than six days is to be considered as meaning not six consecutive days but six actual sessions. Ex parte Wolf, 14 Neb. 24; Magneau v. City of Fremont, 30 Neb. 843, 47 N. W. 280, 9 L. R. A. 786.

57 Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.) 309. "The record shows that this ordinance was in

ness only can be transacted as could properly have been done at the special meeting.58

§ 507. Quorum.

To prevent action that may be corrupt or hasty in its character, statutory or charter provisions require not only the presence of a required number of the total members of the body 59 but also that of certain designated officials.60 The rule is ordinarily applied that a majority of a quorum present can legally transact business, but in some instances the action only of a majority

troduced at an adjourned meeting of the council, held on the 21st of April, 1852, but it is objected that it does not appear whether this was an adjourned meeting of a special or stated meeting. If it were the former the adjourned meeting was but a continuance of the special meeting and the ordinance being introduced at such a meeting was never legally before the council." Flood v. Atlantic City, 63 N. J. Law, 530, 42 Atl. 829.

58 Rylands v. Pinkerman, 63 Conn. 176, 22 L. R. A. 653; Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.) 309.

59 People v. Harrington, 63 Cal. 257; City of Covington v. Boyle, 69 Ky. (6 Bush.) 204; City of Somerset v. Somerset Banking Co., 22 Ky. L. R. 1129, 60 S. W. 5; Bybee v. Smith, 22 Ky. L. R. 1684, 61 S. W. 15; State v. Bemis, 45 Neb. 724. The absence of the governor as an ex officio member of a board from its meetings will not invalidate their proceedings where all the other members are present. In re State Treasurer's Settlement, 51 Neb. 116, 70 N. W. 532, 36 L. R. A. 746; Outwater v. Borough of Carlstadt, 66 N. J. Law, 510, 49 Atl. 533; State v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359.

60 State v. Pinkerman, 63 Conn.

176, 22 L. R. A. 653; Gostin v. Brooks, 89 Ga. 244, 15 S. E. 361; Griffin v. Messenger, 114 Iowa, 99, 86 N. W. 219; City of Somerset v. Smith, 20 Ky. L. R. 1488, 49 S. W. 456; Bousquet v. State, 78 Miss. 478, 29 So. 399; State v. Gray, 23 Neb. 365, 36 N. W. 577; In re Dudley, 33 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. Supp. 742; Zane v. Rosenberry, 153 Pa. 38. The assignment of official duties to a person does not necessarily constitute him a member of a city council. District School Trustees v. Wimberly, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 404, 21 S. W. 49; Doherty v. City of Galveston, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 708, 48 S. W. 804; West v. Burke, 60 Tex. 51. The presence of the county judge is necessary to constitute a quorum of the county commissioner's court.

61 City of Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; People v. Harrington, 63 Cal. 257; Wilson v. Waltersville School Dist., 46 Conn. 400; Atkins v. Phillips, 26 Fla. 281, 8 So. 429, 10 L. R. A. 158; Martin v. Townsend, 32 Fla. 318; Schofield v. Watkins, 22 Ill. 66; City of Chariton v. Holliday, 60 Iowa, 391; Wheeler v. Com., 17 Ky. L. R. 636, 32 S. W. 259; Collopy v. Cloherty, 18 Ky. L. R. 1061, 39 S. W. 431; State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303; State v. Cowgill

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